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Abstract
This thesis aims to give an account of collective action. It starts with a detailed presentation of its 
underlying phenomenology. It is argued that in order to understand this phenomenology, we must 
move  beyond  the  framework  of  individual  agency; thus  rejecting  Michael  Bratman's  Shared 
Cooperative Activity  Account.  Doing so opens up  a space for Margaret Gilbert's  Plural Subject 
Theory.  Plural Subject Theory is presented as capturing this phenomenology by allowing that we 
can act  as  collective agents. However,  it  also creates  a  puzzle  centring on  the relation between 
individual autonomy and constraint by the collective will. The solution to this puzzle, this thesis 
argues,  is  to apply  Bratman's  planning  theory  of  agency  to  the  collective  agent.  In  doing  so, 
Gilbert's theory is improved,  such that it is better able to capture the sense in which living social  
lives entangles our sense of individual agentive identity with our sense of collective agentive identity. 
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“...  when  we  came  down  from  the  
mountain,  there  was  much  foolish  talk  
about  who got  there first  … All  this  was  
nonsense. And in Kathmandu, to put a stop  
to  such  talk,  Hillary  and  I  signed  a  
statement in which we said 'we reached the  
summit together'”1
Tenzing Norgay, on
reaching the summit of Everest
together with Edmund Hillary
Introduction: Social Life
ven a mundane day is likely to involve social interaction. On the occasional mornings 
when I am not caring for my children, I  like to  buy  a newspaper from the corner 
shop. Doing so requires talking to the owner, and giving her my money; money I had to 
get others to give to me. Moreover, even when I get back home and I am alone reading it, 
my interpretation of the symbols on its pages involves their meaning having been defined 
by my linguistic community. The point is that, understanding these social interactions will 
clearly play a vital part in understanding our actions. This thesis takes up a particular aspect 
E
1 Ullman, 1956, p.263.
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of this task. Our actions can be social not only in that they may involve cooperation, as in 
the cornershop interaction,  nor  only  in  the fact that  they  may  depend on the actions of 
others. Additionally, our actions can be social in the sense that we feel ourselves to be able to  
do certain things together. In this way, I will be examining what it means to say that we are 
capable of collective action.
 Because the individual has had such primacy in many inquiries into the nature of 
agency, we might think that collective action must be a mere illusion; an illusion born of 
the complexity of the way our individual wills interact. However, in examining the best 
example of such an individualist strategy,  Michael Bratman's Shared Cooperative Activity  
Account,  we  shall  see how even  this  account fails  to  capture the  essential collectivity  of 
collective action. Instead, I will argue that we should accept Margaret Gilbert's claim that 
we have the ability to act as plural subjects.2 For Gilbert, forming plural subjects involves, in 
a real sense, the pooling of individual wills to create a collective will. This is the core of her 
Plural Subject Theory.  It is the necessity of such an outlook that will form the bedrock of 
this thesis.
Gilbert supports her theory by telling a compelling story of the phenomenology of 
our social experience. The most important elements captured by her theoretical set are the 
sense  in  which  we  experience  direct  normative  pressure  to  act  in  line  with  collective  
intentions and the fact that we feel this normative pressure to be hard to escape from. For 
Gilbert, when we commit to act as a collective we form a plural subject. This means that I, 
as a part of we, will find myself to be rationally bound to play my part unless we, together, 
change our commitment.
Despite my general allegiance to the broad picture Gilbert paints, I will argue that, 
as it stands, her theory is deficient. This will become apparent when we turn our attention 
towards  the relationship  between  individual  autonomy and our  being  bound  by  the 
collective will. Untangling this issue will motivate us to find a robust way to underpin the 
nature of plural agency. I will make the case that this can be achieved by applying Michael 
2 Made most systematically in her book On Social Facts (1992).
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Bratman's  Planning Theory of Agency (which he uses to explain how individual wills can 
bind individuals) to collective action.3
Ultimately,  I  shall conclude  that a  proper  understanding  of collective  action 
requires  that  we  give  an  adjusted  form  of  Gilbert's  Plural  Subject  Theory.  We  must 
augment it by allowing that  we need not voluntarily pool our wills. Rather, our wills  can 
become  entangled merely  through our  living  social lives.  Such a modified Plural Subject 
Theory will  be shown to  fit  better  with our  actual  experiences  of  being bound by the 
collective  will; in  particular,  it  will  be  shown  to  capture  the  variation  we  feel  in  the 
costliness to our sense of identity of defection from different groups. Plural agency, as we 
shall see, is a real phenomenon but it is also a complex and messy affair.
3 Bratman, 2007. Note that this is not a use that Bratman would support, as he favours a more individualist 
account of collective action (or as he calls it shared cooperative activity). However, as we shall see, it is 
possible to separate his planning theory of agency from his stance on collective action.
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Chapter 1 – Our Collective Actions
Some of the things that we do we do alone; just now I am sitting here alone typing 
this sentence. However, we are social beings and many  of the  things that we do, we do 
together with others;  this evening some friends  and I  plan to meet up and play football 
together in the park. The former action is mine alone; the latter, however, will be one that I 
will do together with these friends. The sitting is merely my sitting, the playing in contrast 
will be our playing. This observation might be thought so obvious as to be mundane, but, 
as  with  many  issues  that  appear  straightforward,  much  philosophical  complexity  and 
controversy lurks not too far beneath the surface. This thesis will make the case that there is 
a  sense  of  doing  things  together  which  is  distinct  from a  mere  multiplicity  of  related 
individual acts – a sense I shall refer to as collective action. In exploring this phenomenon, I 
will be chiefly concerned with the work of the two philosophers who have explored it with 
most focus, Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman. Their opposing theories are the most 
developed attempts at understanding this phenomenon.
As this thesis progresses,  I will  argue that  Bratman's  Shared Cooperative Action 
Account (SCA)  is unable to give a fully satisfactory account of collective action and that 
such an understanding is possible  only  if  we accept  the  key aspect of Margaret Gilbert's 
Plural Subject Theory (PST). That is, we must understand the individuals involved as in a 
real sense pooling their agency such that together they form a plural agent. Accepting this  
does  not  require  that  we  conjure  up  any  metaphysically  suspect  separate  social  realm; 
however, it does require that we move beyond the notion that we can only understand 
agency in terms of individual  separate agents.  Such an approach, I will propose, can best 
deal with the phenomenology of collective action.
Before we can begin to criticise and construct theory, we must have a clear view of  
the target. This first chapter explores the particular characteristics of what it feels like to us 
to act together with others. I will claim that the essential elements of this experience are the 
feelings of unity, collective intentionality, detachment and constraint. This exploration of the 
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phenomenology of collective action forms the bedrock for the theoretical work that will 
follow. At the end of this chapter, I will also briefly situate the problem of understanding 
collective  action  within  the  wider  philosophical  issues  that  surround  it,  clarifying this 
investigation's underlying philosophical assumptions.
1.1 – Capturing the phenomenology of the phenomenon
Generating  examples  of  things  that  we  do  together,  in  the  sense  we  are  here 
interested in, is not a difficult task. Michael Bratman, for example, provides the following 
list, “You and I might sing a duet together, paint a house together, take a trip together,  
build something together, or run a give-and-go together in a basketball game”. 4 Similarly, 
Margaret Gilbert picks out, “... picking mushrooms together, going for a walk together and 
travelling together”.5 I shall be seeking to understand in this thesis the phenomenon that is 
common in both these lists and, as indicated above, I will use the term 'collective action' to 
refer to it – the appropriateness of this term will become apparent in what follows.6
The ease with which both Bratman and Gilbert are able to construct their lists arises 
from the everyday ubiquity of our expressing ourselves in ways that imply the existence of 
collective  action. Of  course,  as  Donald Davidson rightly  notes,  “[o]ur  ordinary  talk  is 
studded with metaphor, ellipsis, easily recognised irony, and hyperbole, not to mention 
slips  of  the tongue,  jokes and malapropisms.”7 Given this it  would be wrong to overly 
boldly assert,  without pause, that we really mean to evoke a  distinct  type of action. Such 
hesitation is,  however,  easily  overcome,  for  it  is  not  just  the  formal  structure  of  such 
sentences that points to this phenomenon, but also the actual experience, the phenomenology, 
of using such expressions and being part of the situations they describe. It is clear that when 
we use  an expression  such as “we painted  a  house”,  most  of  the  time  we  do not  feel 
4 Bratman, 1999, p.93.
5 Gilbert, 1992, p.155.
6 The choice of this term should not be taken as implying any particular theoretical outlook. There is not 
agreement across the literature on one standard term and others, such as 'joint action', 'shared action' or 
'plural action', may also be used, generally in the discussion of the work of others. Unless otherwise 
indicated, in this thesis all these terms should be all so be taken as theory neutral ways of referring to the 
same phenomenon.
7 Davidson, 2005, p.15.
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ourselves to be making a joke; nor when we say such things as “we walked to the top of the 
hill”  do we  generally  want  them  to  be  taken  as mere metaphor.  Rather,  in  most 
circumstances, we feel ourselves to be using these phrases in straightforward ways. We really  
do mean that we painted the house and we really do mean that we walked to the top of the 
hill.
Just as generating such lists is easy, grasping that the examples in them are instances  
of  a  common  phenomenon  needs  no  special  training;  it  is  an  expression  of  the 
phenomenology of our everyday social lives.  That is, it is an expression of the way things 
naturally appear to us to be. This is why Gilbert claims that “[i]n dealing with such lists the 
reader is ... not supposed to baulk at an 'and so on' at the end”,  and that  given this, the 
reader is  thought to have “...  grasped a concept or an intuitive  principle of some kind 
linking all the examples mentioned.”8 In this case, with the lists of collective actions above, 
this does indeed seem to be the case. To acknowledge that such grasping takes place does 
not imply that it is easy to explicitly express the exact necessary and sufficient conditions  
that govern inclusion in such lists. As is the case with all such everyday ways of 'carving up' 
the world, there will be some examples that we are not sure of and some examples that we 
feel to be on the fringes of exemplifying the phenomenon. However, this does not detract 
from the fact that it is easy to see that some examples clearly fit and others clearly do not.
We can focus further in on  our folk concept of  this phenomenon by considering 
examples of  kinds of  actions that do not fit; seeing what they lack will move us towards  
appreciating what the examples in question share. So let us first take my solitary action of 
sitting here at this desk, typing this sentence. This clearly is not, at least not in the context 
in play, an action of the same type as painting a house with another person or jointly going 
for a walk. It might be thought that the reason such action feels to be of a different type is 
obvious; the examples of doing things together with other people involve other people, in 
contrast, the example of my lonely typing involves just me. Doing things together, it could 
then be suggested, is easily characterised: it is just any action that involves others. However, 
the involvement of others, whilst clearly a key aspect of collective action, is not – on its own 
8 Gilbert, 1992, p.8.
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– enough to distinguish collective action from non-collective action. There  is  a sense in 
which even my solitary typing does involve others. That is, it depends for its existence on 
the actions of others. I would not be able to sit here typing on this computer if the society  
in which I live had not nurtured its invention, manufacture and distribution. Likewise, if I 
was not in receipt of some means of sustaining myself, of obtaining food grown by others 
and such like, I would not be able to spend time pondering philosophical issues. One might 
think that my activity only has the meaning it has given that I am utilising a language  
created and sustained by my society. Further, one might think that the fact that I intend for 
others to read this thesis, and engage with its content, is an integral part of my activity. We 
might say then that all (or at the very least a great many) of our apparently non-social 
activities in this sense involve others; they depend on the actions of others existing as part of 
what we might call their background.9
So, dependence on others is not enough to characterise how it feels to act together 
with others. Perhaps this is not surprising as it is a very weak sense of 'others being involved 
in  our  actions'.  A  better  candidate  for the  relevant  sense  of  'others  being  involved' is 
perhaps the stronger condition of  interdependence between acts.  That is,  the requirement 
that all the acts in question  are dependent on each other,  rather than just that  the act  in 
focus is dependent on the preceding acts in its background. In this sense, our action would 
be an interaction and the distinguishing feature of the experience of collective action would 
be the existence of interplay between the actions of multiple agents. 
Again this is taking us in the right direction, i.e. away from the isolated individual  
towards the socially integrated one. However, again, it cannot quite be the full story, for it  
to fails to exclude examples that do not naturally fit into  the lists  given  above. Take, for 
example, the drive  to the park for the aforementioned football  game that I plan to make 
9 The notion of dependence here is a wide one, and it is possible to give stronger and weaker versions of the 
idea of individual actions depending on the acts of others. The notion of what we might call 'causal' 
dependence (e.g. I could not type if food had not sustained me) seems far more straightforward than that 
of what we might call 'conceptual' dependence (e.g. my action of typing only makes sense because of 
existence of a community of speakers of a common language). The causal claim is unproblematic but, 
below in section three of this chapter, I will suggest that on some readings the stronger conceptual claim is 
at odds with the project in hand.
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tonight. This act depends on others' actions as a background condition; I could not drive  
my car if someone had not built it and,  the fact  that we are playing the game which we 
play, only makes sense given the existence of a community that sets its rules. However, my 
driving is also social in the stronger sense of involving interaction with others: to complete 
my driving action I will have to stop at the traffic lights to wait for other agents to cross and 
their actions of crossing will likewise be dependent on my stopping. In the same fashion, I 
will have to ensure that I drive at a safe speed relative to the driver in front of me and they  
will  (hopefully)  also  be  keeping  an  eye  on  my  driving  and  adjusting  what  they  do 
appropriately.  This action, then, is social in a stronger sense than the sense in which my 
solitary typing is social. While my solitary writing merely depends on others (in the two 
senses set out above), the driving involves others in the sense of my interacting with them.  
And yet my act of driving is not like playing football, it is not acting together with others in 
a way that would fit into the above lists.10
What we can say so far is that both Bratman's and Gilbert's lists of activities capture  
a phenomenon that feels to be, both in use and contemplation of, distinct from merely 
depending on others, and also distinct from actions that merely involve interaction with 
others.  Both of these types of actions might in some useful way be called social actions. 
However, collective action  is social  in a distinct and special  sense.  This strong sociality 
involves  the  additional  element  of  feeling  to  be  collective. The feel-of-collectivity has 
multiple elements and I shall explore these below. One overarching  characteristic is that 
this  phenomenon feels  not just  to involve  the  experience of  seeing  others  as  externally 
related agents,  as  in the mere  interaction discussed above; rather,  it  appears  to involve 
seeing other agents as internal to the action. What I mean by this is that the relevant agents 
are  not  experienced  as merely  performing separate,  though  mutually  interdependent, 
individual  acts.  Instead, it  feels  to  the  relevant  agents that  they are  all  together  the 
performers of a singular action. So when we sing a duet together, it is not that one person 
sings and the others are involved in  that person's doing so, nor even just that there are 
many related acts of singing; rather, it is a we that is performing an act, a we that is singing. 
Likewise, when we paint a house it is not that we are each involved in assisting the others  
10 Bratman makes a similar point with an example of two soldiers in battle (1999, p.95).
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painting (though if we are successful then this will be true) but rather that we can rightly 
say that it was us that painted the house. This is why it makes sense to distinguish, as I did 
at the start of this chapter, the act of playing football from the act of sitting alone at a desk, 
by stating that while the act of sitting is mine alone, the playing football will be our playing. 
We  may say,  then,  that  doing things together,  in the sense  embodied in the  examples 
above,  feels  to us  to be doing things as  a  singular  unit of  sorts.  This  is  what makes it 
appropriate to talk of doing things together as collective action, i.e. it presents itself to us as 
being the action of collections of people considered together as a whole .11 This is the basic and 
foundational claim of this chapter. The ability to make sense of this, what we might call the 
collectivity of acting together, will be the key test of theories that purport to describe this 
phenomenon.
In  what  follows,  I  will proceed  to  break  down  this experience  of  the  feel  of 
collectivity into the following four  elements:  unity,  collective  intentionality,  detachment 
and constraint. These, I will argue, are transparently part of our experience. While it is my 
claim that these features can be found in the way we talk about the things we do together 
with others, it is true that there are no neat phrases, least not in the English language, that 
precisely and unambiguously carve out these phenomena. This need not lead us to abandon 
the contention that understanding these features is part of our everyday conceptual toolbox, 
for, as Margaret Gilbert notes, “[w]e could possess a given concept without possessing some 
neat phrase or single term to express it.”12 Hence, though I take the names I give to my four 
elements to reflect  the common usage  of those terms, it should be understood that I am 
using  them here  explicitly  with the  senses  which I  shall I  set  out.  In order  to further 
overcome the ambiguity in everyday modes of expression I will also, on occasion,  borrow 
from Raimo Tuomela the terms 'I-mode' and 'we-mode'.13 Use of the term 'I-mode' will be 
11 As Gilbert notes (2008, p.101, footnote. 10), those who work on rational choice/game theory also use the 
term 'collective action'. However, they (rather oddly) use the term to refer to any combination of 
individual actions, even including combinations of acts that need not even be the same type of action. It 
seems fair to treat such an unintuitive usage as a peculiar technical term and separate its use in that realm 
from my distinct use here. Gilbert discusses the connections between these two ways of using the term at 
more length in Gilbert, 2007.
12 Gilbert, 1992, p.11.
13 I take my usage to be akin with Tuomela's, though I do not wish to be wedded to the framework he 
constructs around his terminology (See Tuomela, 2007, p.46-64). I also adopt the practice of italicising 
'we' (where it is used to refer to a collective) throughout the thesis to emphasise that it is not being used 
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a  shorthand way of saying that the  subject in question is a singular individual, or where 
there are multiple subjects, where these are each individually being referred to as separate 
agents.  Use  of  the  term 'we-mode' will be  a  shorthand  indication  that  the  subject  in 
question is multiple individuals being understood together as a collective. Thus,  'I-mode 
actions' refers  to  those  actions  that  are  seen  as  being  performed  by  individuals  and 
'we-mode actions' refers to actions that are seen as being performed by collectives. Where 
examples are ambiguous, I will use these terms to distinguish the sense I am interested in.
Let  me now propose  the  four examples  that  will  act  as  my canonical  cases  for 
understanding  the  collectivity  of  collective  action.  I  purposely  choose  a  diverse  set  as 
examination of the differences between them will play an important role in clarifying our 
theoretical models as the thesis progresses. My examples will be a romantic couple feeling 
bound, a climbing duo ascending a mountain, a rugby team pushing a bus and a residents' 
association campaigning about a  green space. I  will  take each example in turn as  each 
highlighting one of the features of our experience of collective action given above.
1.1.a – Unity
There is a wide sense in which the phenomenology of collective action involves an 
experience of unity inasmuch as  collective action feels to be  attributable to one singular 
thing, i.e. the collective. Unity in this wide sense exists in all circumstances where we can 
think of sets of objects as having attributes that apply to them only taken together as a unit. 
For example, it is true to say that the set of those with red hair in Sheffield would fill over 
half of a medium-sized football stadium.14 This is an attribute of this set of people and is 
not  true  of  any  single  member  of  that  set.  In  this  weak  sense  we  experience 
all-the-red-heads-in-Sheffield as constituting a unit – that is as constituting something that 
we can attribute properties to as a whole. However, there is also a narrower, and stronger, 
sense of unity: the feeling of being united, as in sharing a bond. Such a feeling may or may 
distributively. 
14 Estimate based on percentage of redheads in the UK (6%), the population of Sheffield (551,800) and the 
average size of a medium capacity football stadium (50,000)
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not  exist  in  sets  of  people  such  as  all  the  red  heads  in  Sheffield15 but  it  will  be  my 
contention that it is a necessary element of being part of a collective that is capable of 
collective action.
The kind of unity that I will claim is apparent in all examples of collective action 
can be seen very clearly in romantic partnerships, and hence here I set out the example of a 
united  couple as  an illustration of  this  phenomenon.  Romantic  partnerships  are  often 
described as  unions,  particularly  (though not necessarily)  when accompanied by formal 
decrees such as that of marriage.16 When we think about being in a  properly functioning 
romantic couple, it is clear that we think of the individuals involved as experiencing their 
relationship in terms of unity. This is a feeling of unity that is very distinct from the mere  
knowledge  that  they  share  common  characteristics  by  which  they  could  be  grouped 
together and referred to as one. It is characterised, as Gilbert has noted, by general comfort 
in use of the plural pronoun 'we', that is, by a general feeling of being united in such a way 
that plural reference is natural and ongoing.17 Of course, the reason we want,  in cases of 
being in love,  to be united with another  person  may be different to any other collective 
action. At least when love begins there is  an overwhelming desire to be  in each other's 
company, however, as love matures, the sense of the unity we have in mind here comes to 
the fore;  it  is  the unity of wanting to count yourselves as bound together.18 As  Andrea 
Westlund puts it  “... lovers form a  we in jointly constituting the subject of a variety of 
activities,  projects,  and goals,  one of which is  often the quite general  goal  of  sharing a 
life”.19
15 See next chapter for further discussion of the issue of the unity that is generated by mere set membership. 
16 See Westlund, 2008, for an illuminating discussion of love as requiring union. I explore Westlund's claims 
about love and collective action, in particular in relation to her rejection of key elements of Gilbert's 
Plural Subject Theory (PST), in the article 'Love, Plural Subjects & Normative Constraint' 
(Kisolo-Ssonko, 2012). I will return to the example of love in the final chapter of this thesis (Chapter Six), 
where I will claim that we can better understand elements of the phenomenology of love using the 
modified version of PST that I will develop in Chapter Five.
17 See Gilbert, 1996d.
18 Robert Nozick makes the stronger claim that: “Love, romantic love, is wanting to form a we with that 
particular person to be the right one for you to form a we with, and also wanting the other person to feel 
the same about you” (1995, p.234). It is unclear to me that such a claim captures the multiplicity of 
meaning we attach to the term 'romantic love'; however, it does seem clear that the actual structure of the 
committed romantic relationships that we commonly form involves becoming the kind of unit that is set 
up to engage in collective action.
19 Westlund, 2006, p.5.
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For Gilbert, the ease with which a romantic couple can refer to themselves as a we 
and with which they can share in an action, in addition to the contrasting difficulty of two 
strangers doing so, marks something important. It marks the feeling of unity which couples 
share  as that  which  is  existent  throughout  the  experience  of  collective  action. Gilbert 
stresses this very point by having us imagine a post-conference dinner where most people 
are newly acquainted with the exception of  two, Tony and Celia,  who are engaged to be 
married.  After the main course is finished  “...Tony asks Celia 'Shall we share a pastry?' 
Celia nods agreement. Then one of the other men, Bernard, turns to Celia, who is sitting 
on his right, whom he hardly knows, and asks 'Shall  we share a pastry?'”20 Gilbert, and I 
think rightly so, takes it that the invitation to share a pastry involves here more than merely 
two people each individually eating half of one pastry, rather it  is a call to  do something  
together,  namely  to  collectively  share  in  the  pastry.  In  this  context  there  seems  to  be 
something particularly  presumptuous of  Bernard's invitation as  compared to Tony's. It is 
not the intimacy of the act itself, for we can easily imagine the pastry split onto two plates 
and thus the eating of each piece not involving any close physical contact. Rather, the issue 
is that the collective act of sharing a pastry implies a level of unity that Celia and Tony are, 
being  lovers,  pre-set  up  to  be  ready  to  engage  in,  whereas  Celia  and  Bernard,  mere 
acquaintances, are not. This does not mean that Celia is not free to take up Bernard's offer. 
She can choose to perform a collective act with him, and accept the unity this involves, 
without  having  had  any  prior  relationship  with  him.  Rather,  it is  just  that  without 
preamble, Bernard’s offer seems rather forward. 
It would be wrong to claim that all collective action requires a feeling of unity that 
is linked to an emotional relationship – as it is with a romantic couple. Perhaps in arduous 
collective acts, such as the act of the mountain climbers in the example that I will explore 
below, such a bond is likely to become this emotionally strong. However, in the cases such 
as playing football  together the bond  need not be emotional at all, and  this seems even 
more likely when we look at examples of collective acts such as picking mushrooms or 
painting a house together with  strangers.  Rather,  the point is that the romantic couples 
20 Gilbert, 1989, p. 175.
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wear  on  their  sleeve,  their  bond  of  unity;  the  bond that examination  reveals to  be  a 
typification of the bond that exists for all collective actions. Love involves a feeling of unity 
that makes it an ideal set up for us being ready to share in collective actions. This reflects 
the more general point that for any set of individuals, if there is no feeling of bond at all 
between them, then it seems odd to describe any activity they are involved in as a collective 
action performed by them.
1.1.b – Collective intentionality
The  second  experience  I  will  examine  is  that  of  collective  intentionality. The 
following example illustrates the necessary inclusion of the experience of intentionality. By 
this I mean the necessary inclusion of  purposefulness  as an element of our experience of 
collective action. Further, it illustrates that this purposefulness must be directed towards the 
collective  activity,  and  in  this  sense  must  be  collective  intentionality.21 Let  us  use  a 
real-world example from 1953, the first ascent of the world's highest mountain, Everest, by 
Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay. In describing the final moment of their epic journey 
Tenzing said, “We stepped up. We were there. The dream had come true.”22 Note that he 
does not refer merely to his personal goal being achieved, but rather he refers to the dream 
that  was shared by them both;  reaching the summit is the realisation of this shared goal. 
That Tenzing should be understood as truly experiencing their summiting the mountain as 
a collective act is reinforced by the fact, noted by Philip Ebert and Simon Robertson in an 
article on the philosophy of climbing,23 that when they were asked to say who reached the 
top first, both climbers repeatedly rejected the question because they saw summiting the 
mountain as something that they had done together.24
21 I do not mean use of the phrase 'collective intentionality' to imply that it must be the collective that holds 
the purposeful attitudes, i.e. that there is a collective agent. This will be one of the points of contention in 
the following chapters.
22 Ullman, 1956, p. 265 [emphasis mine]. It is possible that the 'we' in this statement could be a distributive 
I-mode reference to multiple individuals rather than a collective we-mode reference to the group. As noted 
above, expressions in the English language are often ambiguous, particularly when considered in isolation. 
However, if considering his statement in its context, it appears clear that he does mean to make the 
stronger we-mode claim.
23 Ebert & Robertson, 2010, p.102.
24 The quote which opens this thesis, at the beginning of the introduction (see p. 1), illustrates this (Ullman, 
1956, p.263). The idea, which appears to be being expressed in that quote, that understanding the act as 
collective can be more fundamental than understanding its individual components, is something that I 
13
The element of the example above that I am interested in directing our attention to 
at this juncture is that getting to the top of Everest is a clear illustration of an intentional 
act.25 It is  obviously not something that is likely to have merely happened – unlike say, a 
stone rolling down a hill or a stream flowing to the sea. Nor is it  a simply  mechanistic 
reaction to some external stimuli, such as the triggering of the air bags in a crashing car, or 
the blinking of my eye when there is a gust of wind. In contrast to these  examples, the 
climbing of Everest was something that is done with a purpose.26 Now the general question 
of  exactly  how  we  should  understand  intentional  action,  the  necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions on the mental states of the agent and their causal relationship to the event in 
question, is the subject of much debate. Indeed, it has its own subject area: action theory. 
These  questions  do  not  need  to  be  settled  here.  However,  while  it  is  hard  to  exactly  
characterise the nature of intentionality and its role in action, it is relatively uncontentious 
that,  as  Alfred  Mele  and  Paul  Moser  put  it, “[r]emove  intentionality  altogether  from 
intentional  action,  and  you  have  mere  behaviour:  brute  bodily  motion not  unlike  the 
movement of wind-swept sand on the shores of Lake Michigan.”27 This point seems equally 
well to hold for collective action, just as it does for individual action. Of course, there may 
be borderline cases where it is hard to discern if we really have true action, such as when I 
scratch my head without thought. However, we need not know where exactly to draw the 
line to see that  getting to the top of Everest was not only clearly  an act that felt to be 
will return to in chapters Five and Six.
25 Confusingly, in action theory the term 'intentional' has a number of meanings. For the main I will be 
using it in what seems to me the most natural sense which we can roughly think of as 'with purpose or 
aim'. 'Intentional' can also be used to mean being about or representing something. There is a further 
term that is pronounced the same but spelled differently: 'Intensional' (with an s). This term is a function 
of having the truth of usage of terms represent things dependent on meaning and not just reference. 
Confusingly, all three are sometimes all relevant to single discussions for being intentional (with purpose) 
seems to involve intentional (aboutness) mental states and these seem to have the feature of being 
intensional (non-replaceable with referentially equivalent terms). For the purposes of this thesis, I can be 
taken to be using 'intentional' in the first meaning unless otherwise stated. Note that in adopting this 
preference I restrict 'collective intentionality' to a narrower meaning than philosophers such as Searle 
(1996, 2010) who takes collective intentionality to refer more broadly to any shared attitudes that are 
intentional in the aboutness sense (e.g. shared belief, shared emotion and shared intentions {in the 
narrower sense of intentions}).
26 We might equally well speak of it being done with a 'goal', or with an 'aim', or with an 'intention'. Such 
terms may well have subtly different implications and are certainly used to play different technical roles in 
certain theories. However, I will follow Gilbert (see 2006, p.122) in thinking that nothing important 
hangs on the difference between these terms, at least not at this point in the discussion. 
27 Mele & Moser, 1997, p.223.
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purposely willed but, given the extreme arduousness of the feat, it will have been one where 
the  required high strength of  will  must  have  been  very  evident  indeed.  Though other 
collective acts – such as painting a house together, picking mushrooms together and playing 
football together – may not require such high commitment, what makes these events feel to 
be actions,  as  opposed to  mere  happenings,  is  that  they  are  experienced as  having  been  
purposeful. 
So, given the above, it seems that collective action must feel to be intentional. There 
is a further question about the subject towards which this intentionality must be directed.  
This can  be  seen  by  thinking  about  the absence of  collective  action  in  the  following 
situation:  in  modern  times  the  ascent  of  Everest  has  become  a  popular  hobby  for 
hyper-wealthy tourists,  leading to  crowds of people all independently trying to reach the 
summit. Each person is intentionally trying to reach the summit; each is doing what they  
are doing (plodding along, sucking on oxygen and occasionally digging in their ice axes) in 
order to achieve this intention. Their behaviours are all I-mode intentional. This leads to it 
being the case that, as a set, they all move upwards towards the highest point.  However, 
this is not enough to be able to say that together they are summiting the mountain. There is 
something missing, something that would make them, as Gilbert puts it, “... partners and  
not just participants in the act of travelling together.”28 Part of what is missing is that the 
intentionality  in  question  is  wrongly  directed.  It  is  directed  towards  the  acts  of  each  
individual  rather  than towards  a  possible  collective  act  involving  them all  together.  In  
contrast,  Tenzing  and  Hillary,  whilst  each  of  course  likewise  performing  their  own 
individual  intentional  acts,  seem to embody something more;  they seem to be  together  
intending to reach the summit.
A last  specification we can add to the character of the intentionality, on top of it 
being pointed towards the collective, is the question of where this  intentionality must be 
seen to be realised. As we shall see, it also seems that it must – in some sense – be the group 
that is the holder of the relevant intentional attitudes. So much can be seen in considering 
the  following:  if  I  were  to  feel  that  there  was a  purpose  in  a  road being  blocked 
28 Bratman, 1999b, p.94.
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unknowingly by a crowd exiting a theatre, say that I was glad to be made late for work, this 
would not mean that they were thus performing a collective act of doing so. Just as, if I saw 
a purpose in some single stranger accidentally slipping over, then, this would not turn that 
individual’s accident into an action.  Collective intentionality must exist internally to the 
collective  action;  it  must  be  the  intentionality  of  those  agents  who  are  together  acting. 
Whether this means that each of the group members must individually hold the same aim 
for  the collective,  or  if  there  are  other ways  for  them to together  count  as  having the 
relevant collective aim, is a question that must be left until the following chapters. For now, 
before I move to the construction of a theory of collective action, we can say that, the 
intentionality feels like it must be collective intentionality inasmuch as it must be such that 
we can say of  the participants  that  they  together  assign purpose to that  which they are 
together doing.
1.1.c – Detachment
The  notion  of  collective  action,  that  is  in  fact  the  most  robust  in  the 
phenomenology of our everyday experience, is of acting together within formal frameworks  
such  as  clubs,  companies  and  even  nation  states.29 We  naturally  say  such  things  as: 
Manchester  City  won  the  premier  league;  Coca  Cola  sanctioned  the  killing  of  Trade 
Unionists in South America; and that the UK invaded Iraq. If anything it is even clearer in  
these cases than in small  scale cases  (such as  two people going for a walk)  that we are 
asserting collections of people considered together to be the performers of these actions. 
Whilst this fact is in some way acknowledged by most philosophers of collective action, its  
implications tend to be seen as peripheral, i.e. as an extension from the norm rather than as 
the strongest case. For example, Bratman says that in order “[t]o keep things simple”, he 
focuses on “... activities that involve only a pair of participating agents and are not the 
activities of complex institutions with structures of authority.”30 Gilbert takes a similar line 
saying in Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon that “... we can discover the 
nature of social groups in general by investigating such small scale temporary phenomena as 
29 Though the nature of our feeling regarding nation states tends to vary according to our political outlook, a 
point which will be explored in the final two chapters.
30 Bratman, 1999b, p.94.
16
going for a walk together.”31 That is not to say that either of them deny the possibility of 
any large and complex groups. For example, Bratman states that “[s]uch shared cooperative 
activities can involve large numbers of participating agents and can take place within a 
complex institutional framework”.32
Large and complex groups are the clearest expression of the phenomenon I will now 
be  exploring,  that  of  detachment.  However, while  the  phenomenology  of  collectivity 
becomes  stronger  when  we  focus  on macro  examples (i.e.  the  experiences  of  unity, 
collective intentionality, detachment and constraint are even more clearly felt), the problem 
is that as we scale up the groups  there is a greater theoretical temptation to  dismiss the 
reality behind these experiences – as Hans Bernard Schmid has rather memorably phrased 
it, to “... cry ontological bullshit”.33 We can leave to one side the truly massive groups for 
now – I will return to them in later chapters – as, though most keenly felt in very large 
groups, the experience of detachment exists  in all  those collectives  capable of  collective 
action.  So, let us take the  following smaller scale example: in my local area there was a 
proposal by the council to build a football facility on half of the local green and many local 
residents  objected to this,  coming together to form a group  the ‘Greenbank  Residents' 
Association’ (henceforth shortened to ‘GRA’) to campaign against this. While each of us  
who came to form this collective were united in our opposition to the development, each of 
our reasons for doing so were not identical. Some focused on the increase in traffic that the  
development would bring,  whereas others were most concerned about the loss of purely 
non-commercial space. We all agreed that the building of a clubhouse and car park would 
destroy green space that we felt should remain. In order to produce a united and effective  
campaign we concurred that whatever our personal differences we should agree on a stance 
to be taken by us collectively as the GRA. This we did by meeting together, discussing our 
various opinions, forming a rough consensus and endorsing by majority vote this consensus 
as the stance of GRA as to the ills  of the development. We also endorsed ‘stopping the 
31 Gilbert, 1996b, p.178.
32 Bratman, 1999, p.93.
33 A term used by Schmid in his talk on corporate entities at the 8th Conference on Collective Intentionality  
(the abstract for his talk can be found on CIVIII, 2012). Interestingly, in his talk Schmid discussed 
empirical data that suggests that the likelihood of rejecting the agency of large organisations varies 
between cultures. 
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development’ as the main goal of our group.  Though each of us felt we were part of the 
collective actions that followed, and we all endorsed the collective perspective that we had 
agreed as collective justification for this action, none of us felt that the group perspective  
was  the  same  thing  as  our  own  perspective.  In  this  way,  we  experienced  the  group 
perspective as something other and removed from us as individuals.  We can say then that 
we saw our perspective and the group perspective as detached from each other. As Gilbert 
puts it, collective goals “... exist at a different 'level' to personal goals.”34
The  separation  between  the  perspectives  of  the  individuals  and  those  of  the 
collectives of which they are members can be seen most clearly when we think of cases of 
compromise.  For example,  situations where each individual  puts  forward their  personal 
perspective for consideration but – through a process of discussion – a group position is  
arrived at and endorsed by a majority vote that amalgamates these perspectives but mirrors 
none of them. Further, it can be seen even more clearly in cases where the majority elect a  
small 'sub-group' to deliberate separately from the mass of members but have authority to 
set the perspective for the group as a whole. While such cases make the phenomenon of 
detachment most vivid, even in cases where the collective perspective that underlies the 
collective  intentionality  of  a  collective  action  is in  complete  harmony  with  all  of  the 
perspectives of the individuals involved, they will not be experienced as necessarily identical. 
Rather, the possibility of them coming apart will always be there. This is what I understand 
as  the  experience  of  detachment;  it  includes  both  the  experience  of  actual  difference 
between perspectives  and also the experience of the  mere potentiality of  such difference 
arising.35
1.1.d – Constraint
The final key aspect of our experience I am interested in is a phenomenon which 
makes entering into the unity of collective action something that is not always comfortable. 
34 Gilbert, 2006, p.123.
35  This line of argument takes its inspiration from Gilbert's various examples where she raises the possibility 
of difference between the sum of individual perspectives and the group perspective. See for example (Gilbert, 
1987, p.190) where she discusses a poetry group forming a collective position on the aesthetic judgement of a 
poem. I expand on use of the term harmony in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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It is the fact that we experience collectivity as constraining what we – as individuals – can 
rightfully do. The possibility of constraint, as we shall see, flows from the fact, discussed 
above, that the collective intentionality of collective action is experienced as being detached 
from each individual's personal perspective.  This means that there is a possibility that they 
can be involved in collective actions in which what they – as individuals – intend to happen 
does  not  align  with  what  everyone  together  –  as  a  collective  –  intends to  happen. In 
situations such as these, the purpose of collective action, and that which must be done by 
the  individual  in  order  to play  their  proper  part  in  the  collective  achievement  of  this,  
appears to that individual as an  external burden;  i.e.  something that they do against their  
individual will.
Take the following example:  the East Midlands rugby club, the 'Leicester Tigers', 
are on their way to a match against their northern rivals, the 'Newcastle Falcons' and their  
coach breaks down at the bottom of a hill. Knowing that there is a garage at the top of the  
hill, the Leicester Tigers form the collective aim to together  push their bus up the hill. 
Here, it seems that each player is obliged to put their back into it and participate in getting 
their bus to the top of the hill. Further, this obligation does appear to stem from their team 
membership. So much can be seen by imagining the following  example: suppose that a 
bystander, Sue, sees the collective endeavour that the rugby team are engaged in, and offers 
to help. Imagine that, Sue starts pushing the bus but after half an hour she says that she has 
to leave (perhaps because she is late for another engagement). Suppose that, in response the 
flanker  Bob also  stop  pushing and says, “If Sue's stopping then I don't see why I should 
continue!” Such behaviour might elicit all kinds of responses from the team captain, some 
too  rude  for  print.  However,  it  would  be  unsurprising  if  the  content  of  his  response,  
whatever its tone, included the fact that Sue is not part of the team and thus is at liberty to 
make her own mind up when to continue or stop. Bob,  in contrast, does not have this 
liberty; he ought to do what they agreed to do together.  It feels  to be important that we 
make sense of our criticism of Bob by reference to the collective aims of the group to which 
he belongs – Bob faces pressure to play his part in what the team intends to do, regardless 
of  his  personal  preference,  because  he  is  a  team member.  In  this  sense  he  feels  to  be 
constrained by the collective perspective.
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The scenario just painted might strike those who have ever taken part in an arduous 
collective task (and I imagine pushing a bus up a hill is an arduous task indeed) as far too 
harmonious. In the picture painted above the participants accept the collective goal and try 
to achieve it.  However,  complexities  arise  when we consider what happens if  there  are 
competing  visions  of  what  the  team  should  do.  Imagine,  for  example,  that  after  the  
endeavour has gone on for half an hour the team captain, Jim, calls a stop to the activity.  
“This is far too risky to our health”, he might say, “we should stop!” The team manager 
might take a different view and a row might break out. The dynamics of such conflicts, and 
our experience of  them, will  form an important  part  of  my examination of  competing 
visions of the nature of collective action in coming chapters. For now we need just note 
that  the  possibility  of  such  conflicts  does  not  point  to  the  non-existence  of  collective  
constraint, but rather it is an affirmation of its existence; if each individual experienced no 
such constraint,  they  would merely  experience  themselves  as  going along or  not  going 
along.  They  experience  themselves  as  rebelling  and  their  co-participants  experience 
themselves  as  having the  standing to rebuke  them for  such rebellion  because  they  feel 
themselves to be grappling with the constraint of the collective perspective.
 
1.2. – The phenomenological state of play
So a summary of where we have come so far:  we can easily generate examples of 
acting together in a strong sense, and for the sake of clarity we can refer to this as collective  
action. Our phenomenal experience of our social lives presents collective action as a distinct  
kind of social action,  distinct in its sociality from merely relying on others or interacting 
with them. Further, it presents collective action as involving:
Unity – the feeling of being bound as one
Collective  
Intentionality – the feeling of purposefulness at the level of the collective
Detachment – the  feeling  of  separation between the  individual  perspective and the collective perspective
Constraint – the  feeling  of  being  under  the  command of the  collective perspective
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A note of caution concerning the strategy of using the phenomenology described 
above as a test which a successful theory of collective intentionality must pass: it is not 
always  easy  to  disentangle  one's  assessment of  how things  appear  from  the  theoretical 
positions that one holds about the subject in question. Thus, I accept that there is no such 
thing as a completely plain presentation of the phenomenology. With this in mind, it may 
be best not to see the four elements of the experience of collective action, set out above, as 
being set in stone tests for theories to pass, but rather as signs pointing towards the kind of  
theory  that  would be  adequate.  On this  picture,  the  final  test  of  a  theory  will  not  be 
whether  it necessarily generates these phenomena, rather  it will be whether it can make 
sense of them within a broad theoretical framework that is both coherent and fits with our  
wider  understanding.36 In  introducing  the  terms  'collective  action' and  'collective 
intentionality', it might be thought that I have already ruled out individualist readings of 
the  phenomena  of  doing  things  together.  I  am  claiming that  we  must  say  that  our 
experience presents the social world to us as seeming to involve collective acts.37 However 
this does not rule out the individualist possibility that we can ultimately reduce the process 
that produces this experience to a complex interaction between individual acts – i.e. it does 
not rule out that the collective element is a kind of illusion. That said, I do take it that I 
have ruled out  the following approach:  it  might be  thought that a commitment to the 
primacy of individual agency  means that we should look to combinations of individual 
actions as the  starting point for investigation.  The problem with doing this is that it risks 
losing sight of the actual data  that we should be explaining; it risks  losing sight of our 
actual experience of the social world.
In the following chapter, I will look at what kind of account of collective action we 
need to be able to meet the challenge of explaining these experiences. In particular, I will 
36 This will be why, though I will use the phenomenology presented here to motivate my rejection of 
Bratman's SCA account (Chapter Two) and my preference for Gilbert's PST (chapters Three and Four), I 
will ultimately propose that the stronger support for PST over SCA comes from the possibility of aligning 
Gilbert's theory with a wider account of agency (chapters Five and Six).
37 I thus stand in opposition to philosophers such as Michael Keely who, in his paper 'Organizations as 
Non-Persons', presents the idea of 'collective action' as a kind of mystical philosophical thinking invented 
by philosophers to try to make sense of corporate responsibility, but, in fact, counter to the common sense 
view (Keeley, 1981).
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put Bratman's shared cooperative action account to the test. Before I begin this, however, a 
survey of the context surrounding the philosophical investigation of collective action will  
help us further get our bearings as to this investigation's starting point.  I will give some 
reasons why we might think that collective action, as I have characterised it here, is an  
important part of our social life.
1.3. – Why should we care?
So the phenomenology of our everyday social lives presents collective action to us as 
involving a real sense of being united together as a we. That's all well and good, but why 
should we care about this? Well, we might think that understanding a phenomenon that is 
embodied in our everyday experience is an important enough philosophical end in itself. 
Putting  this to  one  side,  there  are  wider  philosophical  issues, topics  that philosophers 
already care about, that are affected by our understanding of the nature of collective action. 
It is not possible to give an exhaustive list of possibly related issues here, especially before 
we have a full theoretical account of the phenomenon in question. However, in this section 
I will outline of some of the wider questions about society and our social lives that are  
related to the question of the character of collective action. I will be returning to some of 
these topics at the end of this thesis, to ask what the particular conception of collective  
action I develop has to say about them,  and I  will return to the others as future avenues 
with which to continue my research.
Arguably the idea that there is an important sense in which we do things together,  
and that we should care about understanding this, can be found lurking beneath the surface 
of much historical philosophy. For example, when Rousseau in The Social Contract talks of 
such things as men “...uniting their separate powers” such that they “... are directed by a  
single motive and act in concert”,38 it is possible to read him as advancing a theory of what  
it  means for  individuals  to  act  together,  as  well  as  a  political  theory  about  the  moral  
legitimacy of such unions. No doubt a  historical  survey of the importance of collective 
action in different philosophical  movements  would throw up many such examples  and 
38 Rousseau, 2004, p.14.
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would be a valuable endeavour. Unfortunately, while it is possible to interpret many works 
as  making reference  to collective  action,  these  references  are  mostly  deeply  buried and 
uncovering them would require exegetical work beyond the scope of this thesis. Given this,  
this  thesis will  mostly  be directed at  the modern move towards  a focused and analytic 
analysis  of  collective  action.  While  there  is  some work in the  1970s  that  matches  this 
criterion, such as Rolf Gruner's 1976 piece 'On The Action of Social Groups', in which he 
noted that philosophical work on “... what kinds of entities can and what kind cannot be 
said to act has hardly been considered”,39 most of the developments have taken place within 
the very recent emergence of the subject area that has been dubbed 'Social Ontology'.40 As 
stated above, I will be most closely interested in the work of Margaret Gilbert and Michael 
Bratman. However, in terms of the question of the wider implications of an understanding 
of collective action, it is important to acknowledge the role of John Searle. It was Searle's 
2001 plea for “... a branch of philosophy that in English speaking countries does not yet 
exist ... centring especially around questions of social ontology”41 that can be thought of as 
setting  the  tone  of  much  of  the  debate  and  as  popularising referring to it  as  social 
ontology.42
Searle's main interest in  social ontology is  in  seeking to understand the sense in 
which social  facts  are  about real  things;  he thinks both that  they  are  and that  we can 
understand this by seeing them as being constructed by collective acts. Searle believes that if 
we look at the social world we find “... a class of entities that are objective, such as money 
and nation states.” They are objective because “[i]t is not just a matter of my opinion, for 
example, that this piece of paper is a twenty-dollar bill; it is a matter of objective fact”. 
However the puzzle is that “... these institutional facts exist only because of our subjective  
39 Gruner, 1976, p.443 Also of note as an early example of the kind of focused work on collectives that I will 
be focusing on is Anthony Quinton's “Social Objects” (1975/1976) and David Copp's “Collective 
Actions and Secondary Actions” (1979).
40 Though note that this area is still sufficiently neglected for Christian List and Philip Petit to remark, in a 
similar fashion to Gruner, that “Despite their foundational place, however, the questions have received 
surprisingly little attention in recent philosophy and the methodology of the social sciences.” (2011, p.2).
41 Searle, 2001, p.15. In further work Searle makes the bold claim that “It is an odd fact of intellectual 
history that the great philosophers of the past had little or nothing to say about social ontology [e.g.] such 
figures as Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, as well as Quine, Carnap, Strawson, and Austin” (p.6, 2010)
42 Gilbert gives a useful survey of the initial emergence in the late 1980's and 1990's of this “important new 
turn” (as she calls it) in her Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social 
Phenomena (2008).
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attitudes”.43 How can we understand this apparent objective/subjective  duality of  social 
facts? Well, for Searle, the solution is that the social world presents itself to us, as individual 
agents,  as  being  objective  because  it  is  not  the  product  of  the  subjective  attitudes  of  
individuals, but rather of collective action. Because of this, facts about it are experienced, by 
each member of the society, as being what Searle calls 'epistemically objective' – that is their 
truth is not up to any singular agent to decide – but they remain 'ontologically subjective' – 
that is, their truth is up to us together.44 So what does it mean for something to be 'up to 
us'? The story Searle tells is that it is a matter of us doing something together, namely of us 
collectively assigning status functions. So, for example, that David Cameron is the Prime 
Minister is a matter of us together assigning the status function of Prime Minister  to his 
person. It is a matter, so to say, of a collective act of assigning that status function to him. 
The apparent objective/subjective duality of social facts arises then because the social world  
is a product of collective action. Clearly then, if we are to understand the social world in 
general, we are going to have to first understand the nature of collective action.
We can say more; the assumption is that social life is not just created by us in some  
accidental way as the mere result of our behaviour, in the way a valley is created by the  
mindless passing of water along a river. Rather the social world is thought to be created, or 
at least in large part, by what is going on in the minds of the people who are its members.  
In this sense,  social  ontology is  what Gilbert calls  an intentionalist  project.45 That is,  as 
Schmitt puts it, social ontology assumes that “... collectivity phenomenon like groups, joint 
actions, and joint attitudes must be characterised in part in terms of intentional attitudes 
and their contents.”46
43 Searle, 2010, p.18.
44 Searle, 2010.
45 Gilbert, 1992, p. 128.
46 Schmitt, 2003, p.22. It is important not to confuse the project of examining the construction of social 
facts with the, superficially similar, philosophical project of social constructivism. Searle devotes a whole 
chapter to dismissing social constructivism (1996), as does Gilbert (1992). Social constructivism makes 
the claim, as Goldman puts it, that “... truths or facts are not in or of the world; they are not ‘out there’ to 
be discovered but are mere social fabrications or constructions” (Goldman, 2010, p.3). As Schmitt notes 
this theory is “... incompatible with the claim that intentional attitudes and their contents depend 
conceptually on collectives. For the two together give rise to a circularity in the characterisation of 
collective phenomena.” (2003, p.22). Denial of social constructivism is not to deny the obvious truth that 
our actions (both individual and collective) often are dependent on the prior actions of other individuals, 
as explored above with the example of my solitary typing. However, unless we can make sense of the 
formation of individual intentional attitudes separate from already understanding collective attitudes we 
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So,  understanding  collective  action  looks  like  it  is  going  to  be  important  for 
understanding the ontological  status of  the  social  world,  that  is,  for  understanding the 
structure  of  the  social  world.  A  further  way  that  it  may  well be  important  is  in 
understanding the interactions between agents that occur within this structure. This is most 
clear in the case of considering the rationality of the actions that take place within social  
settings. Famously, Hume described the following dilemma involving two farmers:
“Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow 'Tis profitable for us both 
that I shou'd labour with you today, and that you should labour with me 
tomorrow. I have no kindness for you, and know that you have little for me. I  
will not, therefore, take any pains on your account and shou'd I labour with 
you on my account, I know that I shou'd be disappointed, and that I shou'd 
in vain depend on your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone: You 
treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our  
harvests for want of mutual confidence and security.”47
The problem is that to secure the best outcome for both of them each farmer must 
trust the other. However, whoever goes first will know that the most rational thing for the 
other to then do will be to renege on the deal and refuse to do their part. The generalised 
version of this problem is known as the dilemma of rational cooperation: in its most broad 
form it asks, “how can we make rational sense of a cooperative society if rationality would 
always have the agent defect when it is in their interest to do so?” Now, there have been  
many attempts to solve this problem. Some of these do so by changing what has been called 
the 'pay off structure' of the different options. This means changing the examples such that 
the value that each agent places on the different outcomes makes it rational for them to 
cooperate, for example, by introducing moral feelings that make it so that any agent who 
fails to cooperate will feel so bad at having harmed the other that this outweighs any benefit 
they might gain from failing to play their part. However, one might feel dissatisfied with a 
solution that requires changing the individual pay-off structures, as it feels as if there ought 
to be a way for agents to count as rational in cooperating even with the pay-offs as they are. 
One interesting solution, from the perspective of our current investigation, which seems to 
might fear that we will end up with a vicious circle.
47 Hume, 1739, book III, part II, Section 5.
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work without  simply changing the pay-offs,  is  presented by Martin Hollis  in his  book 
'Trust  Within  Reason'  –  he  calls  it the  “team solution  to  the  problem of  trust”.48 His 
solution is, on face value, brilliantly simple: “The farmers both get their harvests in if they 
can trust one another to play as a team”.49 If we imagine the farmers seeing themselves as 
each participating in performing the collective action of harvesting all of the corn, then it is  
clear that from the collective perspective what is rational will be each agent 'playing their 
part', for  that  is  what  is  needed  to  complete  the  collective  goal.  The  viability  of  this 
solution, and the question of the relation between the individuals and their team can only 
fully be addressed if we can answer the question of the nature of collective action.50
Trust is clearly an important aspect of social interaction. This is also true when we 
think about epistemic interaction, that is, when we think about gaining knowledge from 
the testimony of others.  When we learn things by being told them by other agents, there 
seems  to  be  something  importantly  different  going  on  compared  to  when  we  acquire 
knowledge from the information gleaned from non-agentive mechanisms, such as a reliable 
clock or thermometer.  Trusting an agent  appears  to have a distinct epistemic character 
from  taking  a  non-agentive  device  to  be  a  reliable indicator.  The  relevance  of  the 
investigation of collective action to this area of epistemology is that, as Miranda Fricker has 
pointed out, we do  not just  trust in the testimony of other people but also in that  of 
collectives.51 That  is,  we  treat  the  apparent  pronouncements  of  groups,  particularly 
institutions,  not just  as  signs pointing thermometer-like towards possible  truths but we 
treat such pronouncements as collective acts of telling – to be believed (or not), rather than 
simply as being relied upon (or not). The fact that we understand collective testimony thus 
is arguably an important part of our taking ourselves to have the kind of socially mediated 
knowledge that we generally take ourselves to have, for example, that I take myself to have 
come to know that Iran sent a monkey into space through trusting the BBC's report that 
this  was  the  case.52 It  may  also,  as  Fricker  claims,  thus  be an  important  part  of  the 
48 Hollis, 1998, p.137. Team solutions are also explored by Sugden,1993 and Bacharach, M. 2006.
49 Hollis, 1998, p.137 [emphasis mine].
50 As Hollis notes, one particularly thorny question is: “Does success mean that the farmers have chosen 
rationally or the team has?” (1998, p.142).
51 Fricker, 2012.
52 BBC, 2013.
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functioning of a democratic society.53 However, all this  is predicated on the possibility of 
making sense of collective testimony. If we can understand collective action, then we will 
be able to get a handle on the possibility of the collective act of telling. The understanding of 
collective  action  we come to  have  will  affect our  understanding  of  the testimony  and 
trustworthiness of collectives and the relation of these to the testimony and trustworthiness 
of the individuals who are part of such institutions.
The most ambitious use of understanding of collective action, which can be seen as 
an extension of the team solution to the problem of trust perhaps, is Gilbert's attempt in  
On Political Obligation to try to make sense of the political obligations we have, in terms of 
being part of collective acts at the state level. She also extends this to the possibility of our 
feeling collective guilt over the acts of the states we belong to.54 In doing this, we can see 
her as trying to complete Rousseau's project of understanding the foundations of political  
society.  However, while  Rousseau  starts with  political  analysis,  Gilbert starts  from  an 
understanding of what it is for agents to act together. I think that Gilbert is right to believe 
that her account of collective action ought to be able to be extended to the scale of state 
actions. However, some of the things she says seem to go against our general experience of 
political obligation, and I will later argue that our experience of political obligation is better 
explained  by  the  modified  Plural  Subject  Theory  that  I  will  attempt  to  construct  in 
chapters five and six. 
1.4 – Chapter Summary
In this chapter I have tried to capture the phenomenal experience of doing things 
together, in the sense that is implied by sentences such as, “We painted the house”, “We 
went on a walk”, “We summited Everest” and “We booked the holiday”. I have argued that 
the things described in these sentences are best  referred to as 'collective actions' because 
53 She says that, “[w]ithout [the] possibility of institutional testimony, and the second-personal relations of 
trust that are required for it, the democratic ideal of how institutions make themselves accountable to the 
citizens they serve, and the collective understanding of what is at stake in institutional truthfulness, would 
be very much diminished.” (2012, p.28).
54 Gilbert, 2006. This extended discussion of political obligation is foregrounded by her earlier short sketch 
of the same position. (1996e)
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they present themselves as being performed by collections of people considered together as 
a  unit;  furthermore,  that  they  involve  a  feeling  of  being  bound as  one,  the  feeling  of 
purposefulness at the level of the collective, the feeling of separation between the individual  
perspective  and  the  collective  perspective  and  the  feeling  of  being  constrained by  the 
collective perspective.  The question I will move onto in the next chapter is that of what 
theoretical framework we can use to make sense of this phenomenology.
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Chapter 2 – Mere Sums
The term 'collective action' is sometimes used in a narrower sense than I have been 
using it here, to refer particularly to actions such as industrial disputes that seek to defend 
the interests of large groups of workers.55 However, as we have seen, there is a wider sense 
of the term that refers to any act which is performed jointly with others. In the last chapter, I 
established that collective actions of this type share  the fact that they are  experienced as 
involving the  following  phenomenological elements:  a  feeling  of  being  bound  as  one 
(unity); a feeling of purposefulness at the level of the collective (collective  intentionality); a 
feeling  of  separation  between  the  individual  perspective  and  the  collective  perspective 
(detachment);  and  a  feeling  of  being  under  the  command of  the  collective  perspective 
(constraint).  I take these four experiences to delineate the sense in which collective action 
feels to be strongly  collective.  That is, the sense in which it  is experienced as a  we-mode, 
rather than an I-mode, phenomena. 
Let us imagine that it is  a  typical sunny English summer's day and two walking 
companions are setting out to walk together to the top of Scafell Pike.56 According to the 
picture I have painted, these two ramblers will feel themselves to be united as a pair with 
the collective aim of getting to the summit. At the same time, however, each will also feel 
that this collective act is something they are individually detached from and something that 
can potentially constrain them. Of course, noting how things are experienced as being does 
not necessarily tell us how they actually are. In this chapter, I will shift from setting out the 
phenomenology of collective action to examining its substantive ontology; that is, to asking 
how we might best understand the actual structure of collective action  that  underlies its 
appearance. I will begin by setting out some theoretical considerations that might incline us 
towards what I will call the framework of individual agency. This framework restricts us to 
individualist  accounts;  that is,  it restricts us  to accounts that seek to reduce the apparent 
we-modeness of collective action to a sum of individuals' I-mode characteristics.  Such an 
55 Additionally, as noted in the last chapter (see footnote 11), it is also used in a completely different sense 
by game theorists.
56 A modified form of Gilbert's example (1996, pp. 177– 94).
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approach faces a  number  of  challenges  that motivate  modification of  the  simple 
individualist account. This modification leads to a more complex version of summativism, 
one that allows the activity component of collective action to be joint, but still claims that 
the intentional character of collective action is given by the sum of the intentions held by 
individuals. Further modifications will be needed to deal with what I will call the problem 
of control. This problem centres around the question of how joint activity can be jointly 
under the control of  multiple individuals. I  will  explore why we might think that such 
control is a necessary part of collective action; why it could be problematic to conceive of 
multiple  individuals  as  having  such  control;  and  I  will  consider Bratman's  Shared  
Cooperative Activity (SCA) account as a solution to this problem. I will also explore the fact 
that for Bratman the nature of  the 'interdependence of purpose' (that is at the heart of 
collective action  on his view) implies a commitment to the joint activity and to mutual 
support in achieving it.
On Bratman's SCA account, collective action consists of joint activity governed by 
the compatible and interdependent plans of the individual group members.57 In addition, 
on  this  account this  interdependence  must  be  common  knowledge  to  these  group 
members.58 So, for example, for us to jointly walk to the top of a hill is for us to satisfy the 
following conditions: we must engage in the activity of jointly walking up the hill; this joint 
walking must be led by our individual plans to so walk; and our following of our own plans 
must be both in accordance with and because of the (commonly known and compatible) 
plans held by both of us to so walk.  By requiring that our plans are compatible, Bratman 
does not mean to say that they must match. Rather, as he puts it, just that they must mesh. 
That is, that they fit together not only at surface level but also at the level of the subsidiary 
plans.59 For example, if one of our walkers intends that they together walk up the hill using 
the high path and the other has the aim that they use the low path, then there can be no 
collective act,  for such activities are not co-possible. However, it is  unproblematic if one 
57 This account is explored throughout Bratman's work, but see in particular 1999b, 1999c, 1999d & 
forthcoming.
58 In this context, the term 'common knowledge' has a meaning that is more specific than, but related to, its 
common use. Its exact use here is explored below.
59 By subsidiary plans, it is meant the additional plans we must make to fulfil our main goal.
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intends that they walk slowly and the other intends that they admire the flora along the 
way, as these plans are not in conflict.
The conclusion of these investigations will be that,  by requiring complex ties of 
intentional cooperation and inter-reliance, Bratman's SCA manages, within an individualist 
framework, to give partial explanation for aspects of the feeling of collectivity. However, I 
will claim that, hampered by this framework, it fails to explain the richly collective nature 
of our experience of collective action.  In particular, it struggles to give an account of our 
experiences of detachment and of constraint.  In highlighting the limitations of Bratman's 
account, my goal is not to provide a knock-down argument against any possible summative 
account.  Rather,  my goal is to expose the weaknesses inherent  in such accounts, in order 
that I will be in a position to argue that a non-summative account can do better. In doing 
this, I seek to open up the space for an account that takes  our experience of collectivity 
seriously,  namely  Margaret Gilbert's  Plural Subject Theory – a task I will take up in the 
following chapter (Chapter Three).
2.1 – The framework of individual agency
A seemingly straightforward explanation, for the collective aspects of our experience 
of collective action, is the claim that it arises from such action being the action of a distinct 
and separate  collective  agent.60 The problem with such a claim is that  it  is immediately 
vulnerable, as Thomas Smith says, to “... an accusation of metaphysical extravagance”.61 Do 
we really want to invoke, as John Searle puts it, “... some Hegelian world spirit, a collective 
consciousness,  or  something  equally  implausible”?62 If  we  resist  any  literal  notion  of 
otherworldly collective spirits, then an alternative way to read such a proposal is in terms of 
what we might call the  organic thesis. According to this thesis,  just as individual human 
beings  are  organisms  that  arise  from the  combination  of  molecules,  social  entities  are 
60 Margaret Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory, which I will be examining in the following chapter, also claims 
that there is a collective agent. However, as we shall later see, it differs from the account in question, as it 
does not claim that this agent is a separate social organism. The rejection of the thesis that follows (the 
organic thesis) is thus not a rejection of Gilbert's proposals.
61 Smith, 2005, p.76.
62 Searle, 1996, p.25. When presenting this account of collectivism to my peers, those who study Hegel tend 
to reject that he held any crude notion of a separate world spirit.
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organisms that arise from the combination of individual people. Along these lines, when we 
talk,  as in one of the examples  from the last chapter, of the Leicester Tigers' pushing  of 
their bus up the hill, we are invoking a singular action of a singular creature – the action of 
an organism called 'The-Leicester-Tigers'.
Such an explanation  has  some minimal  plausibility, in particular when looking at 
the actions of  formal  organisations,  such as  sports clubs. However,  as  Andrew Vincent 
notes, “[i]t is difficult to find theorists who actually take the organic thesis with complete 
seriousness, in the sense of actually identifying groups as organisms.”63 While it might be 
arguable that  groups can count as  having some of the kinds of properties  attributed to 
organisms – such as being responsive to external stimuli, being capable of reproduction and 
growth, and maintenance of homoeostasis64 – at best this might mean that a case could be 
made that they mirror simple creatures, such as bacteria. It seems doubtful that they might 
be the kind of organisms that can perform complex intentional actions.65 Actions such as 
planning holidays, climbing the world's highest mountain, moving buses to places where 
they can be fixed, and opposing development of prized green land, all seem to require such 
a complexity of mental representation  that it is hard to imagine could be independently 
realised by the structure of a group considered as a separate organism.
Even if  there  were  no  difficulty  in  identifying  groups  as  the  kinds  of  complex 
organisms  independently capable  of  complex  intentional action,  the  organic  thesis  goes 
against the spirit of our understanding of the relation between individuals and collectives, 
as set out in the preceding chapter. The notion of a separate social organism is at odds with 
the  underlying  assumption  of  intentionalism  that underpins  the  current  study. 
Intentionalism, as we can recall from the previous chapter,66 is the idea that social facts are 
63 Vincent, 1989, p.698.
64 It is worth noting that the idea that a collective could be an organism is not ruled out merely by the fact 
that it would be an organism composed of parts that themselves count as organisms. Indeed, the human 
body contains trillions of micro-organisms and they outnumber human cells by 10 to 1, though being 
much smaller they only take up 1 to 3 percent of the body's mass. (National Institute of Health, 2012).
65 Whether something is complex is, of course, relative. My action of taking the milk from the fridge to put 
in my tea might not be considered complex compared to the act of playing the violin, say. However, in 
comparison to an earthworm's moving away from the light, it is indeed complex. I use the phrase 
'complex intentional action' with the second kind of comparison in mind.
66 See Chapter 1, section 1.3.
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generated from the intentional  attitudes and behaviour of individuals.  Collective action – 
we can also recall from the last chapter – appears to be the foundation of social fact. That 
is, it appears to be the mechanism through which social facts are generated. If we were to 
explain collective action by evoking a separate agent, then it would follow that social facts 
are not generated by the intentional attitudes and behaviour of individuals, but rather that 
they are generated by  the distinct  intentional attitudes and behaviour of this mysterious 
collective organism. Further, if we adopted the organic thesis, we would have a puzzle as to 
how  individual  agents  would  relate  to  this  separate  organism.  Why,  for  example,  if 
individuals were mere parts of some greater organism with mental attributes of its own, 
would individuals experience such a separate entity as constraining upon them, in the sense 
set out in the last chapter?  While such worries do not rule out the organic thesis, paired 
with the concerns about complexity expressed above, they certainly make it an unattractive  
research avenue. 
If the organic thesis is unattractive, then what is the alternative? In the next chapter 
(Chapter Three) I will claim that, in Margaret Gilbert's writings, we can find an account of  
a collective agent that does not require the existence of a separate social organism. In this 
chapter, however, I want to explore another possibility; that is, the claim that the apparent 
collectivity  of  collective  action  is  generated  by  the  mere  sum  of  individuals and their  
individual attributes. Consider a group of leaves caught in the wind; as they fly around they 
appear to have unity, to move as one. There is an apparent collectivity to their movement; 
however,  clearly  this  apparent collectivity is  an illusion.  The movement  of  each leaf  is 
independent from the movement of the other leaves. They merely follow similar courses 
driven by the invisible wind. The simplest individualist account of collective action is one 
that makes its explanation akin to the explanation of the unity of these wind swept leaves. 
It  would state that, whilst there is an appearance of action occurring in the  we-mode, all 
there really is, is a set of I-mode actions related to each other, in such a way as to give rise to 
the appearance of collectivity.
This analogy is obviously only partial. There is much that is different between our 
experience  of  the  apparent  collectivity  of  the  mass  of  leaves  and the  experience  of  the 
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apparent collectivity of collective action. As the detailed exploration of the phenomenology 
of  collective  action  in  the  last  chapter  shows,  the  collectivity  of  collective  action  is 
multifaceted. While the leaves are externally  perceived  as belonging to a singular moving 
unit, true collective actions involve the agents internal to them having robust experiences of 
unity,  collective  intentionality,  detachment  and constraint.  Further,  while  the  apparent 
unity of the leaves can be explained easily, the apparent collectivity of the romantic couple, 
the mountain climbers,  the residents' association and the rugby team  is  not  so easy  to 
dismiss. All of which is not to say that a reductive strategy is impossible, rather just that it 
will not be straightforward.  However, there are some reasons why we might think that  at 
least attempting such a reduction is worthwhile,67 and I will explore these in what follows.
An account that seeks to reduce  we-mode action to a sum of I-mode actions  is a 
simpler  kind of account because it posits  fewer types  of actions  than one that takes the 
we-mode at  face  value. Rather  than  allowing for  two  types  of  action – individual  and 
collective – such an account says that there is only one real type of action – individual. That 
a simpler account is to be preferred follows from an ontological version of Occam's razor; a 
theory that posits fewer kinds of things is, all else being equal, to be preferred to one that 
posits more. Of course, whether all else is equal is exactly what is up for dispute; however, 
the principle suggests that we would do well to at least start with the simplest account  
possible. As it stands, this is not motivation enough to follow a reductive strategy. This is 
because complexity can be measured in many different ways and there is a sense in which 
collectivist  explanations  are simpler.  As  Christian List  and  Philip  Petit  say,  such 
explanations  have  “...  greater  descriptive  and  explanatory  parsimony”;68 that  is,  they 
straightforwardly explain apparent collectivity with no need for reduction.
If an appeal to simplicity is insufficient, we might look to the following for further 
justification.  What  motivates many attempts at  reducing collective  action to individual 
action  is  the  idea that  having  rejected notions  of  social spirits  and emergent  social 
organisms the only thing left is the action of individuals. A reason to think that this is the 
67 And hence why, in terms of the overarching structure of this thesis, it is worthwhile examining Bratman's 
account before moving onto Gilbert's.
68 List & Pettit, 2011, p.1.
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case can be found in consideration of the fact that action requires intentionality. As we saw 
in  the  former  chapter,  this is  what  distinguishes  it  from  mere  happenings. However, 
intentionality appears to be a mental phenomenon and, having rejected the separate social 
entity thesis, it appears to follow that only individuals have minds. Thus, as Searle puts it, it 
must be the case that “... all intentionality takes place in individual brains.”69 From this 
starting point, it is easy to think that we can move to the conjecture; if action requires 
intentionality and intentionality only takes place in the minds of individuals, it appears to 
follow  that  only individuals can perform actions.  For want of a name, let us call  these 
claims together the framework of individual agency (FIA).70
In this form the FIA implies that there are no actual collective actions: there are just 
sums of  individual  actions. I  follow Gilbert  in using the term 'summativist'  to describe 
reductive theories of this type.71 We can define a summative account as any that takes the 
properties of a group to be no more than the sum or aggregate of the individual properties 
of the members of the group. Conversely, a  non-summative account is any that takes the 
properties of a group to be something more (whatever that 'more' may be) than the sum or 
aggregate  of  the  individual properties.  The  organic  thesis,  discussed  above,  is a 
non-summative account,  in that it claims that there is something – the emergent organic 
properties of the group as a whole – that is more than just a description of the sum of the 
properties of the relevant individuals. 
With all  the  above  in  mind,  we  might  construct  what  we  can  call  a  simple  
summative account of collective action. According to such an account, to say that collective 
action a was performed would just be to say that all members of the collective in question  
performed an action of the same type as  a. Such an account  is a useful  starting point  for 
constructing an  explanation that is compatible with the framework of individual agency. 
69 Searle, 1996, p.24.
70 My usage of this term follows Gilbert's (1989, p.12). In other places Gilbert has also referred to this as the 
singularist assumption (see, for example, Gilbert, 2008).
71 Gilbert takes the term 'summative' from Quinton, who claims that in some cases, such an account of 
social attributes is obvious; for example he says that, “To say that the industrial working class is 
determined to resist anti-trade Union laws is [obviously] to say that all or most industrial workers are so 
minded” (Quinton, 1975/1976, p.17).
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However, as we shall see, as it stands, it is clearly inadequate. The question of what we need 
to add to it, to try to make it adequate, is that which will drive us forward, towards a more 
complex account. 
According  to  this  account, that  which is  said  collectively  of  the  group  can  be 
reduced to something that can be said distributively about every member of the group.72 At 
first,  it  appears  that  there  are  times  when this account explains collective  action. 
Unfortunately, examining these instances  reveals them not to be instances of the kind of 
phenomena that is our target, i.e. collective actions. For example, if we were to say, “All of 
Manchester went shopping on Saturday”, we are likely to feel ourselves to be expressing 
nothing more than just the notion that each Manchester resident (or at least a great many 
of  them)  independently  performed  the  action  of  the  same  kind  – i.e.  that they  each 
performed an action of  going shopping on Saturday. However, rather than showing the 
strength  of  a  simple  summative  account, such  cases  highlight  its  failings.  The 
appropriateness of the distributive interpretation in this case, and others like it, is down to 
the fact that the  expressions in question are never meant to convey collective action. We 
can see as much by imagining a conversation that might follow. On hearing me talk of the 
whole of Manchester going shopping you reply, “That's amazing, the whole of Manchester 
went shopping together?” To which I might perfectly reasonably reply, “Oh no, I just meant 
that they each went shopping at the same time.”73 As Gilbert notes, “[t]he sentence 'X and 
Y are doing A together' is susceptible to a weaker interpretation in which sharing in action  
… is not involved”.74 Instances where we give a straightforwardly distributive account of 
expressions may appear to have the form of attributing actions to social groups. However, 
though their form is similar  to true expressions of collective action, they are  not, in fact, 
meant to attribute collective action in the sense we are interested in here.
To construct a more plausible account of collective action, in what follows I will 
examine how we might adjust and augment the minimal summative account above in line 
72 See Rolf Gruner for discussion of the distinction between 'distributive' and 'collective' reference (1976, 
p.445).
73 Example modelled on Gilbert, 1992, p.154.
74 Gilbert, 1992, p.154.
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with the  four  elements  of  our  experience  of  the  collectivity  of  collective  action, whilst 
remaining within the spirit of the FIA. Doing so will bring us to Michael Bratman's Shared  
Cooperative  Activity (SCA)  account,  which,  as  I  stated  above,  I  take  to  be  the  most 
promising  summative strategy  to  explain  the  apparent  collectivity  of  collective  action. 
However, it will also take us past Bratman's account, as such an account will be seen to be 
unable to sufficiently explain the experiences of detachment and of constraint.
2.2 – Mere sums -vs- the experience of unity
Let us start  the task of  augmenting the simple summative account  by  examining 
what we might add to explain the apparent unity that is experienced as  part of collective 
action. Recall that I used the example of the lovers to characterise this experience; the unity 
they feel is that of being bound together. This appears to be the kind of experience of unity 
required for all collective acts.  Acting together seems to involve the experience of being 
bound together in a sense which makes it appropriate to think of yourself together  with 
those  with  whom you  are  bound  as  a  we.  The  simple  summative  account  allows for 
situations where there clearly is not such felt unity (such as the Mancunian shoppers). The 
question, then, is how we might adjust the account such that it does explain the existence 
of the feeling of unity? 
One possible  claim would be  that  for  a  sum of  individual  actions  to count  as  
collective  action,  the  members  of  the  collective  must  themselves  share  some  uniting 
characteristic.  As  it  stands,  however,  such  a  condition  would  be  unclear.  As  already 
discussed  (in  the  previous  chapter) the  mere  fact  of  the  relevant  individuals  being 
objectively groupable by virtue of some shared characteristic is not enough to generate a  
feeling of unity; e.g. the individuals who make up the set composed of all the red-heads in 
Sheffield  may  well  feel  no  unity  at  all. Perhaps,  though,  while  a  sharing  of  a  single 
characteristic is not enough, what we need is just more commonality. This, though, is not 
the case, as can be seen in the case of mountaineers summiting Everest. As noted previously 
the ascent of  Everest  has  become something of  a hobby for  well-to-do tourists,  with a 
(comparatively) large number of people all independently trying to reach the summit. On 
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such occasions, each person is intentionally trying to reach the summit and they make up a 
set of individuals with lots of shared characteristics; the climbers are all rich, they are all fit, 
they are all dressed in modern mountaineering clothing,  and so on. Yet we  still  have no 
collective action; we just have a bunch of individuals swarming over the mountain. Further, 
adding a requirement for shared characteristics is in danger not just of failing to rule out 
non-collective acts, but also, wrongly excluding some acts that we do think are collective, 
for it does not seem to be the case that collective acts cannot take place when there is a huge 
diversity of individual characteristics; for example, the team that climbs Everest  as a team 
might have diverse characteristics – be of different genders, different nationalities, different 
heights etc. None of this appears to block the possibility of  their performing a collective 
action.75
One thing that is clearly absent from the example of the individualist mountaineers 
is cooperation. Each is out for themselves and is not interested in helping the others to 
achieve their goals. Indeed, in a notorious case in 2006, an injured climber (David Sharp) 
was left to die by others who did not want to sacrifice their own achievement to try to help  
him survive.76 The  contrast  to  this  strident  individualism  would  be  a  situation  where 
everyone was  cooperating to reach the summit.  Such considerations suggest  an account of 
collective action where each individual is cooperating towards achieving their action. Now, 
in the last chapter I noted that mere interaction does not seem to be enough to generate the 
kind of felt unity in question, and thus that it is not enough to turn multiple actions into a 
collective action. There I used the example of driving down the high street, noting that this 
involves interaction and cooperation with others77 but does not appear to be a collective act.
Perhaps though, what blocks the driving example from being a case of collective 
action is merely that the individual acts that are being achieved are all of different types. We 
75 Of course they must all share the characteristic of being part of the team that is climbing Everest, but this 
cannot be the characteristic we appeal to as constitutive of their unity, for this would be circular.
76 Edmund Hillary said of the affair “I think the whole attitude towards climbing Mt. Everest has become 
rather horrifying. The people just want to get to the top. They don't give a damn for anybody else who 
may be in distress." (McKinlay, 2006).
77 In driving I have to stop at the traffic lights to wait for other agents to cross and their actions of crossing 
are likewise dependent on my stopping. I have to ensure that I drive at a safe speed relative to the driver in 
front of me and they must also be keeping an eye on my driving, adjusting what they do appropriately.
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might adopt a summative account that stipulates that there must be cooperation between 
individuals  that  are  all  performing acts  of  the  same  type.  However,  this  still  does  not 
provide a strong enough criterion to capture the collectivity of collective action. This can be 
seen by noting that a modified version of the selfish mountain climbers example above can 
fit this criteria, but still fail to be collective action. Imagine that, rather than being selfish, 
we make our climbers  friendly and  helpful:  if they see that another is in need, they will 
throw them a rope;  if they are informed on passing another that they are short on food, 
they will share their food;  etc. Now this kind of cooperation is  the  type of thing that we 
would expect if they were all collectively summiting a mountain. However, we commit the 
fallacy of affirming the consequent if we think that such cooperation is thus in itself enough 
to mean that there  is  a collective action.  Indeed, we can well  imagine that  though the 
climbers are transformed from selfish to cooperative they remain primarily focused on their 
individual achievements; they remain driven by their individual goals to each reach the top 
of the mountain themselves. While they are happy to help the others achieve their goals,  
which happen to be of the same type, it is only their individual achievements that define 
their actions. They would be helpful and unselfish soloists, but soloists they would remain.
What  then  is missing  from  the  helpful soloists  example?  Whilst  they  are 
cooperating, they still  have their own individual goals as the focus,  the situation merely 
having been modified such that they are willing to help others achieve their own individual 
goals, and be helped to achieve their own in return. It seems that we need a stronger form 
of cooperation. We need cooperation towards the achievement of a single joint activity. This 
is  the  route  taken  by  Michael  Bratman.  He believes  that  collective  actions78 have 
cooperation  at  their  core,  but  that  this  cooperation  must  have  a  particular  aim.  For 
Bratman, what we need is that the participants are cooperating to share in the creation of a 
joint activity.
The notion of a joint activity  is  the notion of  something that  we are  all  doing 
together.  In  bringing  it  into  play  we  lose  something  of  the  simplicity  of  the  simple  
78 Note that, Bratman prefers not to use the term 'collective action', as it may be taken to imply a 
non-reductive analysis. However, in the sense I use it here, the phenomenon of collective action is the 
same phenomenon that is the apparent target of his investigations.
39
summative account, for we admit that there is something that must be considered at the  
level of the collective – i.e. the activity –  however, as I will show below, we need not be 
thought to be abandoning the framework of individual autonomy altogether.
2.3 – Mere sums -vs- the feeling of collective 
intentionality
Having significantly altered the simple summative account,  in order to allow it to 
explain unity, we come now to test our augmented theory against the feeling of collective 
intentionality. That is, test it against the feeling that collective action has purpose and that 
this  purpose  is directed  towards  the  collective  activity.  It  is  in  exploring  a  possible 
explanation of the nature of this collective intentionality that we come to see how we might 
(along the lines suggested by Michael Bratman) gloss the notion of cooperation, such that it 
generates activity that is distinctly collective. 
So,  above,  we  have  already moved  some way away from the  simple  summative 
account;  from consideration  of  what  it  is  that  each  individual  is  doing  towards 
consideration of what everyone together is doing. If we examine the kinds of things that we 
think of ourselves as being able to do collectively, such a refocus becomes obviously correct. 
There  are  many  things  that  we  would  claim  are  collective  actions  that  could  not be 
individual  actions.  For  example,  we  might  say  that  the  members  of  the  residents' 
association – from the example raised in the last chapter –  together blocked a road  as a 
form of direct  action to try to save their  park.  Such an action would  transparently be 
resistant  to  a  simple  summativist  reduction  as it  cannot  be  that  each  individual  is 
themselves blocking the road, for each is far too small to be doing so. The way forward is to 
recognise that trying to stay within the framework of individual agency rules out the idea 
that the action, in its totality, is understandable only on the collective level.  However, it 
need not rule out the idea that  we can consider the  activity as joint,  while keeping the 
intentionality summative. 
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To  understand  what  it  might  mean  to  make  activity  joint  while  keeping 
intentionality summative, we must recall that action is more than just activity. Exactly what 
more is a matter of some very fine-grained argument. Nevertheless, as I noted previously, 
we can broadly say that it involves intentionality. To act is not just to do something, rather, 
it is to do something with a purpose. This is the difference between the acts, such as that of 
walking into a room, and something like the accidental activity of tripping over a rug. 79 As 
Frankfurt  says,  there  is  a  “… contrast  between  what  an  agent  does  and  what  merely 
happens to him, or between the bodily movements that he makes, and those that occur 
without him making them.”80 Of course, from the perspective of the activity that takes 
place,  an action can be identical  to a mere unintentional  happening.  For example,  the 
activity performed by a health and safety rep' who, as an illustration of the dangers of rugs, 
purposefully makes herself trip over a rug, can be identical to that of a  clumsy man who 
does so by accident. 
Just as we can separate the doing from the intending in individual action, we can do 
so in collective action. This allows us the option of admitting that one element of collective 
action must be considered as irreducibly collective, whilst keeping within the spirit of the 
conceptual framework of individual agency. We allow that the activity is collective – or as 
Bratman calls it 'joint' – but still hold on to the idea that all the intentionality in pla y must 
be in the heads of the individual agents. So, while the helpful-soloists were all cooperating 
towards performing individual instances of the same act type, i.e. each personally trying to 
get  to  the  top  of  the  mountain,  what  they  were  not  cooperating  towards  was  the 
performance of a single joint activity. By pairing up the idea that collective action must be 
cooperative, with the idea that this  must be cooperation aimed at achieving a single joint 
activity,  we  arrive  at  the  cooperative  joint  activity  account of  collective  action.  Strictly 
speaking,  this account  is  not  a  summative  one.  Rather,  it is  mixed  summativist  and 
non-summativist;  it  says that  there  is  an element  of  the  action  (activity)  that  must  be 
understood by seeing the set of individuals as a singular unit. However, this is a very tame  
and unproblematic form of non-summativism.  Activity  in-itself is not something that we 
79 See Davidson (1971, p.1) for discussion of this example.
80 Frankfurt, 1997.
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normally reserve only for agents; we allow that rivers can flow and grass can grow without 
thinking that this somehow makes water or grass into an agent.81 Thus in allowing activity 
to exist at the collective level we can still hold that the only agents are individuals. This is a 
break from the framework of individual agency strictly conceived because, in allowing that 
activity  is  collective,  we  allow  that  collective  action  cannot  be  wholly  understood  as 
decomposable to separate individual actions. However, it does preserve what we might think 
is the core aspect of the FIA, that is, it preserves the notion that intentionality exists only in 
the heads of individuals and thus that only individuals can make something into an action. 
If action is activity plus intentionality then we can say, without violating the relaxed version 
of FIA, that collective action is irreducibly collective at the level of activity, but not at the 
level of intentionality.82
The cooperative joint activity account allows us to identify the kind of cooperation 
that might be thought to give rise to the collectivity that characterises collective action and 
distinguishes it from mere mutually beneficial interaction.  The distinctive feature of this 
account  is  that the  intentional  attitudes  of  the  individuals  involved  are  aimed  at  the 
achievement of  a  joint  activity.  It  might be thought that  the argument above does not 
require the existence of cooperation and only motivates us to make do with the idea of 
shared activity. However, this would not do, as without  the inclusion of cooperation we 
could not rule out examples of multiple actions that fail to be collective  by failing to be 
shared. This can be seen in situations where there  are common intentions – which point 
towards the same activity –  but  that do not count as situations of collective action.  The 
sum of secret intentions for the collective to act in such a way, does not seem to be the right 
kind of thing for us to say that the collective acted. For example, if it turned out that all the 
81 Hence Gilbert, for reasons along these lines, refers to accounts of this sort as summative accounts. In the 
interests of clarity, we might re-describe summative accounts to fit this, defining them as: any account that 
makes at least the intentional aspect of collective action nothing more than the mere sum of the individual 
intentional attitudes of the participating members. 
82 Such considerations fit with Michael Keely's suggestion that we must distinguish the notion of aims of a 
collective from that of aims for a collective (1981). He accepts that “... organisations [which I think we can 
fairly read as collectives in the sense used in this thesis], as systems of human interaction, produce events 
or consequences that are attributable to the organisation” and that these “... are 'more than' the aggregate 
effects of individual behaviour”. However, he claims that “... from this fact that an organisation can so act 
in the sense of producing an effect, it is a large leap to the claim that it can act in the sense of intending an 
effect.” (Keely, 1981, p.152).
42
climbers on the mountain each secretly intended for it to be the case that together they 
counted as swarming, this would still not be collective action. Gilbert makes a similar point  
with an example of two people on a train who secretly fancy each other. The fact that, each 
is sitting where they are sitting (e.g. next to each other), because each wants it to be the case 
that they are both travelling in close proximity, does not make it the case that, they can yet 
say that they are travelling together (in a strong sense).83
What appears to be the case  is  that, the participants in a collective action need to 
share their intentions. That is, they need to make them public. We might think that this is 
implicit in the idea of cooperation that I introduced above, as it would be an odd concept 
of cooperation that had it that it was possible for us to secretly cooperate with each other.  
We can secretly act in ways that we know will assist another person, and it can even be the 
case that unbeknownst to us they are doing likewise for us; however, this  would not be 
cooperation in the  fullest sense. Indeed, Bratman introduces such a condition, claiming 
that  we  can  understand the  idea  of  “being  in  the  public”  in  terms  of  the  account  of  
common knowledge given by philosophers such as David Lewis.84 Roughly put, the notion 
of common knowledge is that it is transparent to each participant that the knowledge in 
question is known to all and known to be known by all.85 Bratman does not claim to have 
an analysis of exactly what common knowledge amounts to. Rather, he claims to be using it 
as “an unanalysed idea”86 and in this we can follow him, i.e. we can be neutral between 
83 Gilbert, 1992, p.159.
84 Lewis, 1969.
85 More precisely, the idea of common knowledge is that it is transparent to each participant that the 
knowledge in question is openly known to all. So if p is common knowledge to agents X and Y then:
X will know p
Y will know p
X will know that (Y knows that p)
Y will know that (X knows that p)
X will know that (Y knows that (X knows that p))
Y will know that (X knows that (Y knows that p))
X will know that (Y will know that (X knows that (Y knows that p)))
Y will know that (X will know that (Y knows that (X knows that p)))
X will know that (Y will know that (X will know that (Y knows that (X knows that p))))
Y will know that (X will know that (Y will know that (X knows that (Y knows that p))))
X will know that (Y will know that (X will know that (Y will know that (X knows that (Y knows that p)))))
Y will know that (X will know that (Y will know that (X will know that (Y knows that (X knows that p))))) ...
etc. Ad infinitum.
86 Bratman, 1999, p.102.
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accounts of the exact mechanics, because it seems that it is possible to grasp the general idea  
of something being out in the open.
2.3.a – The problem of control
Collective  action thus may be seen as  being any  cooperative joint  activity.  The 
notion of cooperation embedded in this account is meant to imply that the intentions of 
each individual (for it to be the case that they perform said activity together) are out in the 
open. This account takes us even further away from the simple summative account and it is 
easy to see why such cooperative activity would feel to involve being bound together (i.e.  
unity) and having of a commonality of joint purpose (i.e. collective intentionality). Though 
this account is reductive and in keeping with the FIA (at least with the spirit of the FIA), it  
is  not  claiming  that  collective  action  is  an  illusion  in  the  same  way  that  the  simplest 
summative account claims that it is akin to the dancing mass of leaves. The key difference 
between this account and the simplest account is that it allows us to admit that there is a 
real  and  distinct social  phenomenon  that  constitutes  collective  action  and  that  this 
phenomenon can be  distinguished from sets  of  individual  actions  that  are  not  related. 
However, whilst not claiming that it is an illusion that there is a distinct phenomenon, this  
account is still claiming that it is an illusion that this phenomenon is one where there is real 
collectivity in the strong sense. That is, it is an illusion that there is a collective agent. There 
is then, even if not a fully collective sense, a real sense in which (on the cooperative joint 
activity account) intentionality is  shared; it  is  directed towards same  commonly known 
joint goal.
Given the  above,  such  an account  is  a  more  credible  contender  for  explaining 
collective  action.  However,  this  credibility  comes  at  a  cost:  the  way  in  which  this 
intentionality is thought to be shared raises a problem I will call the  problem of control. 
Roughly put, the problem of control is that it seems to be illegitimate for each member of a 
group  to  intend that  they  together  perform  an  action a.  This  is because,  in  order  to 
legitimately have such an intention, they must each think of themselves as able to settle the 
issue of  the joint activity that will constitute a's occurrence. But, it seems impossible that 
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they can all rightly think this to be the case. Intending for the joint activity to take place, 
appears to require that, the individual intender is in control of its occurrence.  However, 
each individual’s being in control appears to require that the other individuals are not in  
control.  Reflecting  on  this  problem  will  move  us  from  the  broad characterisation of 
cooperative activity accounts, given above, to Bratman's full Shared Cooperative Activity 
Account. 
To  explicate the  problem of  control more  fully,  I  must  again  direct  attention 
towards  the  nature  of  action  in  general.  As  I  have  said  above,  the  performance  of  a 
collective action requires not just the existence of some joint activity; it requires that that  
joint activity is performed with the intention of being the action in question. Additionally, it 
does not seem enough that the agent in question has in their head the kinds of intentional 
attitudes that would give the activity purpose; rather, the activity has to take place because 
of these particular intentional attitudes. So much can be seen in the following example: let 
us return to the illustration, given above, of intentionally slipping on a rug. Suppose that I 
did have  the  intention to demonstrate  safe  rug slipping techniques  but  that  I  was  not 
paying attention and slipped on the rug by accident. In  this case,  and others like it, it 
would seem that although the intentional attitudes are there, they do not make my action 
intentional. Something more than the mere existence of intention for that activity appears 
to be needed to turn activity into action – they must be connected in some way.
So what is the necessary link between the intentional attitudes and the activity? We 
might think that it  must just be  some causal link.  However, this comes up against the 
problem that we can think of cases where an appropriate intentional attitude causes some 
activity, but that it fails to be an activity. Roderick Chisholm gives the example of someone 
who has the desire to kill their uncle and has the belief that they can do this by running 
him over. As this man is driving along about to commit his devilish deed, the seriousness of  
his unsavoury intention causes him to become nervous which, in turn, causes him to swerve 
the wheel of the car and accidentally run over his uncle.87 Here, even though he intends to 
kill his uncle by running him over, and his having this intention causes it to be the case that 
87 Chisholm, 1964.
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his uncle is killed in this way, it seems to be untrue to say that he performed the action of 
doing so. Something about the causal link between his intention and activity in question is 
deviant – and hence these cases are known as deviant causal chain cases.88
What  goes  wrong  in  examples  of  deviant  causal  chains?  Well,  defining  exact 
conditions that rule out such cases has proved problematic.89 There may be different things 
wrong with the different cases. However, for our purposes here we need not be concerned 
with  the  exact  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions.  Rather,  we  just  need  a  general 
characterisation of what it is that those deviant cases lack. The obvious thing to say seems 
to be that the intentional attitudes must cause the activity in a way that makes it true to say 
that the agent is in control of the activity. When the agent slips on the rug, even though they 
held the relevant intentions and these caused the activity, they did not do so in a way that 
makes it true to say that they controlled the activity. There is no reason to think that this 
point  should  not  hold for  collective  actions  just  as  it  does  for  individual  actions. The 
positive  claim,  that  it  does so hold, is  supported by imagining the following collective 
deviant  causal  chain  example:  imagine  that  together  we  have  planned  to  descend  the 
mountain on its south side, and knowing that this is our plan causes us to set out over the 
ridge. However, suppose that we miss the fact that a thick cornice of snow has built up and 
our trying to enact our plan causes us to walk onto this cornice, which collapses, and we 
plummet down the south side. This would not be a case of our performing the collective  
action  of  descending  the  south  side,  even  though it  would  be  a  case  of  our  collective 
intentions causing the intended activity. It follows from this that collective actions need 
more than the appropriate intentional attitudes to exist  and more than for  these to cause 
the appropriate activity; rather, these attitudes must further control this activity.
88 This is a case of what has been called primary deviance in that the causal chain goes astray between the 
intentional attitudes and the appropriate bodily movements. There are also cases that we can call secondary  
deviance. This is where the causal chain goes astray between bodily movements and results of those 
movements. We can see this in the following example given by Myles Brand (Brand, 1984 – as reported in 
Mele & Moser, 1997, p.7). A man may be trying to kill someone by shooting them, their aim is generally 
good but this time they miss. By chance the noise of the shoot causes a stampede of wild pigs which kill 
the intended victim. Here, even though the correct intentional attitude of the gunman causes the event 
and even though the event is describable in a way that fits these attitudes, it does not seem that the death 
of the man is really his action.
89 See Mele & Moser, 1997.
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Returning to the cooperative joint activity account,  it thus seems that if the joint 
activity is to count as an action, the appropriate intentions must not just cause it, they must 
control it. This gives rise to the following question, “How can it be that the intentions of 
each person all separately control the behaviour?” Take the example of walking to the top of 
the hill. If one of us  is  in charge  (perhaps they are the elected leader of our hill walking 
team), then it seems legitimate to suppose that they can see their intention that we climb 
this hill as being in control of our activity. However, the cooperative joint activity account 
requires not just that there is one boss whose plan gives purpose to our activity, rather, it 
requires that each of our individual plans play this role, and thus that each of our individual  
plans are in control of our activity. If one person controls the situation it looks as if none of 
the others can. Of course, the thoughts of individuals can lead them to play their parts in  
the group activity. However, playing your part is not enough to settle the issue of whether 
the group activity takes place; being in control of the activity, that is ‘playing one’s part’, is 
not the same as being in control of the activity of the whole group. It looks like in order for 
each group member to intend that the group performs some collective action, they must be  
in a position to see themselves as making the decision about whether it does. The problem 
is, as Velleman puts it, that “... the logical space of decision making is open to those who 
are in a position to resolve the issue, and it admits only one resolution per issue.” 90 One 
way to solve this problem is just to say that there is just one controller – one agent that 
settles  what  happens  –  and  that  this  agent  is  everyone taken  together  as  a  collective. 
However,  to  take  this  line  would  require  us  to  abandon  the  framework  of  individual 
agency.91 Michel Bratman's alternative is to try to solve the problem of control within the 
framework of individual agency by using the cooperative joint activity account. 
90 Velleman, 1997, p.35. Velleman has us think of an example of two people lifting a sofa and says of it, 
“Suppose that we jointly decide to lift a heavy sofa together. We thereby exercise a kind of joint discretion 
over the issue of whether the sofa will leave the ground. The interesting question is precisely how two 
people can jointly exercise discretion over a single issue. The answer cannot be that each of us exercises full 
discretion over the issue individually, as we would have to do if each of us were to intend that "we" will 
lift the sofa. Discretion cannot be shared by being multiplied in this way, since no issue can be settled by 
each of two people at once.” (1997, p.35) 
91 Note that this is Margaret Gilbert's approach, and I shall be exploring it in the following chapter.
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2.3.b – Bratman's solution to the problem of control
If we could make control collective then we could avoid the problem of control. 
There is no problem with saying that  we are in control; rather it is just with saying that 
each of us has control exclusively. However, in parcelling out the appropriate intentions to 
each individual, the collective joint activity account appears to preclude any reference to we 
being in control that does not imply that each of us are individually in control. Bratman's  
solution to this  is  to  cede something  further to the  non-summativist  by introducing a 
collective element to the intentional stances of the individuals. But note that for Bratman 
this collective element need not comprise the intentions themselves, but rather can be merely 
an enabling background to them. Bratman believes that this collective enabling background 
is created by requiring that the intentional attitudes in question be interdependent. That is, 
the  enabling  background  is  created by  requiring  that  the  intentions  in  question are 
intentions  for  the  collective  activity  to  have  a  certain  purpose  if  and  only  if all  other 
members of the collective transparently also have such intentions. This attempted solution 
to the problem of control remains within the spirit of the FIA, as the relevant intentional 
states remain individual mental states.
Bratman approaches the problem of control first by noting that it is not an issue 
about the impossibility of the necessary mediation of other agents in each agent controlling 
the collective action. It is clear that our individual actions need not be the immediate result 
of  our  individual  bodily  movements;  rather,  they  can  rely  on  facilitating  mechanisms. 
Bratman illustrates this point by having us imagine an “… example of the person – call him 
Abe – who moves the pump handle, thereby pumping water into the house”. 92 Here, use of 
the pumping system does not make Abe’s action problematic, as the predictable reliability 
of the pump means that there is no issue about Abe's intentions controlling the action. So 
it is clear that mediation by a facilitating mechanism –  between the appropriate intentional 
attitudes and the resultant activity – is not  generally  a problem.  Now let us suppose that 
instead of a purely mechanical system (which aids Abe’s pumping of water into the house) 
that there is another person involved. Bratman names her Barbara and has us imagine that 
92 An example he reports as originally given by Elizabeth Anscombe (1963).
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her  job is  to keep pushing a  certain pump handle  so that  the  water  pressure  will  stay  
sufficiently  high  in  the  system,  thus  enabling  Abe  to  pump  the  water.93 Given  the 
background condition that Barbara  has the intention to maintain the water pressure,  her 
role does not undermine Abe’s intentional stance towards his action itself, for, given her  
reliability, he still  has control over the situation.  So mediation between the appropriate 
intentional attitude and the resultant activity, by another agent, is not a problem.94 
We can say then that control can unproblematically be mediated by other agents. 
However,  there are several important differences in the collective action situation and the 
case of one agent merely facilitating the individual actions of another. In the pumping case, 
Abe relies on Barbara’s intentions in order to have his intention to pump the water, but the 
reverse is not true, Barbara does not rely on Abe’s intentions in order to have her  own 
intention to perform her facilitating action. In contrast, in a collective action situation, the 
intentions and actions of each individual, if they are to be conceived as intending the group 
to act and performing the group action, are all interdependent. While Barbara's action can 
be the background to Abe’s action, it is hard to see how all the performers of a group action 
could have their intentions both as the enabling background to the other's intentions and as 
backgrounded by those other's  intentions.  This  appears  impossible,  in the same way as 
supposing that one can support the base of a  stone  pillar on the head of the same  stone 
pillar.
The problem, then, is how the individual intentions  can exist in the dual state of 
both  being  background  to  the  intentions  of  the  other  group  members  and  being 
backgrounded  by  those  other  intentions.  Bratman's  solution  is  that  this  is possible  if 
intentions of the individuals have a particular interdependent character. He accepts that the 
background conditions are not right for each individual to start off with a straightforward 
intention to  act;  so  he  supposes  that  each  group member  starts  with  a  certain  mental  
attitude that is not quite an intention for the group to act but becomes one when everyone 
93 Bratman, 1999d, p.150.
94 Lest, we might not find this convincing, Bratman has us compare it with a situation in which a 
mechanical device monitors the system and adjusts the water pressure, a situation that does not seem 
essentially different to one where an agent plays the appropriate role (1999d, p.151).
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else shares the same mental attitude.95 It is an ‘I will if you will’ situation. In this way each 
member can come to have their intentions at the same time, relying on the others to have 
their intentions whilst at the same time be relied upon to have their own intentions.96 Thus 
they can all legitimately see their intentions as being in control of the collective action via  
facilitation of the intentions of the others. In this way, they can all be in control of the  
collective activity. Imagine two people, let  us call them Seren and Freda, standing on the 
edge of a swimming pool.  Seren intends to jump only if Freda intends to jump. Freda 
intends to jump only if Seren intends to jump. These intentions are common knowledge; 
they are out in the open between them. Neither can rely on the other's intention as a 
settled  background  condition  of  their  own intention,  for  each  knows  that  the  other's 
intention is conditional on their own. It seems that they are at an impasse but they can 
solve  it.  Freda  and  Seren can  at  the  same time come to intend to jump into the  pool 
together through knowing that their intentions mesh in such a way that they are both 
satisfied.97
We can think of the problem of control as asking how, as individual participants in 
a collective action, each person can frame their intentional attitudes such that the collective 
action  is  controlled by  each one. Bratman's  answer  is:  “...  first,  that  I  can 'frame'  the 
intention that we J in part on the assumption that you, as a result, come also so to intend ...  
Second, even after I have formed the intention that we J, in part because I predict that you 
will concur, I can recognise that you still need to concur: It is just that I am confident that 
you will. Third, and finally, once we arrive at a structure of intentions that satisfies [the 
conditions of  shared  cooperative  activity] we can see the matter as partly up to each of 
us.”98
95 Bratman, 1999d, p.154.
96 To clarify, Bratman is not claiming that each individual intends conditionally (i.e. intends for the group 
to do a if everybody wants it to) rather it is the very intention that is conditional (i.e. if everybody 
conditionally ‘intends’ for the group to do a then I intend for the group to do a).
97 As Schmid notes, the requirement for there to be an interlocking mesh between individuals' intentions 
means that Bratman’s conception of shared intentionality goes beyond individualism, inasmuch as it 
rejects the idea that a single brain-in-a-vat could be the barer of a collective intention (2007, p.206). In 
this, Bratman's view of collective intentionality contrasts with that of John Searle who argues that the 
rejection of a group mind means that the collective intentionality must exist wholly in individual minds 
and thus should be possible for a brain-in-a-vat. (see Meijers, 2003 for a convincing refutation of Searle's 
Brain-in-a-vat condition and a discussion of the content externalism that is implied by this).
98 Bratman, 1999d, p.157.
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Bratman’s  solution  shows  that  the  thoughts  of  different  individuals  can  be 
coordinated such that  each individual  can be said to have personal  discretion over  the  
situation. However, the control issued by each is still itself discretionary; that is, it is at the 
control of each other.  This means that the control that rests with each individual is only 
partial in that the real control lies in the combination of all the individual thoughts considered  
as a whole. His solution, then, introduces a further element of irreducible collectivity with 
its focus on what he calls an “interlocking web of intentions”.99 Importantly  for staying 
within FIA, he does not see this web as itself constituting a new agent; rather, its role is as a 
background condition  for the agency of each individual. This does, however, call for a 
further relaxing of our understanding of the FIA. We must say that while only individuals 
can have intentions, these intentions can be inter-reliant on the intentions of other agents 
in an important sense. This is somewhat more relaxed than the original statement of FIA 
and thus Elisabeth Pacherie  is right to say that “...  conceiving of shared intentions as an 
interlocking  web  of  intentions  of  individuals,  Bratman  moves  away  from the  classical 
reductive analyses of collective action”.100 Whilst it is true that Bratman has moved away 
from the simple reductive analysis,  his account is  still within  the spirit  of the FIA,  as it 
respects the notion that intentionality really only exists in the heads of individuals. 
2.3.c – Bratman's Shared Cooperative Activity Account
So Bratman believes that there is a real sense in which  collective action involves 
shared intention.  However,  for Bratman,  “ ... a shared intention is not an attitude in the 
mind of some superagent consisting literally of some fusion of your mind and mine.”101 
Rather,  it  is  a  sum  of  interdependent individual  intentions.  As  I  stated  above, 
interdependence of intentions means that each intention is framed in terms of the existence 
and  character  of  the  intentions  of  others.  This  implies  that  the  structure  of  these 
interdependent  intentions  must  fit  together.  Bratman  cashes  this  out  in  terms  of  the 
requirement for what he calls messing subplans. This is the requirement that our intentions 
99 Bratman 1999d, p.143.
100 Pacherie, 2012, p.352.
101 Bratman, 1999c, p.111. 
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for the joint activity in question are co-realisable  not only at surface level, but also at the 
level  of  the subsidiary plans. Bratman has us  imagine that  we intend to paint a house 
together,  but  that,  both of  us  being stubbornly individualistic  in our aesthetic  tastes,  I  
intend to paint it all entirely blue and you intend to paint it red all over. 102 Suppose neither 
of us is willing to compromise and we go ahead and paint the house a resulting mess of red  
and blue. This action, Bratman claims, would not be a shared cooperative action and thus, 
in the terms I am using, it would not be a collective action.103
Holding an intention necessarily requires the holding of sub-plans to achieve that  
intention. For example, if I intend to walk to the park then I am going to need to intend to 
put one foot in front of the other. Bratman calls this the principle of Means-End Coherence 
and renders it formally as, “[t]he following is always pro-tanto irrational: intending E while 
believing that a necessary means to E is M and that M requires that one now intend M, and 
yet  not intending M”.104 What  holds for  individual  intentions  also holds for  collective 
intentions – intentionally a-ing implies the necessity of having sub-plans that will bring a 
about. If the different agents do not have meshing sub-plans then they cannot be thought 
to  have  coherent  intentions  about  what  they  both  will  do.  This  does  not  imply  that 
Bratman thinks that sub-plans must always be matching. He allows that, for example, one 
of our house painters might intend that we paint the house with inexpensive paint and the 
other that we buy the paint from Cambridge Hardware if “I don't care where we buy the  
paint and you don't care about the expense … we could proceed to paint the house with 
inexpensive paint from Cambridge Hardware. Our activity could be cooperative despite 
differences in our sub-plans”.105
Further, this interdependence must not be accidental. Rather, it must be intentional 
on the part of each agent; they must be committed to having their intentions mesh with the  
102 Bratman, 1999b, p98.
103 It is not just that it would not be a collective act of painting the house a single colour, as obviously, it 
would fail to be this merely because it would fail to be the case that house was painted only one colour. It 
would, on Bratman's account, fail to be even a collective act of painting the house multiple colours – 
rather it would merely be an accidental joint activity of doing so.
104 Bratman, 1999f, p.413.
105 Bratman, 1999b, p.98.
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intentions of the others with regards to the joint activity. This means that the intentions of 
each individual cannot be coerced. Bratman gives a case concerning the unacceptability of 
kidnap  as a case of collective action  and indeed one person being kidnapped by another 
does not ordinarily strike us as a collective action.106 Bratman's ruling out of cohesion fits 
with the notion that cooperation is key to collective action. However, it is tricky to draw a 
line  between allowable  cohesion and non-allowable  cohesion. Bratman must allow some 
level of persuasion and incentives otherwise his account would fail  to apply to our real  
social interactions. In the case of Hillary and Tenzing climbing Everest, Hillary is climbing 
solely because it is what he wants to achieve. In contrast, part of the reason that Tenzing is 
climbing is that he must do so in order to get paid. We might imagine that it could have 
been the case that if he did not receive the money from this job then he would not have 
been able to buy food and he would starve (and that no other jobs were available) – is this 
different from the Mafia case, where the Mafioso tells the victim to come with him or he 
will shoot him?107
So then, for Bratman, the essence of collective action is that it must involve joint  
activity, this joint activity must be intended by each member, each member's intention 
must  be  dependent  upon  and  mesh  with  the  intentions  of  each  other  member,  each 
member's  intention must  be freely  made and include  the  propensity to work with the  
others in achieving the joint activity. In contrast to the simple summative account, we have 
here a complex summative account which we could give a name that was some variant on 
the  'collective  joint  activity  account'  tag  used  above,  such  as  the  fitting  but  unwieldy 
'interdependent, but  individually intended, joint activity account',  but for simplicity let us 
stick with Bratman's own phrase,  and refer to it as  the Shared Cooperative Activity (SCA) 
account.
Importantly Bratman thinks that his conception of  collective action answers the 
question of what role such action has in our lives.  He believes that  it  helps coordinate 
106 Bratman, 1999b, p.100, also discussed in Bratman, 1999c, p.118.
107 The actual situation was different from this in an important way in that Tenzing did independently want 
to climb Everest and saw himself as having a dual identity between Sherpa and Mountaineer. I will return 
to this issue in a further chapter.
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activities, helps coordinate planning, and structures relevant social bargaining.108 It does this 
because by its very nature it provides a background framework of baseline commitments 
that agents can take as a given. The fact that the agents are taking part in action that has the 
structure  outlined  above  means  that  they  must  all  commit  to  the  same  joint  activity. 
Further, this commitment implies that they must also be committed to mutual support 109 
as they are not merely committed to the joint activity, but committed to its being achieved 
through the meshing sub-plans of all  of the agents. Thus, if,  for example, we think of  
Tenzing and Hillary climbing Everest together, then on this account, because their seeing  
their action as joint requires that they intend to achieve it via the intentions of the other; 
they cannot see the other  as a mere  non-agentive  tool. Rather, they must be flexible and 
willing to work together to both consciously achieve their goal.
In modifying the simple summative account we now have an account that is, we 
might say,  robustly social – it seems to capture unity and something of the joint-ness of 
collective  intentionality.  However,  one  worry  might  be  whether  collective  actions 
necessarily  must  involve such high degrees of cooperation.  Further,  we  might  question 
whether the complex openness requirement is needed. Both these points can be seen most 
clearly when we examine the phenomenon of detachment, as I shall explore below. 
2.4 – Mere Sums -vs- detachment
Now we come to a tricky part of our experience of collective action for a theorist 
who  is trying  to  stay  true  to  the  framework  of  individual  action:  detachment.  To 
understand the challenge of explaining this phenomenon, let us return to the examination 
of the example with which I first set it out: the Greenbank residents' association agreeing to 
fight the development of their local park. In this example we can see the phenomenon of 
detachment  manifest  in  the obvious  feeling  of  separation  between  the  individual's 
perspective (and its relation to the group act) and the collective perspective (and its relation 
to the group act). This separation generates the possibility of non-correspondence between 
108 Bratman, 1999c, p.112.
109 Bratman, 1999b, p.94-95.
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the individual perspective and the collective perspective. Because summative accounts, such 
as Bratman's, see the purpose of the collective act as given by the sum of the purposes the 
individuals have for it, this generates what I shall call the 'problem of non-correspondence'.
The Greenbank residents' association, as we will recall, chose to collectively call for 
‘stopping the development’ as the main goal of their group. Their decision to have this as 
their  collective  purpose is  reached through compromise  over  various  opinions,  a  rough 
consensus battered out through long discussion and then endorsed by majority vote as the  
stance of GRA. While this stance is generated by the interaction between the individuals – 
which may well involve expressions of their individual attitudes – it presents itself to those 
individuals as something separate. Imagine then that the Greenbank residents' association 
calls a meeting and twenty of its sixty members turn up. The majority, say fifteen members,  
vote to write a letter to the leader of the council, they then draft such a letter and send it 
off. Now it seems perfectly reasonable to say the activity of posting the letter constitutes a  
collective action by the GRA, a collective action that realises their collective intention to  
write such a letter. However, it seems that though the institutional framework of the group 
allows  that  the group's  intentions can be set  by a  majority  of  attending members  at  a 
properly convened meeting, most of the the members have not directly participated and 
that their  intentional  attitudes  have  not  been  directly  counted.  The  majority  of  the 
members may in fact have forgotten all about the meeting, and thus hold no intentions that 
correspond to the collective intention to send the letter.  Gilbert raises this problem. She 
calls it the possibility of “... compatibility with lack of corresponding intentions”110 or the 
'disjunction criterion'.111
At first it seems that Bratman's SCA cannot deal with such cases. Indeed, the focus 
that Bratman puts on small-scale straightforward cooperative acts might lead us to believe 
that  he  does  not  see  his  theory  as  extending  to  them.  However,  he does  admit  the 
possibility of “...complex institutional frameworks”112 and so it seems he must see a way 
110 Gilbert, 2000b.
111 Gilbert, 2009, p.493 See also Gilbert's example of how a poetry group might collectively hold a position 
that does not correspond to the individual position of any of its members (Gilbert, p.190, 1970).
112 Bratman, 1999b, p.94.
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that his account can fit with non-correspondence, but it is still unclear what this will be and 
unclear that it is possible while still keeping in the spirit of the framework of individual  
agency.
Perhaps we can solve this by using something like  David  Copp's idea of  operant  
members. Copp believes that this phenomena is similar to that which takes place when one 
individual acts on behalf of another, so just as “... if Jones gives someone power of attorney 
and orders him to purchase a certain building for him then, if  the attorney buys it  for 
Jones, Jones has bought it.”113 He also points out that not just anyone can perform actions 
on another’s behalf (whether for another individual or a group) rather to be able to do so 
will depend  on  certain  facts.114 These,  he  says,  will  include,  “…  all  facts  about  the 
constitutional rules or laws, laws and by-laws” for organised collectives and “…facts about 
the  composition  of  and  dynamics  of,  or  patterns  of  interpersonal  relations  within 
un-organised collectives.”115 What these facts include in any given social group is perhaps a 
matter for empirical study, but it is fairly easy to see how the rules of Green Bank residents' 
association allow the chair of the group to set the collective perspective, but do not allow a 
stranger from another area  to set the collective perspective. Things may be more fluid in 
non-hierarchical groups. The key seems to be that the performer of the action was in some 
way authorised by the group to perform an action on its behalf. As Tuomela puts it, the 
operant members of the group can only be said to act for the group if the non-operant  
members  in  some  sense  passively  participate  “…  in  virtue  of  having  some  relevant 
awareness of what’s going on in the collective.”116
113 Copp, 1979, p.177.
114 He refers to these as “constitution relation” or C-R facts (Copp, 1979, p.179). Also see Tuomela, 1989, 
p.482 for a similar discussion.
115 Copp, 1979, p.180.
116 As Gilbert says about the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia, “… In order for us to feel comfortable 
with the idea that a certain group [i.e. Russia] invaded Czechoslovakia there must surely be a sense in 
which whoever organised the invasion and whoever took part in it, was the authorised representative of 
the group as a whole” (Gilbert, 1992, p. 206) She also makes the interesting suggestion that Plato was 
getting at much the same sort of idea when he claimed that a city can be wise in virtue of its leaders being 
wise but only if those leaders are accepted by the citizens as being representatives of the city (Gilbert, 
1992, p.470, footnote: 45).
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Integrating  the  notion  of  operant  members  of  a  social  group  into  the  mixed 
account, however, comes at a price. The driving force of our acceptance of Bratman's SCA 
is the fact that it seems to stay within the spirit of the FIA – it  claims that the relevant 
collective intentionality is spread throughout the heads of all the individual agents. If we 
allow that an operant member can have intentional attitudes for the other individuals, then 
are we not going against this? Not necessarily. The fact that Jones' attorney can buy a house 
on his behalf does not take away from Jones' agency. This is because we might think that it  
is dependent on Jones' acquiescing to having his own intentional states set by others. He has 
agreed that his stance towards the buying of the house shall be whatever stance his attorney  
takes for him. This would make explanation of the Greenbank Residents' Association case 
that involves the residents who are absent from the meeting, would be that via, say, their 
acceptance of the institutional structures that govern their group, each is agreeing to have 
their  individual intentional attitudes set by the operant members of the group – who are 
constituted by the majority faction of those in attendance.
On a summative account that allows operant members, the important thing is still 
supposed to  be the  sum of  the  stances  of  each of  the  individuals;  it  is  just  that  each  
individual has  their  personal  stance  fixed  by  means  of  the  operant  member's  personal 
stance. It is, in Kirk Ludwig's terms, a situation of proxy agency.117 The problem is that the 
members of Greenbank residents' association  in this second example, do not seem to be 
authorising some individual to set their individual intentions. If one personally thought 
that the main goal should be to improve the drainage, the result of the vote would not have 
meant  that  one's personal  view  has  thus  automatically changed.  It  seems  perfectly 
reasonable  for  them  to  say:  “We think that  the  main  goal  should  be  to  stop  the 
development,  but  personally I  think that  it  should  be  to  improve  the  drainage.”  The 
operant members cannot then be seen as proxy agents for each other individual rather they 
must be proxy agents for the collective as a whole.
Bratman's  SCA  account  can  be  seen  as  being  robustly  social,  as  it  locks the 
individual into the collective perspective in such a way that the possibility of detachment is 
117 Ludwig, 2013.
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banished. However, detachment is a strong feature of our experience of collective action. As 
Christopher Kutz points out, even in situations where an individual member's stance does 
not conflict with the collective stance,  it seems fine for them to simply lack the relevant 
intentions  for  the  collective activity.  He gives  the  example  of  a  cellist  in  an  orchestra. 
“[T]he cellist need not, and likely will not, engage in planning directed at ensuring that 
others will accomplish their parts, or worry about whether the bassoonists have properly  
realized the mood of the conductor's interpretation”.118 The feeling of detachment is part of 
the feeling of collective  intentionality, insomuch as we feel detached from the  purpose of 
the group as a whole.  We feel ourselves not to need to personally intend for the group. 
Rather, we only feel  the need to participate in the group in such a way that there is  a  
collective joint intention.119 
Above, I looked at how collective intentionality must involve the correct kind of 
control over the collective action.  Here we can say that the feeling of detachment from 
collective intentionality can  also  be seen in  how the individual feels towards this control. 
To say that we feel detached from the intentional control of collective action is to say that it 
feels to be in the hands not of any individual to decide the collective action but rather in the 
hands of the collective. In Kutz's orchestra case the cellist will feel that it is their collective 
purpose as an orchestra that controls their activity, and thus makes it into their collective 
act of so playing. However, she need not feel that her personal intentions are in control of 
the orchestra's playing. In fact, she appears to lack the appropriate intentions that could be  
in such control.  The control  exercised by the conductor is as a proxy for the group as a 
whole  rather  than  a  proxy  for  each  individual. This  conflicts  with  Bratman's  account 
because, as he sees it, the control is in the hands of each  individual; it is just that it is 
mediated  by  an  interdependent  web.  Each  relies  on  the  intentions  of  others,  but 
nonetheless each still should feel to be in control. Bratman's account, then, does not sit well 
with the fact that we feel ourselves to be detached from such control.
118 Kutz, 2000, p.23.
119 Kutz (2000) believes that this point is obscured by Bratman where he considers non-hierarchical cases, 
such as the two painters, because in these – as a matter of practicality – each individual must hold 
individual analogues of the collective intention in order to achieve coordination. In contrast, in examples 
such as the orchestra the coordination can be achieved through the conductor.
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2.5 – Mere Sums -vs- constraint
Bratman's  SCA account  has  been shown  to fail  to make  sufficient  sense of  the 
experience of detachment.  Similarly, I will now present the case that it struggles to make 
sense of the experience of constraint. The canonical example of constraint I set up in the 
last chapter was the obligation of a member of the Leicester Tigers to play his part in the 
collective act of pushing his team's broken-down bus up the hill. Similarly, Gilbert has us 
imagine two people going for a walk – and she says of them that each “... gains a special 
standing with respect to the actions of that other person.”120 That is, in participating in a 
collective action, each participant gains an obligation to play their part and to expect the  
other to do so also. The existence of this  obligation is, Gilbert believes, best seen if we 
imagine either party transgressing its demands. Imagine that at some stage in the walk, Jack  
starts to draw ahead creating an increasing distance between himself and Sue. At this point 
Gilbert says, “Sue might call out  'Jack!'” or she might “catch up with him and then say, 
somewhat critically,  'You are going to have to slow down! I can't keep up with you!'”121 
Even if Sue is timid and does not issue such rebukes, we can say, at least, that she would be  
entitled to.
Gilbert believes that the fact that such rebukes are possible, and appropriate, in such 
cases illustrates the fact that accounts of collective action should meet the following two 
criteria.  Firstly,  the  obligation  criteria:  each  participant  has  an  obligation  to  promote 
fulfilment of the intentional goals of the collective action. Jack, by drawing too far away, is 
failing  to  promote  the  goal  that  they  walk  together.  Secondly,  the  permission  criteria: 
participants understand that they are not (ordinarily) in a position to unilaterally “by a 
simple change of mind” remove the constraints of the intentional goals of the collective 
action.122 Jack  cannot  remove  his  obligation  towards  them walking  together  by  simply 
making a personal decision to turn back;  he must get Sue's permission for the collective 
goal to be abandoned. 
120 Gilbert, 2000a, p.7.
121 Gilbert, 1996b, p.180.
122 Gilbert, 2000b, p.17.
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How can we explain these obligation and permission criteria within a summative 
framework?  Our first  attempt might  be  to suggest  that,  in  forming a  collective  that  is 
performing an action individuals come to have special moral obligations. We might then 
suggest that the wrong that Jack is doing to Sue when he walks too far away from her on  
their walk is a moral wrong. However, while the case of Jack's walking away from Sue 
might have some moral element, this  need not be the case for all collective actions. For 
example, there seems to be some sense in which a gangster could be reproached by fellow 
team members for not playing their part. Most common cases need not be morally bad or  
good but are more likely  to  be morally neutral. I may have a moral obligation to keep 
walking with you. However, a similar rebuke seems possible if we had agreed to perform an  
immoral act,  such as to kill someone together. Since we jointly decided to commit the 
murder, it seems that if we do not jointly decide to call it off then you are entitled to  
rebuke me for trying to pull out. Gilbert notes that it would seem odd to suppose that “… 
those who lack the concept of a moral duty altogether be incapable of going for a walk 
together”123. 
Perhaps the alternative is that we have an overarching intention to continue to hold 
on to our collective intentions. Roth calls this a bridging intention; he has us suppose that 
“... your intention has the requisite status and corresponding impact on my reasoning in 
virtue of a special meta-intention I form: the intention to coordinate my intentions with 
yours.”124 For  Bratman,  the  existence  of  such  a  bridging  intention  follows  from  his 
requirement  that  the  intentions  of  the  individuals  involved  must  be  minimally 
cooperatively stable, that is it is baked-in-to the very nature of Shared Cooperative Activity. 
Thus he says that if I am a participant in a shared intention then “... the rational pressures 
characteristic  of  shared intention are  built  right  into my own plans,  given their  special 
content and given demands of consistency and coherence for my own plans.”125
123 Gilbert, 1990, p.4.
124 Roth, 2003, p.67.
125 Bratman, 2009b, p.55 [emphasis mine]
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However, the problem with the bridging intention proposal is that it seems that 
each participating member is free to merely rescind their bridging intention. Hence Roth 
says: 
“Suppose I revise  my bridge intention to coordinate  with your intentions. 
This is presumably something I can do, given that the bridge intention is, by 
hypothesis, an individual intention. It is therefore mine to reconsider should 
circumstances arise that I judge to warrant reconsideration. If something does 
come up that gives me good reason to revise my bridge intention, I may do so 
– even though you don’t think it’s a reason to revise this intention. Once I 
revise the bridge intention, the intentions you have (supposing they are not 
geared to the revised bridge intention, assuming I even have one) will  not 
have the status of rational constraint for me. I am free to ignore (circumvent 
or undermine) your intention that would have me A. I would be able to do 
some B instead. But this seems to give me a way of shielding myself from any 
sort of rational objection to my B-ing rather than A-ing. In revising my bridge 
intention, I sweep away any sort of authority you may have had as a party to 
the intersubjectivity between us.”126
To the extent that he recognises it,  Bratman  tries to answer this problem in two 
ways. Firstly, he downplays the extent to which the obligation and permission criteria hold 
true. Secondly, he claims that when they do hold true this is just because of the normative 
necessity of a certain level of stability in individual intentions.  This he calls the norm of 
intention stability. Bratman's concept of intentions as plans involves the claim that we must 
have reasonable stability in holding onto intentions.127 Such a norm would account for the 
problem  with Jack changing his mind and starting to walk away  if  he does so  without 
giving due consideration to his former intention to play his part. In this vein, Bratman says 
that  “...  intentions  are  subject  to  a  demand  for  stability  … the  reconsideration  of  an 
intention already formed can itself have significant costs”.128 This seems true. However, we 
may  imagine  that  before  he  starts  to  wander  off;  Jack  gives  proper  consideration  to 
changing his mind. He thinks about how it fits with the rest of his plans and intentions and 
concludes that it is the best thing to do. In this case it does not seem that we could say that  
Jack was breaking the rule of reasonable stability in his intentions. Nevertheless, he would 
still be open to criticism from Sue – she would still be able to rebuke him. It is hard to work 
126 Roth, 2003, p.80.
127 Bratman, 1999.
128 Bratman, 1999c, p.126.
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out  to  what  extent  Bratman  would  accept  the  appropriates  of  rebuke  in  these 
circumstances, he does, however, introduce an element of the norm of intention stability 
that is specially in play in situations of collective action and might be thought to account 
for the inappropriateness of Jack's considered rescinding of his own intention. Bratman 
notes that “...an agent who too easily reconsiders her prior intentions will be a less reliable 
partner  in  social  coordination.”  This  means  that  there  is  a  specifically  social  pressure 
towards stability. Bratman speaks of this as cooperative stability and he says of it that: “...an 
intention is minimally cooperatively stable if there are cooperatively relevant circumstances 
in which the agent would retain that intention.”129 However, while Bratman does give some 
room for the normative pressure towards cooperation in situations of collective intention,  
he  insists  that  this  is  a  question  of  levels  of  reasonableness  rather  than  violation  of 
obligation. So ultimately he says of the walking case that, “[w]hen I abandon my intention 
that we take a walk together I am, then, being unreasonable. But it does not follow that in 
abandoning  my intention I  am violating  a  nonconditional  obligation  grounded in our 
shared intention.”130
Given the phenomena picture that  has  been painted of  collective  action in this 
thesis so far, it seems fair to complain that  Bratman underplays both the felt normative 
force of the collective will and the importance of the fact that it feels as if it is that very will 
(rather than any bridging intention) that is the direct source of the obligations. Given these 
problems, any attraction of Bratman's view must thus come back then to the attractiveness 
of the framework of individual agency.  However, as we shall see in the next chapter, we 
may well be able to give a richer understanding of the feeling of constraint by abandoning 
it. As Gilbert says, “If a shared intention is such that one cannot unilaterally release oneself 
from participation in it by simple change of mind then there must be something other than 
a structure of personal intentions at the core of any shared intention.”131
129 Bratman, 1999b, p.105.
130 Bratman, 1999c, p.126.
131 Gilbert, 2009, p.495.
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2.6 – Chapter summary
In this chapter,  I have set out the set out what might motivate us to accept the 
framework  of  individual  agency  and  the  challenges  to  such  an  account  that  lead  to 
Bratman's robustly social Shared Cooperative Activity Account. However, while Bratman's 
account is robustly social, it appears that this might not be equivalent to its being robustly  
collective. The SCA account does seem able to explain the experience of unity, but makes it 
stronger and more demanding than we might expect. It makes some sense of the feeling of 
collective  intentionality,  but  in  doing  so  has  to  make  use  of  complex  structures  of 
intentional inter-reliance that may be too demanding for real examples of collective action. 
Further, the structures of personal intentions as Bratman sets them up are not detached 
from the individual's own sense of personal agency, and thus he cannot make sense of the 
feeling  of  detachment.  In  particular,  he  must  deny  the  existence  of  the  feeling  of 
detachment from the sense of control of the collective act. The biggest struggle is its failure 
to explain the direct nature of the feeling of constraint. One option, in Bratman's defence, 
is to claim that robust sociality is just the best we can get and that robust collectivity is just 
an illusion. However, such a counsel of despair only seems credible if all other options have 
been ruled out, i.e. if there are no alternatives. In the next chapter I will explore Gilbert's 
Plural Subject Theory as a relevant alternative.
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Chapter 3 – Plural Subjects
Let us return to our two hill walkers and their collective act of climbing to the top 
of Scafell Pike. Recall that the departure point of the last chapter was that when we describe 
this  act,  we  must  see  it  as  the sum  of  the  actions  of  the  two  walkers  considered  as  
individuals. This departure point is the framework of individual agency (FIA). It is motivated 
by  the  idea  that  collective  action  must  either  be  the  act  of  a  mysterious  collective  
organism/spirit,  or  it  must  be  no  more  than  the  sum  of  individual  actions.  Its  most 
sophisticated  realisation  was  given  as Bratman's  Shared  Cooperative  Activity  (SCA) 
account. The SCA account allows that activity is characterised at the level of the collective 
(i.e.  non-summatively), but  remains  true  to the  spirit  of  FIA by claiming that  we can 
understand  the  relevant  intentional  attitudes  as characterised  at  the  level  of  separate 
individuals (i.e. summatively), by making them interdependent in complex ways. As we 
saw, this theory goes some way towards making sense of our phenomenology. However, it 
still failed to fully make sense of our experiences of constraint and detachment. 
The departure point for this chapter will be to question the founding assumption of 
the last. Rather than accept that rejecting the organic thesis leaves us with only the sums of 
individual attributes to play with, here I posit the possibility of a different kind of collective 
agent. This collective agent is not a separate entity, but rather it is comprised of a plurality  
of  socially united people.  It will be referred to as a plural subject.  In the first section of this 
chapter, I  will  argue that  the  existence  of  such  pluralities is  part  of  our  everyday 
understanding of social life and that they  are  understood as  the intentional products of 
instances of uniting together. Having shown such a notion of intentional social unity to be 
commonplace, the task will be to explicate it, and I will put forward the case that Margaret 
Gilbert's  Plural Subject Theory (PST)132 fills this role. The chapter's structure  will  parallel 
the dialectical  approach  of the  last  chapter  –  i.e.  starting  out  with  some  theoretical 
considerations  (in this case, considerations about what it  is  that distinguishes the social  
from the individual) and then,  in the following sections,  seek to refine and clarify  our 
132 This account is developed throughout Gilbert's work but in particular see 1992, 1996b, 2000a and 
2006.
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understanding  by considering the  four  elements of our experience of collective action in 
turn. 
Gilbert's PST account shares the organic thesis's rejection of the FIA. However, in 
contrast  to the organic  thesis,  Gilbert's  non-individual  agent (the  plural  subject) is  not 
some entity that exists separately from the relevant individuals; rather, it is something that 
they together comprise through becoming  socially  united.  For Gilbert, this  social  unity 
requires the  sharing, or as we might say the pooling, of  the individuals'  agency.  For this 
pooling of agency to occur, Gilbert believes that the relevant individuals must together, in 
conditions of common knowledge, make joint commitments to hold certain attitudes or do 
certain things as a we. I will unpack these notions in detail as the chapter progresses, but for 
now let us just consider our two hill walkers. On Gilbert's account, for us to jointly walk to 
the top of the hill: we must be engaging in the activity of walking to the top, and we, each 
in conditions of common knowledge, must have jointly committed to be a plural subject that 
intends  to walk  thus.  For Gilbert  then,  the hill  walkers  are  not  merely cooperating  in 
having mutually dependent other-directed intentions (as they are for Bratman); rather, they 
are cooperating in sharing one single  collective intention.  The notions of joint intention, 
plural subjects and collective intention will be explained as the chapter progresses.
In the last chapter, I made the case that Bratman's summative theory fails to fully 
get to grips with the four aspects of the phenomenology of collective action. In this chapter,  
I argue that Gilbert's non-summative theory is able to give a better account of the general 
character of all four aspects. However, as we shall see, there is a theoretical cost to accepting 
Gilbert's theory over Bratman's; it involves her explanation of the power of the plural will 
over the individual who is part of it. Justifying this cost involves grappling with the puzzle  
of  how to square our understanding of ourselves as free autonomous individuals with the 
notion of normative constraint and detachment. The existence of this puzzle for Gilbert's 
account might be thought to show that  Bratman's  theory (which does not face such a 
puzzle) is to be preferred – even with its apparent explanatory deficiencies.  Following the 
establishment of the superiority of Plural Subject Theory in capturing our social experience 
in this current chapter, I will approach this puzzle by comparing our constraint by our own 
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wills and our constraint by the plural wills we are part of. In tackling this puzzle, as I shall 
in the chapters that follow, I will be able to give a fuller picture of exactly what Gilbert's 
Plural Subject is.
3.1 – The possibility of social unity
The goal of this thesis is to build a theory of collective action. As we saw in the last 
chapter, the framework of individual agency is motivated by the idea that if we reject the 
possibility of an emergent social entity (whether it be a  mystical  disembodied spirit or a 
gigantic biological organism) the  only thing that we have left  to  do so with is individual 
agency. Here, I present a case for rejecting this premise is built around what I shall call the 
possibility of social  unity. Social unity, as I shall understand  it,  is the  intentional  binding 
together of individuals. Unlike the organic thesis, it posits the existence of no separate new 
organism. However, it does claim that something distinct from the mere sum of individuals 
can be brought into being. This distinct thing is composed of  those individuals united 
together as a social unit. The possibility of this social unity undermines the motivation for 
the  FIA  because the socially-united-plurality-of-individuals is a  plausible alternative 
candidate for the role of collective agent. In this section I establish that the possibility of 
social unity is part of our everyday understanding of social life.133 In the following sections, 
I  explore Gilbert's theoretical understanding of this general idea of social unity, in terms of 
her notions of the plural subject and of joint commitment.
To get to grips with the notion of social unity we must first grasp the central place 
its possibility plays in our everyday understanding of social life. A fruitful way to approach 
this is to start with a situation in which the phenomenon is clearly absent: let us imagine a 
lonely  Robinson  Crusoe  sitting  on  the  beach.  Perhaps  he  is marvelling  at  his  own 
self-sufficiency as he cooks the wild goat he single-handedly hunted. Such a life is surely the 
paradigmatic  non-social  existence.  The  contrast  between Crusoe's  existence and the 
133 This dialectical method mirrors Gilbert's in her foundational work On Social Facts (1992), where she 
comes to the importance of collective action through a concern with what it is that defines the social. In 
particular in that work, she is interested in contrasting her view with Max Webber's sociological account 
of the social as a collection of any actions that take into account, and are thereby orientated in response to, 
the behaviour of others (Webber, 1907).
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experiences of the individuals involved in my paradigm examples of collective action – the 
lovers sharing a cake, the mountaineers working as a team to reach the summit of Everest,  
the rugby players jointly pushing the bus and the local residents banding together to fight 
the development of their local park – is stark. If – as I shall here – we define the  phrase 
'social life' to mean lives that involve social union,134 then, the lives of the agents in these 
examples are clearly social lives, whereas Crusoe's island life clearly is not. What we want to 
know is what is the relevant difference between the non-social life of Crusoe and the social 
activities of our collective actors? As Gilbert asks, “... why do we pick out some phenomena 
as 'social' and deny to others this description?”135
The question might seem odd because its answer appears so obvious; isn't Crusoe's 
life non-social  simply because it  lacks other people? However this does not capture the 
whole story.  Of course, it would be strange to deny that an isolated individual is living a 
non-social life.136 This though is not to say that the converse – i.e. the proximity of other 
people – is in and of itself enough to  imply the existence of social  unity. If this were the 
case, then merely adding others to Crusoe's surroundings should make his life social, but it 
does not.  So much can be seen by way of an element of the original Crusoe story that is 
often  missed  out  in  the  established  myth of  the  archetypal  isolated  man.137 This oft 
overlooked element  is  that,  our  primary  character  is  not truly  alone;  the  island  he  is 
marooned on is also frequented by so called 'savages'.138 The point is that despite the mere 
existence of a multitude of persons on the island, his life still looks to be a non-social one. 
Or,  to add additional complexity, at least it does until later in the story when one of the 
134 It might be argued that this use of the term 'social' is narrower than that employed in common usage. 
This may be, but I follow Gilbert in thinking that it is at least a paradigmatic use of this term. Gilbert 
acknowledges that the term “... is sometimes used to express a less rich notion” (1998, p.94). However, 
even if we were to accept that a looser usage was common, it would not damage the forthcoming 
argument and we could merely stipulate the usage here to be a term of art.
135 Gilbert, 1996c, p.265.
136 Though consider the case of a club containing a single person who keeps a once popular club going, 
giving speeches, writing down the minutes etc. even though she is the only remaining member, in the 
hope that others will soon again join. This may be an example of a solitary social activity, but if so, it is a 
special case that seems parasitic on the social unity of the club when it does have members. If, say, all the 
other people in the world had died, and thus that there was no possibility of the club ever again having 
more than one member it would be odd to continue to regard such activity as social.
137 As noted in Defoe, 1994, the idea of Crusoe as the archetype of the isolated individual has become 
somewhat separated from the detail of the narrative in the original (proto-)novel.
138 Defoe, 1994.
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indigenous population,  given the name 'Friday', escaping from his own group  (and their 
plan to eat him), comes to join Crusoe.  Though  this pair are far from becoming social 
equals, they do appear to form a social unit.139 What, then, is the difference between the set 
composed of Crusoe and Friday, which does constitute a social group and the set composed 
of Crusoe and the other islanders, which does not? 
Such considerations move us on to  a second possible  condition for social unity: 
interaction.  Clearly,  a  Crusoe  who interacts  with  no  one  is  living  a  non-social  life. 
However,  again we must be  careful  in moving from  affirming this  fact  to  asserting its 
converse. It cannot only be the fact that Crusoe interacts with Friday that makes their lives  
social, for Crusoe may well be interacting with all of the 'savages' – though he fails to form 
a social group with them. For example, he may be changing direction when he sees them 
coming, trying to beat them to discoveries of food, wrestling with and killing them when 
he can, and so on.140 Gilbert  supports  the claim that mere interaction is not enough for 
social life with an example of a population of misanthropic humans living scattered in a 
large forest. She invites us to imagine that when any  individual catches sight of another 
individual, they attempt to beat and kill them. These vicious people can certainly be said to 
interact with each other, but they clearly do not live as a society.141
It is not by accident that  Gilbert's  imagined  population of misanthropic  humans 
sounds very much like the fantasy 'state of nature' that is invoked by social contract theories 
139 Putting aside scepticism about whether Friday is treated as another rational agent rather than a mere 
savage animal-like other. (see footnote 150 below for more on this scepticism).
140 These considerations are akin to those that arose when I first tried to illuminate the phenomenology of 
collective action. In Chapter One I used the example of driving a car down a busy high-street to 
illuminate the insufficiency of interpersonal interaction to characterise collective action. Driving a car 
down a road involves interacting with other people on that road, but this does not mean that one is 
performing a collective action with them. Likewise, on its own, it would not be enough to mean that one 
formed a society with them. Of course, the difference between Crusoe's relationship with the other 
islanders and the car driver's relationship with the other drivers and pedestrians is that we are not likely to 
think that the car driver is a social isolate; she does her driving whilst living a social life with those other 
drivers and pedestrians. However, this is not necessarily the case – imagine that one has been dropped on 
an alien planet and is driving around – the fact that one is driving about, or at least this fact on its own, is 
not enough to make it the case that one can say that one is part of a society with them.
141 Gilbert, 1992, p.36. To save us from imagining that it is only the viciousness of the interaction that make 
such lives non-social, she also sets out a similar example involving shy mushroom pickers. (1992, P.36). I 
will return to this example in the concluding chapter of this thesis.
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as the conceptually pure non-social life.142 Identifying the non-social is a key general move 
for theories that  attempt to move us towards an understanding of the bond of society.  
These discussions often invoke the notion of common interest as key to understanding 
social life. Is common interest, then, that which defines social union? Not quite, for there 
must be something more than the objective sharing of interests in a distributive sense. This 
can be seen in the fact that it may be true of those in the state of nature that they would be 
better off being in a society (i.e. they share a common interest) but this does not mean that 
they are thus already in a society. Rather, if the notion of common interest plays a part in 
defining social life, it must be via some actual process of coming to agree to be bound by a 
common interest. This fact may be obscured by the way in which sociologists and political 
theorists sometimes group together certain sets of people and talk of them as united by 
their shared characteristics. For example, Marxist social theorists see the set of people with 
common economic  interests,  due  to  their  need  to  work  for  a  wage  and  their  lack  of  
ownership  of  the  means  of  production,  as being  united  as  a  social  class  (namely,  the 
working class). Nevertheless,  it is not clear that such theorists mean to suggest  that the 
working class is socially united in the sense I am trying to capture .  Indeed Karl Marx's 
repeated  calls  for the  working  class  to  unite  appear  to  imply  that  merely  sharing  the 
characteristics that  make them the  working class,  does  not  mean that  they  are  already 
united.143 All of which is not to claim that mere sets do not have sociologically important 
causal impacts. Take the case of the set made up of all women in China. It is smaller than 
the set made up of all the men in China,  and according to some social scientists this fact 
has real consequences for the functioning of Chinese social life, increasing the risk of social 
unrest  in  the  country.144 However,  the  objective  social  importance  of  their  shared 
characteristics  does not in itself  make them automatically into something that is  socially  
142 Recall Rousseau's talk (noted in Chapter One, Section 3) of such things as men becoming social by 
“...uniting their separate powers” such that they “... are directed by a single motive and act in concert” 
(Rousseau, 2004, p.14).
143 Further, Marx's talk of the working class going through stages seems ripe for interpretation as the process 
of change from being a mere class to become a social unit. This can be seen in the way he describes social 
progress. For example, he says that at an early historical stage “.... the Labourers still form an incoherent 
mass scattered over the whole country, broken up by their mutual competition”. As industry progresses, 
however, “... the workers begin to form combinations (Trades unions) against the bourgeois; they club 
together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision 
beforehand for these occasional revolts.”[emphasis mine] (2000, p.252).
144 As those low-status young males, who are finding it very hard to find partners, have an incentive to 
revolt. (Hudson & Boer, 2005).
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united. As Gilbert puts it, having “... a shared way of life and common interests … alone 
cannot be said to make a population into a collectivity”.145
So, social  unity is  not an objective given;  rather, it is  the result of  some actual 
process of becoming bound together. A fruitful way that Gilbert expresses this point is by 
saying  that  participation  in  social  life  involves  “...  a  type  of  alliance,  a  partnership  of 
sorts.”146 Exploring this way of expressing our social experience can give us further insight 
into our common understanding of social  unity.  What,  then,  are the allusions that  are 
conjured by talk of forming an alliance? Alliances are generally thought to be founded on 
the perception of a connection based on kinship or common interest.  However, this is 
never all there is to such unions, for it is implicit that the parties must not just conceive that 
they are kin or that they have common interests, rather they must  do something to make 
their  alliance  concrete  – i.e. to  actually  bind  themselves  together. They  are  not 
automatically united by whatever it is they share; rather, they must intentionally form what 
we might loosely call a partnership. This talk of the necessity of binding, of becoming allies, 
of partnership is part of the fabric of our understanding of what it is to live a social life and 
implicit in our understandings of these terms is the notion that such a life involves  more 
than mere objectively shared characteristics. What is common between these terms is that 
they  show  that  being  socially  united goes  beyond  merely  being  objectively groupable 
together, it is rather subjectively making ourselves into groups. I use the terms 'subjective' 
and 'objective' here not in the metaphysical sense of what is  really true, but rather in  a 
narrower  ontological  sense  concerning what  is  it  that  makes these  things true.  That  is, 
making ourselves into groups can be understood as  a  subjective  process, insofar as it is a 
function of the choices of subjects, rather than a function of the brute descriptions of those  
145 Gilbert, 1992, p.39. That said, there are times when social theorists talk of sets of people with shared 
characteristics in a way that implies that they are already united, but as Gilbert points out “... one may 
sometimes be tempted to call something, T, an X if it is likely to become an X or if you think it ought to 
be an X. However, if one realises that this is why one is saying that T is an X, one will realise at the same 
time that ones does not believe that T, is, as it stands, literally an X.” (1992, p.228).
146 Gilbert, 1996c, p. 271. A fact that she sees as gaining “... some support from etymology, in that the Latin 
socius means 'ally.'” (p. 271).
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subjects.147 All this can be expressed in more simple terms by saying that social life is what  
we make it.148
Returning to the example of the end of Robinson Crusoe's isolation, we might ask: 
what  actually happens  when  Friday  forms  a  social  union with  Crusoe?  How do  they 
intentionally make themselves into a social group?  Charles Taylor  describes the properly 
functioning  construction  of  society  as  a  process  whereby  individuals  become “...  men 
deliberating together upon what will be binding on all of them.”149 Given that Crusoe, as 
described in the novel, conceives of himself as elevated by his superior white race over the 
savage Friday, we might think that it is unrealistic to suppose that they debate together in 
any politically ideal sense. Nevertheless, if we are to suppose that their relationship is of a 
different kind to that between Crusoe and the goats he herds (i.e. that they really do form a 
society) then it seems that we must claim that they do something that is at least in the same 
vein as Taylor's joint deliberation.150 One thing that we can say of the pair is that they 
come to see their fates as intertwined, and that they share in some common understandings 
and rituals  which they see  as  their understandings and rituals  (in contrast  to the other 
islanders who do not share this commonality). Such a process can be seen in the plot of the 
original  novel  where,  though Crusoe  does  teach Friday  to call  him 'Master',151 he also 
147 I mean to invoke the same allusions as John Searle points towards with his distinction between epistemic 
and ontological objectivity, though I do not mean to commit to his exact theoretical position (see Searle, 
1996 & 2010). I discuss Searle's use of these terms in Chapter One, Section 1.3.
148 It is because Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory accepts the view of social union that is subjective rather than 
objective (in the sense described above) that it is an intentionalist project. Thinking that social union 
involves the active intentional activity of individuals fits with Schmitt's criteria of being “...characterised in 
part in terms of intentional attitudes and their contents.” (Schmitt, 2003, p.22).
149 Taylor, 1985a, p.208.
150 Scepticism about the likelihood that agents with such unequal power would, in the actual world, come to 
see their relationship as a true social union is nicely captured by the poignancy of Gilbert 's observation of 
the Native Indian Tonto's reply (in the popular 1950's television series) to the Lone Ranger's inclusion of 
him within the scope of the use of the term we; “We, white man?” (Gilbert, 1996b, p.198).
151 Defoe, 1994, p.149.
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teaches him to share his language,152 his religion and his ways of living153 and there certainly 
seems to be some sense in which they come to see their fate together as a common fate. To 
put it more abstractly, we might say that they come to see themselves as a we. This is the 
point that Gilbert wants to press home: forming a social group is an intentional act  that 
appears to result from seeing oneself together with others as constituting a we.
3.1.a – Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory
I began this chapter with a rejection of the idea that once we have exorcised the  
separate  social  entity  as  an  explanation  for  collective  action,  we are  left  with  only  the 
properties of individuals to fulfil that role. The task, then, was to locate this alternative 
candidate. Gilbert finds her answer in the central sense in which we use the pronoun we, 
that is in the possibility of forming a social unit. She calls this social unit a plural agent.154 
To help overcome any fears that such a plural subject is just as mysterious as a separate  
social  entity,  I  have  located  the notion  of  social  unity  as  a  commonplace  part  of  our 
understanding of social life and teased out, from the way in which this unity is seen as an 
alliance, the fact that we see it  as an intentional creation rather than a natural fact.  This 
understanding of social unity allows us to propose an account of collective action such that 
the performer of a collective act is a plural subject formed through the intentional unity of 
individual agents.
On one level, this social unity account might be thought to be explanatorily worse 
than the simple summative account in terms of requiring the existence of an extra kind of 
agent – i.e. the plural agent. However, in another sense it is clearly a victor in the Occam's 
152 Sharing a language is important here because it allows more than merely being able to coordinate their 
interactions. Rather, the fact that Friday becomes capable of communicating with Crusoe allows more 
than just an exchange of information about the external world. It allows for the pair to reach what we 
might call a publicly open consensus about their shared lives. By 'consensus', here, I do not mean that they 
must each individually share the same views (given the divergence in their characters, at least at first, we 
might think this impossible). Rather I mean to use the term 'consensus' in the same kind of way that 
Taylor employs it. That is, in his terms, the sharing of inter-subjective meaning (Taylor, 1985b, p.36). In 
this sense the pair create what Taylor calls the 'general will' (Taylor, 1985b), or – as we might alternatively 
put it – they come to have public purposes. I will return to the importance of things being 
out-in-the-open/common knowledge later in this chapter.
153 Defoe, 1994, p.156.
154 Gilbert, 1992, p.152.
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razor test by virtue of being  simpler – that is, it does not require any complicated reduction 
or interdependent individual intentions. According to this picture the we is not some mere 
unifying description of an interplay of  Is, rather it is an emergent creation, by those Is of 
something new, of a plural subject. It is a collective achievement – a  construction.  Thus, 
Gilbert  can  be  defended  from  the  accusation  of  invoking  the  'scary  monster'  of  a 
free-floating social entity that was evoked to justify a summativist approach at the start of 
the last chapter. Rather than suggesting that the plural subject is something mysterious that 
descends from the heavens to reign over people, her model is that it is something that the  
people themselves create through intentionally uniting together as one unit. There is a united 
performer, the plural subject, that acts, and thus things can be taken to be as they appear to 
be.
The question that naturally arises is what makes the notion of a plural subject any 
less mysterious than that of a separate collective entity? On this question Gilbert gives the 
impression that she sometimes regrets her choice of the term 'plural subject'155 – this is 
because some people “read too much” into it. By this I take her to mean that, they see it as 
invoking the very mysterious collective entity that we have dismissed.156 As I have hopefully 
made clear, such a reading misinterprets Gilbert; she does not think that the plural subject 
is a separate entity from individuals, rather she takes a plural subject to be a subject that  
individuals combine together to form.  As Hans Bernard Schmid puts it, Gilbert's plural 
subject is a “...softened and modernized version of the 'collective subject'”.157 Rather than 
looking for the author of collective actions in a mysterious collective social realm beyond 
that in which individuals exist, she believes that the individuals combined are the very thing 
that is the plural agent. Collective action, then, is neither the mere sum of individual acts  
nor is it the act of a separate singular social entity; rather, it is the action of individuals  
combined together as a plural subject.  That is not to say that the question of what this 
155 See for example, in 'Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social 
Phenomena' (2008) she stresses that she continues to use the term (after first introducing it in Gilbert, 
1989) “... just for the sake of a label” (Gilbert 2008,  p.502). I find it hard to understand Gilbert's 
remarks here, other than to suppose that she is being overly defensive about her theoretical set-up for fear 
of being mistakenly taken to be pushing a variant of the organic thesis. 
156 Gilbert, 2008, p.505.
157 Schmid, 2007, p.204.
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softened and modernised collective subject actually is has been resolved. In what follows, by 
considering the four base phenomenal characteristics of collective action, I will begin to put 
the meat on the bones of the  social  unity account, progressing towards Gilbert's  Plural 
Subject Theory (PST). At the heart of PST is the notion of the plural subject, and I will set 
out how Gilbert believes we construct that subject.  The question of exactly what kind of 
thing  it is  that we thus create will be returned to in the following chapters;  any residual 
mystery concerning the notion of agents 'combining together' should thus be cumulatively 
reduced.
3.2 – The we -vs- the feeling of unity
To understand how Gilbert's  account gets  to grips  with the  phenomenology of 
unity, we must understand her conception of the formation of a plural subject.  As I said 
above,  Gilbert  sees  in  the  central  way  in  which  we  use  the  English  pronoun  'we'  an 
invocation of the plural subject.  Take the example described in the former chapters of the 
complexities of sharing a cake. In the example, Celia baulks at being asked “Shall we share a 
cake?” by Bernard.  For Gilbert, Celia knows that, to perform what she understands as a 
collective  act  (cake  sharing)158 with  Barnard,  she  would  have  to  become  a 
socially-united-plurality  (i.e.  a  plural  subject)  with  him.  Hence,  Celia's  baulking  at 
Bernard's question is to be understood as her resisting the invitation to become a plural  
subject with him. According to this model, she rejects this invitation because she does not 
want  to  share  in  the  feeling  of  unity  that  intentionally  socially  uniting  with  another 
necessarily generates.
In a very broad sense, Gilbert's model can be understood as a contractualist model 
of  collective  action.159 In  political  theory,  contractualists  hold that  agreements  bind us 
together. They give us obligations and duties. In this sense, we might think that agreements 
are the kind of things that are perfect for creating social units. This account thus would say 
158 Note that it is acknowledged that there are forms of cake sharing that may not be collective acts; i.e. each 
individually agreeing to have half. But, this example is stipulated to be one where the act is seen as: eating 
the cake together.
159 A fact she acknowledges in Gilbert, 2006.
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that what happens when Friday is lost to his native group and joins together with Crusoe, is  
that  his  former  agreement  with  his  old  allies  is  broken  and  he  and  Crusoe  make  an 
agreement that they shall now live together and that they will do things as allies.160 There is, 
however, a problem with this as a model of social groups, a problem highlighted by those 
who criticise contractualism as a model of political obligation. While it may sound nice in 
theory, if we look at actual societies, it does not seem to be the case that individuals have all  
engaged in an actual practice of making agreements.161 Even when we scale down from the 
lofty height of nation states and look at our example of a miniature society of Crusoe and 
Friday it does not appear that even they must have made an agreement, at least not in the  
full blown sense, to have the kind of relationship they have. Indeed, surely this must be the 
case when they first met, as at this stage they have no common language in which to set out 
a formal agreement. Given that Gilbert believes the question of what it is to be in a society 
is tied to the question of what makes us capable of being united together such that we can 
perform collective actions, it should come as no surprise that she rejects the idea that social 
unity must be generated by  actual agreement.  Gilbert gives an example of two colleagues 
who happen to meet up, at first completely by luck, outside of work every day. She has us 
imagine that as they share part of the journey home; they both walk together. Now, after 
they  have  been doing this  for  some time,  they  may  come to see  each other  as  jointly  
walking (in the sense I have set out in this thesis). This can happen gradually over time 
without it ever having to be the case that they explicitly agreed that they would walk as a  
pair. We can see that they are indeed collectively acting, even without explicit agreement to 
so act, by noting that they will experience the phenomenology that I set out in the former  
chapters. They feel a sense of unity insomuch as they feel themselves to be walking together 
as a we. They feel their act to have collective intentionality insomuch as they feel it to be 
something that they are doing together. They feel detachment and constraint in that they 
feel  that  if  another fails  to show up for the walk they have violated an obligation that 
belongs not to any one of them individually, but to both of them collectively.162 
160 Albeit allies with very unequal power relations.
161 In political theory it is known as the 'no actual contract problem' and it is discussed by Gilbert in her A 
theory of Political Obligation (2006, p.70 – 87).
162 One extreme example she gives is argument as a joint action, such as when a couple says “we argued all 
day.” (2006, p. 117) It seems like entering into an argument is the antithesis of entering into an 
agreement, for not only are arguments acrimonious, they can also be spontaneous and unconsidered. She 
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So if there need not be an explicit agreement, then what do we need? It is tempting 
to talk about tacit agreement – but it is unclear what this amounts to – Gilbert concedes 
that it is not completely wrong-headed to suggest that in all situations where people are 
allied  in  a  way  that  makes  collective  action  possible,  there  is  what  she  calls  an 
'agreement-like  structure'  in  play.  That  is,  this  allying  appears  to  share  features  with 
situations where there are explicit agreements. However, Gilbert claims that we need to 
recognise that  having an  “agreement-like structure” is not the same as  having an  actual 
agreement.163 The semantic question of  the scope of  the term 'agreement' is  not the key 
point here. If we are being linguistically liberal, we might say that Gilbert's model involves 
'agreement' in a very broad sense; however, it is clear that this is not a strict sense implied 
by people explicitly declaring themselves to be bound to a certain course of action.
Rather  than  an  explicit  declaration  to form an agreement,  Gilbert  believes  that 
collective action requires merely the commitment of the parties involved and an awareness, 
by all parties, that such commitment exists. Commitment is something that exists in formal 
agreement.  However, Gilbert believes that it does not require formal agreement. We can 
understand what Gilbert means by commitment by looking again at the Crusoe example: 
when Friday is rescued by Crusoe, though he cannot make a formal agreement with him – 
sharing no common language – he can make Crusoe aware that he wants to be allied with 
him (and this he does by lying prostrate on the ground)164 and Crusoe can make him aware 
that he sees this readiness on Friday's part, and he too is ready to share in such an alliance. 
Gilbert glosses the notion of awareness that the commitment exists in terms of openness of 
expression of  readiness/willingness  to commit,165 saying: “One can say at  least  that  each 
suggests, reasonably plausibly, that arguing can be seen as a collective action. It has the phenomenology 
that I described in the first chapter – when we argue we often feel that there is an 'us' that is arguing, so 
we can say that though we are at odds we feel ourselves to be united, we feel that we together have an aim 
to our activity, the aim of arguing. While I think that Gilbert is essentially right to see arguments as an 
example of the possibility of collective action without actual agreement, this is true only of certain types of 
argument. For example, two people arguing in the street need not see themselves as a we. This does not 
nullify Gilbert's point, however, which can be made as long as there is at least one kind of arguing that is a 
collective action. 
163 Gilbert, 2006, p. 117.
164 Defoe, 1994.
165 Note that the notion of commitment here is neither moral nor necessarily interpersonal; it is rather what 
Gilbert refers to as a 'commitment of the will' (e.g. Gilbert, 2006, p.127). I explore the exact nature of 
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party to the joint action does something expressive of readiness to participate in that action. 
Further,  each  party  makes  this  readiness  manifest  to  the  others.”166 The  notions  of 
awareness, openness and making things publicly manifest recalls the discussion of common 
knowledge given by philosophers such as David Lewis167 (discussed in the last chapter).168 
As I suggested there, though it is an interesting puzzle to work out exactly how we can 
make sense of such public awareness (especially given the apparent problem of a necessary 
infinite regress of knowledge), such a notion is understandable, and fixing the puzzle  is 
peripheral to our current investigation. 
The fact that the kind of commitment that occurs between Crusoe and Friday is 
necessarily public in its nature, is precisely the attribute which Gilbert believes means that it 
is special;  it is what allows it to remove us from being mere social isolates. For Gilbert; 
“Once  the  concordant  expressions  [of  personal  readiness]  have  all  occurred  and  are 
common knowledge between the parties then the joint commitment is in place.”169 This 
can happen in ways that seem to have structures very much like making deliberated upon 
agreements – the residents' association voting after a long meeting – or it can be something 
we can, as Gilbert puts it, “fall into”, as in the example the two workers that meet every day 
after work, and even more so in the example she gives of the collective action of kissing, of 
which she says that there is rarely any pre-standing discussion, rather “... someone expresses 
readiness for a kiss, say, by beginning to play one's own part of that process, and the other  
does likewise.”170
The picture we have of  how collective  action takes  place now looks  as  follows: 
collective  action  is  the  action  of  a  plural  subject  which  is  created  by  members  of  the 
collective  openly expressing their readiness to commit to being united.  Much has already 
been  said  about  Gilbert's  model  of  collective  action  being  founded  on  individuals 
this commitment further in the following chapter (Chapter Four).
166 Gilbert, 2006, p.120.
167 Lewis, 1969.
168 Chapter Two, Section three.
169 Gilbert, 2008, p.502.
170 Gilbert, 2006, p.120 Indeed one might think that pre-standing discussion tends to rather destroy the 
likelihood of genuine kissing.
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intentionally uniting together. Thus, it may seem redundant to ask if her model meets the 
requirement of explaining the experience of unity. Simply put, if collective action comes 
about  through  individuals  committing  to  perform  a  joint  action,  and  this  can  be 
understood as the creation of a plural subject, then they will feel the need to be united  
because they will feel that they have united themselves.
Returning to Gilbert's example of two people sharing a cake. Previously, I set the 
example up as follows: imagine a post-conference dinner where most people have just met, 
but two,  Tony and Celia, are engaged to be married. After the main course,  Tony asks 
Celia “Shall we share a pastry?” Celia nods to show agreement. Then, one of the other men, 
Barnard, turns to Celia, who is sitting on his right, and whom he hardly knows, and asks 
'Shall we share a pastry?'171 Celia feels put out by this question because it invites her to share 
something beyond the cake; it invites her to share in a kind of unity with Barnard. Before, I 
said that this example showed that a bond of some kind needs to exist for collective action to 
take place. Now that we have an outline of Gilbert's model, we can understand what this 
bond in question is. It is not some objective fact about them that bonds them together.172 
Rather, it is that they have committed to  do something together. In this sense they have 
committed  to become a  we.  Or to use  Gilbert's  terminology,  they  have  committed to 
consuming the cake as a plural subject. They are  committed to together forming a plural 
subject with the joint goal of having the pastry together,  and  this is what it is to share 
something in a strong sense.173
So, the feeling of unity is explained in Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory in virtue of 
the fact that collective action requires that individual agents see themselves as creating unity 
between each other; they must openly express their willingness to commit to forming a 
plural subject, and – in doing so – become so committed. In this sense, as Gilbert says,“... a 
joint commitment unifies people in a very real way.”174 For Gilbert, this means that in 
171 Gilbert, 1989, p. 175.
172 Though note, as in the discussion of economic classes above, sharing a relevant objective feature may well 
give them reason to join together.
173 Or at least this is what it is to share in contexts such as this, we can also have plain distributive sharing 
where each just gets their part.
174 Gilbert, 2000b, p.31.
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saying that our lives are social we are saying that we are “...beings both independent and 
interdependent, units that are unified into larger wholes.”175 
I claimed above that a plural subject is not a separate social entity, but rather is just  
the  individual  agents  united  together  in  some  sense;  I  have  now  claimed  that  this 
togetherness is created by those agents committing to be united. However, this raises the 
following question: if  they can not be committing to be a separate social entity, then are 
they just committing to be what they already are i.e. a set of individuals? The answer is that 
they  are  committing  to  become  the  agent  of  the  acts  that  they  intend  to  collectively 
perform. In this sense the thing that they are committing to be (distinct from the mere set 
they already are) is an agent.176 A problem with  this that the term 'agent' is  broad and 
carries with it much baggage that we may not necessarily want (for example moral/worth 
etc.)  To remove this worry, let us just stipulate that, whatever the wider uses of the term 
'agent', it is used here in a weaker sense. In this weaker sense to be an agent is just to be 
something that acts upon the world. In this way, we can read plural agents as truly being 
agents. This point, rather, hangs on a question of the metaphysics of agency that has not 
been addressed as yet; however, in a following chapter (Chapter Five) I will address what it 
means to be an agent.
3.3 – The we -vs- the feeling of collective intentionality
Now let us turn to the experience of collective intentionality; in the first chapter I 
had  us  recall  the  endeavours  of  Edmund  Hillary  and  Tenzing  Norgay,  the  mountain 
climbers  who  together  achieved  the  first  ascent  of  Everest.  Clearly,  this  activity  had  a 
purpose; getting to the top of the highest mountain in the world was no accidental activity.  
Indeed, an activity's being experienced as having purpose seems key to it being an action – 
a point that appears to hold for collective actions just as it does for individual actions.  
175 Gilbert, 2006a, p.1.
176 At one point Gilbert says something slightly different, which is that“ … [t]he parties are jointly 
committed as far as possible to emulate, by virtue of the actions of each, with respect to its intending, a 
single body that intends to do the thing in question.” (Gilbert, 2008, p.503, [emphasis mine]). It is hard, 
however, to work out what she might mean in this passage by the term 'emulate'. It appears to me that she 
is here just being overly cautious in emphasising that her account does not imply that the plural subject is 
an actual distinct organism. 
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Further,  the  fact  that  Tenzing  described  their  purposeful  activity  by  saying  that “We 
stepped up. We were there”177 points to the importance of the intentionality being directed 
not towards individual activity, but towards collective activity. This is the sense in which it 
must  be  collective  intentionality.  Further,  recall  that  discussion  of  deviant  causal  chain 
cases178 showed us that it is not enough that there is a collective intention; rather, this must 
be  the thing that settles the occurrence of the event.  In this  sense, we can say that the 
occurrence of the collective action must be settled by the collective intentionality.  This is 
what was concluded in the first chapter.
We also saw in the previous chapter that if we try to make sense of this in terms of 
the intentions of all the individual participants, we come up against Velleman's problem of 
control. This problem centres upon the apparent illegitimacy of any individual member of 
a collective intending for the collective as a whole. The issue is that it appears impossible 
that each could rightly think of themselves as settling the issue of the action's occurrence. 
The intentionality in question needs not just to cause the action, it needs to control it – i.e. 
settle the case about whether it comes about. Bratman's solution to this problem was  to 
require  that  collective  action  realises  a  complex structure  of  interlocking  personal 
intentions.  Gilbert's  is  far  easier  to express  and  I  will  suggest  that her  solution  to the 
problem of control is  not merely more economic,  moreover, it is  better fitting with the 
phenomenology.  Gilbert's solution to the problem of control  is that  the collective action 
need only be fixed by a singular intention: the intention of the plural subject.  This fits with 
how we experience collective acts –it is not that we are all each in control individually of  
the collective act, rather we are in charge of it collectively. When we are painting the house, 
it is us that must get it done etc. It also makes sense in terms of possession of the action – 
collective acts belong to the collective, in a non-distributive sense they are their action. In 
comparison, it  is  unclear  who  the  collective  action  belongs  to  on  Bratman's  model. 
Summative accounts  seem to be  open to the criticism that  perhaps  according to them 
actions seem to belong to everyone (over possession) and at the same time to no-one (under 
possession). 
177 Ullman, 1956, p.265.
178 See Chapter Two, Section Three.
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This might be a simpler solution to the problem of control – but the question then 
remains – what can it mean to say that there is a singular (rather than distributed) collective 
intention. As we saw in the last chapter, one of the things that motivates the framework of  
individual  agency  is  the  idea  that,  as  Searle  puts  it, all  intentionality  takes  place  in 
individual  brains.179 But is  this  assumption really  as  intuitively  clear  as  it  first  appears?  
Certainly, having rejected the notions of a literal world spirit and the notions of organic  
entity (as we have done) means that there can be no collective mind as in a collective brain. 
Gilbert accepts this; however, as we have seen, she thinks that having some gigantic brain is 
not the only way to  generate collective intentions. As we saw in the discussion of social 
unity at the start of this chapter, rather than something separate from us as individuals, for 
Gilbert, the plural agent is something that we comprise together as individuals. Collective 
intentions thus need not exist in collective brains, but can be generated together by us as a 
united whole.
On Gilbert's  Plural Subject Theory, the relevant individuals need not individually 
share the collective intention; rather they must only jointly commit to holding it as a body 
–  and,  as  such,  form  a  plural  subject.  This  answer  will  of  course,  as  it  stands,  be 
unsatisfactory to a  card carrying  believer in the framework of individual agency  (i.e. to a 
summativisit). What they will want to know is what does it really mean to jointly commit? 
Summativists can allow that individuals can commit to joint projects, in the sense outlined 
in Bratman's  SCA account  – that  is,  allow  that  individuals can each be committed to 
performing  a  joint  activity  on  the  basis  of  their  commonly  known  and  comparable 
individual intentions. However, for Gilbert “... joint commitment is not a concatenation of 
personal commitments.”180 Rather, she sees it as something that is robustly collective, and 
thus  something  that  –  while  not  creating  a  physical  collective  brain  –  does  create  a 
genuinely collective intention. Gilbert's idea is that joint commitments are created by what 
she calls the 'pooling of wills'.  We can understand this as a process by which people allow 
their agency to become part of a larger plural agent. This process is like sharing in money  
179 Searle, 1996, p.24.
180 Gilbert, 2008, p.502.
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by putting it into a joint bank account. If Bob and Jim pool their money then this does not 
mean that half the money is Bob's and half is Jim's; rather, all of it belongs to both of them  
jointly.  Likewise,  Gilbert  thinks  that,  with  joint  commitment,  if  Bob  and  Jim  jointly 
commit to become a plural subject with the collective intention x, then it is not that half 
the commitment is Bob's and half Jim's; rather, the whole commitment is theirs together.
One problem we might envisage with Gilbert's  plural  subject account is  that of 
getting started. If Bob cannot jointly commit without Jim's doing so, and Jim cannot do so 
without Bob's doing so, then how do they kick the whole thing off?  Gilbert's solution  is 
that each expresses conditional willingness to jointly do something and that these combine 
together to form joint commitment. The problem of getting started seems to be the same as 
Bratman's  problem of  each  being  an  enabling  background to  the  other.  However,  the  
outcome is collective rather than individual. When discussing Bratman's SCA account, I 
introduced the thought of two agents standing at the side of a pool, neither wanting to 
jump in alone. According Bratman's framework, we can imagine that they get around this 
by each conditionally holding personal intentions to jump which have the other's holding a 
meshing intention built into them. Each says, “I will if you will”, and they both can then 
jump  at the same time.  In contrast, according Gilbert's  framework, we can imagine that 
they chose to pool their wills  together,  by way of each making their willingness to do so 
public, such that they no longer see the choice over whether to jump as belonging to one or 
the other of them but rather they jointly commit to it. Each thus says “We will jump!”181 
So, for Gilbert, the pooling of wills in this way requires that it is out in the open that each  
individual is willing for there to be such a pooling. In this way, Gilbert,  like Bratman, 
believes in the importance of common knowledge to create the public nature of collective 
action.  The difference, however, is in what  it is that needs to be commonly known. For 
Bratman, it is the personal intentions of each individual that must be in the public sphere.  
For Gilbert, it is rather just the willingness to be jointly committed that must be in the 
public  sphere.  Looking  at  Bratman's  account  through  Gilbert's  eyes  we  can  see  why 
Bratman's  SCA  account  provides sufficient,  though  not  necessary,  conditions  for  the 
181 To fully understand the notion of joint commitment we must, of course, say more than this. I will return 
to examination of what it means to jointly commit – particularly, what it means in relation to one's 
individual autonomy – in the next chapter.
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creation of a collective action. This is because any act that has the form that Bratman sets 
out is going to, by virtue of having this form, also end up satisfying Gilbert's conditions for 
joint commitment to the plural subject.182
3.4 – The we -vs- the feeling of detachment
In the last chapter, I argued that it  is  difficult for summative accounts, such as  
Bratman's SCA account, to explain the feeling of detachment. This is, because they require  
that  the purpose of collective action must be reflected in the sum of the individual views 
about the action. That is the intentionality of the collective act implies that each individual 
holds a corresponding individual intention that is directed towards the collective. Thus, 
there  is,  for  them,  no  distance  between  the  collective  intentions  and  the  individual  
intentions. A non-summative account, however, does not suffer this problem for it allows 
that there is distance between the collective agency and the individual agency. 
Recall the example of the  Greenbank residents' association  coming to hold their 
collective view on the basis of a vote where not all the members are present. Each member 
does not feel the collective view to be a sum of their view together with the views of the 
other group members, but rather  each  feels it to be something separate from their own 
view. On Gilbert's account this possibility is easily explained. For, on it we can say that, the 
individuals involved in the group are free to jointly commit to becoming a plural subject 
with a certain view, without this thereby having to be the view that they individually hold. 
So, for example, the minority, who lose the vote over whether the GRA should write a  
letter say, can nonetheless accept that together they are committed to sending such a letter. 
Importantly (for explaining the phenomena at hand), they can do so without themselves 
changing their minds about the wisdom of doing so. The possibility of compatibility with 
lack of corresponding intentions is thus not a problem on the PST account. So, according 
to Gilbert,  the  single  thing  that  constrains  the  practical  reasoning  of  both  parties  is  
182 There is some ambiguity about whether Bratman is trying to provide a fully sufficient explanation for 
collective action – while the examples that I have set out in the previous chapter appear to imply that he 
does, at certain points he appears to be more equivocal. Gilbert complains about this ambiguity (2008, 
p.489).
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something over which neither party has solitary control. Thus, at the same time, each feels 
both to be part of the collective action, and also to be detached from it.183
Given the above, Gilbert's account does not need to make use of operant members 
in the same way that a summative account does.  However, this does not mean that such 
operant  members  cannot  at  times  play  a  part  in  collective  actions.  Indeed,  we  might 
imagine that Gilbert's  theory must be able to explain this in order to fully capture the  
example of the GRA voting  example, for she must be able to explain how it is that the 
members who are not present at the meeting come to be jointly committed to writing the 
letter.  The difference between the role played by operant members on Gilbert's account 
and that played by them on accounts like Bratman's is that while on summative accounts 
the operant  members  must be seen as  setting the views  of  each member – on Gilbert's 
account the individuals can continue to hold their individual views, but merely commit to 
the operant members setting what they are committed to holding as a collective.  This fits 
the phenomenology of detachment better, as we feel detached from the actions of operant 
members, that is, we feel their actions not to be directly for us as individuals, even though 
we do feel them to be acting for us as a collective. Further, this phenomenon of detachment 
can be experienced as complete ignorance of the collective intention of which one is part  
because one has ceded power to an operant other. Gilbert gives the example of a couple:  
“Asked about his vacation plans, George might turn, in ignorance, to his wife Rosa, and ask 
'What are our plans, love?'”184 
For large groups, because individuals will not necessarily be acquainted with each 
other, there is a need for a weaker version of the claim that it must be out in the open to 
the  participants  that  each has made themselves  part  of  the  required commitment.  The 
common knowledge condition must be tempered somewhat in large groups, for it does not 
seem to be the case that each agent must know all there is to know of the intentions of the 
other members of her group. Does this mean that we must abandon the requirement for 
common knowledge? Gilbert claims not; she claims that we merely need to understand that 
183 Which is precisely what makes it such that Velleman's 'Problem of Control' (as discussed above) is not a 
problem for this account. 
184 Gilbert, 2000b, p.23.
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in large groups individuals have what she calls population common knowledge. As she says, in 
“ …  many populations, particularly large ones, the parties do not know one another  as  
particular individuals. For instance, they may know that many people live around them on 
a particular island but they do not know of them as particular individuals … [here] the  
parties of the commitment would understand themselves to be jointly committed insofar as 
they are  living on the island qua island dwellers.”185 That is, while a participant in a large 
collective action may not be able to point out every other member, they can, however, 
make reference to them by virtue of some distinguishing feature that makes them a member 
of the collective in question, and it is out in the open that agents who have this feature are  
part of the specified commitment.
3.5 – The we -vs- the feeling of constraint
Given  that  PST  is  able  to  found  the  experience  of  detachment  on  the real 
phenomenon of  the  collective  view being something other  than the  sum of  individual 
views, it is easy to see how this detached-other-view can thus be experienced as coming into 
conflict with the individual’s view. In the case of the GRA, the individuals who vote not to 
send the letter will clearly feel that the stance that they come to hold collectively – as a 
plural subject with their fellow members – is in conflict with  the view that they hold as 
individuals. Recall,  however,  that  the  feeling  of  constraint  does  not  just  consist  in  the  
possibility of opposition between the individual view and the collective view; rather it also  
comprises  of  the  fact  that  the  individual  feels  some  sense  of  obligation  towards  that 
collective view and towards playing their part in realising it. Hence, in the example of the 
Leicester Tigers  engaging in the collective action of pushing their broken down coach up 
the hill, Bob, a lazy team member who personally does not care if the bus reaches the garage 
at the top, feels constrained to play his part in the pushing. If Bob manifests his personal  
preference and fails  to  push,  he is  open to rebuke,  and this  rebuke is  founded on  his 
allowing himself to be guided by his personal goals, even though they conflict with those of  
the collective. 
185 Gilbert, 2001, p.52 [emphasis mine].
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The feeling of constraint then appears to reflect a real obligation  that is a direct 
result of the team membership; recall the helpful bystander and how she is not obliged to 
continue. Further, the rebuke that the other team members are justified in issuing involves 
them having the standing to issue such rebukes. They have this standing because they are 
all intimately connected through their pooled will to the joint commitment to push the bus 
as a team. For Gilbert, then, the constraint that issues from being part of a collective action  
is not, as it is on Bratman's account, an indirect result of morality, politeness or feelings of  
loyalty, rather “ …one who calls another on his inappropriate action may well [rightly] 
justify his intervention  by reference simply to the shared intention.”186 and this is  because 
“[t]ogether they  constitute  the creator  of  the  commitment;  the 'one'  who imposed the  
relevant normative constraint on each of the parties”.187 Of course, as Gilbert also notes, 
that your fellow team members have the standing to rebuke does not mean that they are 
always justified in rebuking.188 In the rugby club example, though Bob is part of the plural 
subject that is pushing the bus, and his fellow players thus have the standing to rebuke him 
if he fails to do this, they may not be justified in doing so all things considered if he has, say, 
a bad back. This is because, it would be cruel to make  Bob honour his commitment if 
doing so will cause him lots of pain and thus there may be a moral obligation to excuse him 
from  his  commitment.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  he  does  not  have  such  a 
commitment.189 So the difference between the way that Bratman's SCA attempts to explain 
the feeling of constraint and the way that Gilbert's PST attempts to explain it, is that: SCA 
allows  for  some obligations, but  requires that  these are  just “downstream factors”,190 (i.e. 
that  they  require  additional  factors  to justify the  nature of  the shared intention itself); 
whereas,  according to PST, the  “... obligations of the parties are, one might say, purely 
internal to the commitment”191 (i.e. that they “.. inhere in the shared intention itself”).192 It 
186 Gilbert, 2008, p.499 [emphasis in original].
187 Gilbert, 2008, p.504 We might worry that this implies that it is only together, i.e. as the we that they can 
rebuke. Gilbert’s answer is that a “ … given party is in a position to demand conformity or rebuke for 
non-conformity as co-owner of the action in question … he might say, 'Give that to me that’s mine – qua 
one of us!”(Gilbert, 2008, p.507).
188 Gilbert, 2008, p.498.
189 A further complication is that, you might suppose that this 'if-injured→get out' clause may be implicitly 
written into the plural commitment to push the bus. I discuss this possibility in section 4 below.
190 Gilbert, 2008, p.500.
191 Gilbert, 2008, p.507 [emphasis mine].
192 Gilbert, 2008, p.500.
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is this difference that means that, while Bratman must essentially explain away the feeling 
of constraint, in contrast, Gilbert can show how it is an essential feature of our experience 
of collective action. 
3.5.a – The complication of hierarchy and standing 
conventions
So we have arrived at a picture of  collective action that  sees  it  as  an essentially 
voluntarily entered-into social  union.  The complication of  this picture is  that  collective 
actions do not always take place in the smooth ways that paradigm examples that I set up 
might  suggest  that  they  do.  Thomas  Smith makes  the  following point;  “...  each of  us 
engages in such activity against a background of circumstances, including the actions and 
states of others, which we do not choose, and cannot control. For these reasons, one often  
freely  and rationally partakes of  intentional  joint activity, of  which one does not really 
approve, and which one does not intend.”193 In the next chapter (Chapter Four) I am going 
to be arguing that Gilbert does not fully grasp the nettle of this point  and that there are 
further issues that are brought up by the notion of constraint; chief among them  is the 
relation to autonomy.  More immediately I  will return to this in the next chapter, where 
normative constraint will be discussed in more depth, and where I will suggest that it raises  
a challenge for Gilbert, the challenge of understanding how this constraint can be squared 
with our conception of individuals  as necessarily  being at  least  minimally autonomous,  
which ultimately  requires  moving  past  her  conception  of  voluntary  pooling  of  wills. 
Because of this, I will come ultimately to suggest that her Plural Subject Theory – pooling 
of the wills - is overly voluntary and must be replaced by a notion of 'entangling of the wills'. 
However, that discussion must be delayed for us to finish our current task of gaining focus 
on the general shape of Gilbert's account. Here, let me set out how Gilbert does attempt to 
engage with the possibility of what she calls hierarchy.194 
Gilbert understands the possibility of  hierarchy  as the existence of 'followers and 
leaders' within collective actions. Whilst army generals or heads of states might most readily 
193 Smith, 2011, p.230.
194 Gilbert, 2008, p.99.
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spring to mind as embodying this phenomenon, it is clear that even the smallest groups can 
be hierarchical – as we can see in the unequal power relationships in the Crusoe example. 
The term 'hierarchical' has a rather oppressive ring to it, but  examples of it  need not be 
oppressive. For example, the voting  and holding of executive positions in the Greenbank 
residents' association may be thoroughly democratic, nonetheless, it still involves hierarchy. 
These are for Gilbert, “[n]on-basic cases [that] involve authorities whose status derives from 
a basic joint commitment”.195 They involve 'tacit' commitments and  conventions  (in the 
sense explored below) to explain how we can accept the idea that  these  make possible 
complex  groups  with  multiple  layers  of  hierarchy  and  power  but  still  staying  within 
Gilbert's conceptual framework.
Gilbert allows the idea that when we enter into joint commitments we may have  
special background understandings.196 This might be explicitly stated, or they might just be 
implicit because they involve standing conventions. Standing conventions can be separated 
into two categories: private conventions – such as two walkers have generally acknowledged 
rules that either one can call off the walk  and more widespread societal conventions –  for 
example, that it is taken as a given that someone with a broken leg is excused from playing 
their part in pushing buses up hills.197 Take the lovers from our example above; Tony and 
Celia form a plural subject, thus they will have a number of ongoing joint actions and goals 
and  they  will  face rebuke  if  they  break  them.  However, imagine  that  one  partner  is 
unfaithful; Gilbert says "...suppose that two people are living together as man and wife ... If 
one partner is discovered to have engaged in sexual activity with a third party, the offended 
partner may aver, "We're through!" and the other may not question that point ... Such 
language suggests the existence of an established condition of the kind in question [i.e. 
background condition]".198
195 Gilbert, 2008, p.502, footnote: 48.
196 Gilbert, 2009a, 494.
197 Gilbert, 2006, p.110.
198 Gilbert, 2006, p. 112. Gilbert's description of the phenomenology seems right here, however, her reading 
of it seems to me rather odd. Is there such a convention? I'm not sure. Examples such as lovers tend to 
push peoples' buttons when talking about constraint. Andrea Westlund (2008), for example, takes it to be 
incompatible with the reciprocity that is at the heart of loving relationships that the collective will could 
constrain either partner (I will return to this particular question later in the thesis).
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A major complication in accepting this possible role of standing conventions is that 
it complicates our experience of the phenomenology set out in the first chapter. Namely, it  
allows for situations in which our experience of constraint is mitigated.  Gilbert discusses 
Bratman's example of duet singers as an example of this. In it, Bratman says that it is fine to 
think that there is a collective action going on, even if each party sees the other as free to  
pull  out  at  any  time. Gilbert,  however,  thinks  that  the  “...  possibility  of  such  a 
side-agreement does not force us to reject the obligation criteria.”199 It is rather just that 
there is a pre-standing joint commitment that the collective position defaults to ending the  
joint action if any one member individually pulls out. Related, Gilbert also admits that 
there are circumstances where one had better take the reins.200 Imagine, for example, that 
after the endeavour has gone on for half an hour the team captain, Jim, calls a stop to the  
activity. “This is far too risky to our health”, he might say, “We should stop!” The team 
manager might take a different view and a row might break out. In such a case, would we  
say that the players remained obliged to continue pushing the bus? If not then, does the 
team captain's  ability  to opt  to stop to the collective  activity,  and thus  to remove the 
collective obligations, undermine the permission criteria?
To see why not, we have to ask what makes Jim's calling a halt to the activity  
different from Bob's attempt to extradite himself from it. The key is the fact that Jim is not  
trying  to  unilaterally  remove  himself  from  the  collective  obligation,  and  is  thus  not  
challenging  the notion that constraint is a universal  part of our experience of collective 
action, rather he is trying to change the collective goal. Further, because we have given Jim 
a position of authority, as team captain, he seems to have the right to at least try to do this.  
So, while a team member might not ordinarily be able to unilaterally set the collective goal, 
things will be more complex when there are positions of social power involved. Whatever 
power Jim has to set the collective goal comes from the fact that he has a social position 
within the group; insomuch as he can make decisions for the group, he can do this only  
because the group is structured in such a way as to give him authority over the others.  
Making room for such cases, Gilbert says that participants can “... authorise someone (or  
199 Gilbert, 2008, p.499.
200 Gilbert, 2006, p.107.
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somebody) to set up shared intentions for the people in question.”201 This is the point, 
addressed above, about the role of operant members according to Plural Subject Theory. 
Note, though, that the example included the idea that the team manager might disagree  
with Jim. In this case, the structures of authority may be unclear. The club may have a  
written  constitution  that  governs  team matters;  however,  whilst  this  is  likely  to  cover 
arguments over who gets the final say in picking the first team or new team colours – it is  
very unlikely to cover who has the final say when the team are trying to fix their bus.  
Whether the team members feel that the captain's calling an end to their collective action 
ends  their  obligation  to  push  it  will  depend  then  on  each  player's  conception  of  the  
structures of authority within the group.
3.6 – Chapter summary
In this chapter, I have argued that Gilbert's  PST can successfully  reject the FIA 
without committing the sin of metaphysical extravagance. It does this by using the notion 
of social union that is embedded within our general understanding of social life. Further, 
because PST allows that there is something robustly distinct from mere sums of individuals, 
it can do a better job of explaining the strong sense of collectivity of our experiences of  
unity, collective intentionality, detachment and constraint.  Gilbert's account thus does a 
better job explaining our actual social  lives than summative accounts such as Bratman's 
SCA account. Let us suppose that the critic concedes that the notion of social union is part 
of  our  general  understanding  of  social  life;  nevertheless they  may  still  insist that  the 
argument – as I have presented it so far – still leaves the notion of joint commitment in a 
somewhat mysterious state. Bratman's reading of Gilbert seems to be that she commits just 
this error –  i.e.  that she makes joint commitment an  un-analysable primitive.  One move 
would be to accept this, but plead that we have to hit the ground of a primitive phenomena 
at some point. However it seems fair to think that we can do better than this, and in the 
next  chapter  I  will  suggest  that  there  is  much  more  Gilbert  has  to  say  regarding  the 
question: “What is joint commitment?”
201 Gilbert, 2000b, p.23-24.
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Chapter 4 – Harmony, Discord and Autonomy
Moving from Michael Bratman's Shared Cooperative Activity Account to Margaret 
Gilbert's  Plural  Subject  Theory requires a  shift  in  the  way  we understand our  pair  of 
walkers. We must no longer view them as merely two independent agents cooperating to 
reach the summit;  instead we  should see  them as a pair whose agency  has been pooled 
through a joint commitment to reach the summit together. In understanding things in this 
way, we do not  conjure  up any mysterious  social  spirit,  nor  do we posit  an emergent 
organism with them both as parts. Rather, we see the two individuals as united by means of 
intentionally binding themselves together. As I have explored, the notion of forming such 
self-bound units is not some rarefied artifice of Gilbert's theorising, but rather it is a part of 
our general understanding of social life.
Plural  subject  theory trumps  summative  accounts  in getting to  grips with  the 
essential collectivity of our experience of collective action. However, in doing so, it generates 
the following question: what does it mean to understand joint commitment as truly joint? 
Answering  this  question must  start  with  grasping that  Gilbert understands  joint 
commitment as a type of commitment of the will. As we shall see, she distinguishes this type 
of  commitment from moral  or  contractual  commitment. It  is to be  understood  as  an 
expression of the will. With this centrality of the notion of the will in mind, my exposition 
of joint commitment will have as its  foundation a consideration of  how individual and 
plural  wills  relate in situations  of  collective  action.  I  will  set  out this  relationship  as 
characterised by harmony between wills and discord between wills. These phenomena appear 
to be conflicting but, as I shall explain, they are in fact complementary. This is because our 
wills can be harmonised insomuch as they together form a singularly directed collective 
will, but at the same time, they can conflict with this collective will and with each other. So 
much can be seen as our two walkers pass Mickledore on route to the summit of Sca Fell: 
they feel  their wills  to be harmonised, in that they both share in the collective goal of 
reaching  the  summit.  However,  there  may  be discord  between  their  wills,  in  that  the 
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individual goals of each (say to sit down and have a rest or to divert to an easier path), may 
be in conflict with those of the other and with their collective goal.202 
I explore  the exact  relationship between harmony and discord  in the first section 
below. By clarifying this relationship, I shall then, in the second section, be in a position to 
explain how it is that Gilbert thinks that the public sharing of mutual readiness to jointly 
commit can create a plural subject.  Further, I will be able to express the exact sense in 
which Gilbert thinks that collective commitment is normative; which is that she thinks that 
it is a matter of rational requirement. In this light we can see that if, say, one of our walkers 
was to turn around and retreat (without seeking a change to the collective goal they share 
with their partner), the distinctive wrong they commit would be a violation of that which 
the collective will rationally requires. 
While this additional clarity will help to further demystify the notion of a plural 
subject,  it  will  also bring to the fore  the fact  that  PST entails  the  possibility  that one 
individual can be constrained by the rational requirements of a will that is not their own.  I 
follow Abraham Roth in calling this phenomenon practical intersubjectivity.203 In the final 
section of this chapter, I discuss the fact  that the possibility of practical intersubjectivity 
raises a  puzzle.  This puzzle centres around the relationship between  the assumption that 
autonomy is  a  part  of  our  conception of  ourselves  as  agents,  and  the fact  that  we feel 
ourselves to be constrained in situations of discord. To illustrate again with our walkers: we 
might worry that,  in  allowing  that  their individual  wills  might be  constrained  by  the 
collective  will,  we make them  both  into mere puppets rather than true agents. This  is 
conceptually unappealing because it appears to involve denying that they have the kind of 
autonomy  we  generally  take  individuals  to  have.  I  will  refer  to  this  as  the  puzzle  of  
intersubjectivity.
202 Gilbert similarly uses an example of two walkers to illustrate the same point (2008, p.491), though using 
different terminology.
203 Roth, 2003.
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4.1 – Harmony and Discord of wills
In the last chapter I asked what it is that makes Robinson Crusoe's relationship with 
Friday different to that which he has with the natives he battles. The answer was found to 
be that they together form a social bond; that is, they are caught up in the collective action 
of living a shared life. In a straightforward sense, we can see, then, that there is a contrast 
between, on  the  one hand, the antagonism between Crusoe and the natives, and on the 
other, the harmony that exists between Crusoe and Friday.  Crusoe and the natives try to 
outwit and destroy each other. In contrast, Crusoe and Friday try to assist and benefit each 
other. However, not all collective actions are harmonious in this sense. Think for example 
of the collective act of playing chess; the players do not seek to assist and benefit each other, 
rather they seek to battle and beat their opponent. Nevertheless, even in such cases, there is 
a sense in which there  is a harmony: the harmony that  can be seen in the experiences of 
unity  and  collective  intention.  The  competitive  chess  players  do  not  see  their  general 
interests as united, however they do see themselves as being united as a we with at least one 
harmonised aim, the aim of playing chess together. Harmony in this qualified sense is not 
harmony of  interests,  rather it  is  harmony of  wills.204 That  is,  it  is  the harmony of  the 
creation of a joint goal which all parties join in willing.
But recall that this phenomenon – harmony of the wills – is not the full story. Even 
for Crusoe and Friday, who (unlike the chess players) are not competing against each other,  
there is also the possibility of a tension that threatens to oppose each individual will. This is 
experienced as  constraint  and detachment, as  described in the  previous  chapters. Such 
tension is possible because in creating a harmony of wills from their individual wills, they 
create something  which can be in opposition  to  their individual will. Because this  plural 
will can constrain those individuals and because it can seem to come apart (in its content) 
from the individual wills, it can thus be in discord with them. In this sense, the possibility of  
204 If we are being precise, it is the harmony of wills within a given scope defined by the collective act in 
question. For example, the chess players will see themselves as united during their game of chess but if 
they, say, had to abandon their game because of a fire alarm, they may not feel themselves to be socially 
united (with their opponent) while standing in the car park.
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harmony of wills creates the apparently converse phenomenon: the possibility of discord between  
the wills. 
With  these notions of harmony and discord we can  gain greater  insight into the 
different explanatory  attractions of the theories that this thesis has worked through.  To 
recap the  argument  advanced in this  thesis  so far: the  experiences, which underlie the 
special  sociality  of  collective  action, are unity  (our  feeling  bound  together),  collective 
intentionality (our feeling that we have a joint purpose), constraint (our feeling obliged by 
this  collective  purpose),  and  detachment  (our  feeling  that  this  joint  purpose  can  be 
separated from  our individual  purposes).  In  attempting  to  make  sense  of  this  special 
sociality, I first swung from the ontologically implausible separate collective entity to the 
descriptively  inadequate  mere  sum reduction.  Dismissing  both,  I presented  Michael 
Bratman's Shared Cooperative Activity Account. However, hampered by the framework of 
individual  agency, this account  was  found  not  to  fully  get  to  grips  with  the 
phenomenology, and thus I argued for its replacement by Margaret Gilbert's Plural Subject 
Theory.  At its  core,  Gilbert's  theory is  based on the idea that  individuals  come to act  
collectively  as  plural  subjects,  by  forming  joint  commitments  to  do  so.  I  argued  that 
Gilbert's  theory  captures the  special  sociality of  our  experience  without  positing  any 
mysterious separate entities. In order to understand more fully what Gilbert says about the 
nature of joint commitment as a type of commitment of the will, in what follows I will now 
explore how we can think about the comparison between these competing theories in terms 
of the notions of harmony and discord.
Firstly, the total reduction to individual acts: while such a reduction cannot explain 
the totality of the unity of collective action, it captures something of the harmony between 
wills by  requiring that all wills  aim towards goals of the same type. Though, as we have 
seen,  such harmony does not  in actuality  fit  with the  reality of  social  life,  it  apes  true 
sociality in that it involves wills harmonised in facing the same way,  even if not properly 
harmonised in becoming one. Total reduction thus partially mirrors harmony, however, it 
does not fit  at all  with the possibility of discord; the individual wills all pointing towards 
the same goals cannot be at odds.
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Secondly, the ontologically distinct collectivity  (i.e. the mysterious social spirit or 
the emergent organic entity): this can be seen as a partial possible explanation of the discord 
involved in collectivity, for in setting up the notion of some separate ontological realm of  
social reality we allow for something that can stand apart from the individual and their will; 
something that can be a general will in opposition to it. Distinct collectivity thus partially 
mirrors  discord,  however  it  does  not  fit  at  all  with  harmony;  the  individual  wills  are 
superseded rather than harmonised.205 
Thirdly, Bratman's summative theory: this is able to deal in a much fuller way with 
the idea of harmony; it is able to explain the way in which we think of collective action as  
harmonising our differing interests and aims because it makes those aims interdependent.  
Further, (by stipulation) it requires that our individual wills do not merely have equivalent 
contents  but  also  that  they  have  contents  that  are  united  in aiming towards  achieving 
something  together. On his account, harmony is a matter of the interdependence of the 
intentions of the participating individuals, the fact that each plans to perform their own 
activity in accordance with the meshing plans of the others, as well as their being directed 
towards a singular goal.  It does not, however, allow for the possibility of discord between 
the wills of individuals and the interests and aims they come to share in, for, as in the total 
reduction, the individual wills must be all pointing the same way and thus cannot be at  
odds.
Lastly, Gilbert's Plural subject account: what makes Gilbert's account special is that 
it does not lean, á la Bratman towards harmony of the wills, nor need it lean, á la the 
notion of an ontologically distinct collectivity towards discord between the wills. Rather, it 
can encompass them both – it is, in this sense, a synthesis of them. On this account wills are 
205 This is perhaps the sense in which political theories which have a similar form might be considered to be 
totalitarian; they are seen as permitting the imposition of a discordant general will onto the people, while 
not allowing for the liberal possibility of harmony between wills. For example, Benjamin Constant's 
criticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's notion of the legitimacy the general will can be seen in this light. 
Constant complains that “[Rousseau] forgets that all the life-preserving properties which he confers on the 
abstract being he calls sovereignty, are born in the fact that this being is made up of all the separate 
individuals without exception.” (2003, p.28) [emphasis mine].
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harmonised in a very real sense as individuals pool their wills; individuals commit together 
and they are  together bound by this  commitment.  At the same time the possibility  of 
discord is also alive. This is because the plural will need not reflect a mere sum of individual 
wills, rather, it need only reflect the aims and interests which the individuals are willing to 
commit to sharing in the willing of.
Gilbert's account achieves something the others  do not; it  encompasses both  the 
existence of  harmony  of wills and that of  discord  between wills.  This way of setting out 
Gilbert's achievement emphasises its strengths; however, it also makes stark the challenge it 
faces. In order to really be a synthesis of harmony and discord, Gilbert's account requires a 
literal  understanding  of  the  notion of  pooling  of  wills.  That  is,  it  must  not  just  be  a 
convenient shorthand for talking about distributed wills of the same kind, rather it must 
really be the creation of something over and above this. Some might well argue that failing 
to encompass harmony and discord, as more individualistic accounts seem doomed to, is 
less troubling than accepting the anti-individualistic idea that individuals can actually pool 
their  wills.  To  meet  this  challenge,  we  must first  return  to  clarifying the  notion  of 
commitment that is at stake and its place within Gilbert's theory.
4.2 – Harmony of commitments of the will
The notion of commitment is key to Plural Subject Theory. Becoming committed 
to the collective act is the way in which we are able to intentionally bind ourselves together 
and become plural subjects. Commitment, we might say, plays the role of harmonising the 
wills of the participants. This way of expressing the centrality of commitment brings to the 
fore  the  following  important  question:  what  is  the  relationship between  the  notion of 
'commitment' and the notion of  'the will'?  This section will explore this question.  As we 
shall  see,  for  Gilbert,  the  relevant  notion of  commitment  encapsulates the  activities  of 
deciding, intending, planning, aiming to and such like.
The  word  'commitment'  has  wider  and narrower  usages.  Dictionary  definitions 
tend  to  distinguish  between  meanings  such  as:  being  steadfast  with  fixity  of  purpose; 
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binding oneself intellectually or emotionally to a course of action; making an engagement 
by contract; and making an official pledge.206 However, Gilbert's notion of commitment is 
different from all of these; it can be thought of as providing the core element that unifies 
these  phenomena as  all  being kinds of  commitment.  That  is,  it  provides  the common 
thread that runs through them all. As we shall see below, Gilbert's notion of commitment of  
the will need not have the features that we might commonly attribute to commitments of 
the  more  enlarged  conceptual  type  (encapsulated  in  the  list  above).  The  type  of 
commitments that Gilbert is interested in, need not be well considered; they need not be 
inter-personal;  and further,  they need  not  be  morally  obligatorily.  Carving  away  these 
features from the wider notions leaves us with Gilbert's  notion, of which she gives the 
following definition: “... one has a commitment of the will if, simply by virtue of an act or 
state  of  one's  will,  one is  bound in the  way that  is  common to  decisions,  intentions,  and  
efforts”.207 
We can interrogate our understanding of this notion of commitment by examining 
an example Gilbert gives of an agent making such a commitment. Let us imagine that, the 
day after she has finished walking to the top of Scafell Pike, one of our intrepid hill walkers, 
Jane, is thinking of a new activity to pursue. Let us suppose that she decides to go fishing.  
Having so decided, Gilbert says that, Jane is “... now personally committed to going fishing, 
as long as she does not change her mind.”208 Here Jane, by virtue of her own will, commits 
herself to a certain course of action; this is the sense in which we can say that Jane makes a 
personal commitment.  Of course,  this is not to say that Jane has  definitively closed the 
question of what she should do on that day. Perhaps new information might come to light 
about the relative  fun to be had playing ping-pong in contrast  to fishing. She remains 
rationally free to rescind her commitment and, again by virtue of her own will, become no 
longer committed.
206 Gilbert also notes that the term is used in an altogether different sense by some economists to indicate 
any incentives to behave in a particular way. (2007, p.261) It is unclear to me that this peculiar usage is 
anything other than confusing.
207 Gilbert, 2006, p.131 [emphasis mine].
208 Gilbert, 2000a, p.3 [emphasis mine].
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Examining the different ways that we could fill in the details of the story allows us 
to see that the commitment in question need not be well considered, interpersonal nor  
need it be moral. In regard to the first of these, consider the following: we might imagine 
that Jane has been thinking about taking up a new hobby,  in addition to walking,  for a 
long time – she has considered the merits of a myriad of different sports, their relative costs, 
the level of skill they require, the social status (stigma or prestige) attached to them, and so 
on. Having thought about all this, she comes to a decision to go fishing. In such a scenario, 
the activity she has personally committed herself to matches that which she has –  all things 
considered – most reason to do.  However, Jane need not necessarily be  as reflective; we 
might  imagine  that  upon unexpectedly  passing  a  sports  store  with a  fishing kit  in  the 
window, she simply makes a snap decision to go fishing. In such a case, going fishing is not 
the action that Jane believes she has most reason to perform, it  is  merely one that she 
commits to through an immediate moment of minimally reflective  choice.209 When Jane 
has made the decision on a whim, she may have more liberty to change her mind compared 
to if she has spent a lot of energy coming to the decision; however in both cases if she does  
not change her mind then she is committed to go fishing nonetheless.
It is  also clear from the example as it  stands that the commitment need not be 
interpersonal:  no others need be involved – Jane  can  commit to go fishing alone.  As a 
comparison, we might imagine  a situation in which Jane commits to go fishing with her 
friend  Bob.  This scenario would also involve a commitment of the will.  Additionally, it 
would perhaps also involve a commitment in one of the wider senses, discussed above. For 
example, if we suppose that Bob is paying Jane to come fishing with him, then Jane might 
be seen as making a contractual commitment with him to be his fishing partner. Such 
considerations would add ways in which we could assess Jane as an agent. They would not, 
209 Of course, there are differences between the two cases that are relevant to the issue of our assessment of 
Jane as an agent. The seriously contemplative Jane appears to have made a better decision, or at least 
employed better decision making processes, than the impetuous Jane. Though not necessarily, as pressures 
of time and limited resources may mean that Jane is better off making snap decisions than spending her 
precious time deliberating. Similarly, we may well form different expectations about each Jane, e.g. we 
might expect that the seriously contemplative Jane is more likely to carry out her decision than the 
impetuous Jane. However, despite these differences, both of these cases are examples of commitments of 
the will, though it may be that one case counts more typically as a commitment in the wider sense 
outlined above.
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however, show that  being interpersonal is essential for  all kinds of commitment.  Another 
possibility is that Jane's going fishing with Bob is not a contractual commitment – as such 
– but rather that it is a collective action. If this is the case, then, as I shall explore below, on 
Gilbert's account the commitment in question would be a commitment in the sense we are 
interested in – i.e. a commitment of the will.
Lastly, that the kind of commitment in question is not a matter of morality can be 
seen in the following: suppose that we take seriously the idea that fish can feel pain and that 
their pain might be morally important. If this where true then plausibly Jane ought not to 
make a  decision  to  go  fishing.  However,  this  does  not  show that  Jane  cannot make  a 
commitment of the will to go fishing, rather it merely shows that, morally speaking, she  
ought  not  to.  It  does  not  show  that  Jane's  intention  to  do  something  that morally 
questionable is any less a real commitment of the will than a decision she might make to do 
something we consider to be morally more worthy. Indeed, it is because we think that in 
holding the intention to fish that she is (in the sense we are interested in) committed to do 
so, that we think that morally speaking she is under pressure to rescind her decision. One 
ought not to commit to do what is bad, but that does not mean that one cannot so commit. 
Generally  speaking, we can say then that,  questions about the moral  value of  intended 
activities speak to the issue of what intentions one ought to form, rather than to the issue of  
the force of intentions once they are made.210 As Gilbert notes, commitments of the will 
can be “ … forces for both good and evil: we can intend to save the world, and we can  
intend to destroy it”.211
Commitments in the wider sense (such as duties, contracts, promises and such like) 
exert what we might call external pressure on the will. If it is a moral good to feed the poor 
then this fact implies that I should change my will such that I  form the commitment to 
feed the poor. In contrast, commitments in the sense Gilbert uses the term are not external 
pressures to change the will; they are facts about the way the will is already orientated and 
210 Gilbert notes that this discussion may be confused because talk of “... what one ought to do” may be 
thought to imply obligation in the sense that is derived from some moral principle, i.e. to be moral 
requirement. She agrees that “... it is impossible to have an obligation of this type to do evil.” (2008, 
p.507).
211 Gilbert, 2008, p.487.
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the rational requirements that it being so orientated creates.212 They are internal pressures on  
the will. This is the sense in which, as Gilbert puts it, they are commitments of the will.213 
As Gilbert makes clear,  when we say that Jane, having decided to go fishing, ought to go 
fishing; “[t]he  'ought'  here  is  a  matter  of  what  might  be  referred  to  as  a  rational 
requirement.”214 
Commitments of the will can be said to have what we might call normative powers. 
The notion of normativity is a slippery one, and subject to much debate that is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. For our current purposes, it will do to understand normative power as 
anything that gives rise to an ought or an ought not. Understood in this way, we can see that 
the normative realm is wider than the moral realm; for example, if fishing is cruel then for 
moral reasons Jane ought not to fish, but we can also say that  if  Jane is  attempting to 
perform the  ascent of Everest in pure alpine style then,  even though she would break no 
moral law in not doing so, she ought not to make use of additional assistance for reasons of 
proper sporting style.215 In terms of commitments of the will, we can say that, if Jane has 
decided to go fishing, and continues to hold to this decision, then she ought to go fishing. 
It is important to note that, these differing oughts need not be taken to be all-out universal 
imperatives.  They  give  reasons  for  acting,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  they  supply 
conclusive reasons.  Thus, when Gilbert talks about commitments generating obligations, 
she means only that, to have an obligation to act is to have sufficient reason to act.216 We 
might  thus  say  that  they  provide pro  tanto reasons.  This normative  power means  that 
commitments-of-the-will  trump  mere  inclinations.  For  example, Jane's  decision  to  go 
fishing means that she ought to ignore her inclination to stay in bed.217 Failing to do what 
212 A complication of this picture is that certain views of moral obligation, such as Immanuel Kant's, do try 
to make our moral obligations into facts about the nature of our will. If Kant were right that the 
categorical imperative is a function of our rational will, then, the distinction between moral commitments 
and commitments of the will collapses. Nevertheless, even if this were the case, there would still appear to 
be important distinctions between the universal demands that the categorical imperative imposes – on all 
rational wills – and the particular demands generated by particular commitments of the will – on only 
those specific wills. My internal/external distinction could thus be replaced with the universal/particular 
distinction whilst retaining the import of the distinction.
213 Gilbert, 2006, p.127 [emphasis mine].
214 Gilbert, 2008, p.501.
215 Confusingly, and no doubt reflective of the general muddiness that exists around conceptions of the 
normative realm, climbers refer to such rules of sporting style as 'ethics'. 
216 Gilbert, 2006, p.29.
217 A fact I discuss further in the following chapter.
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we intend to do, is wrong in a way that,  failing to do what we feel inclined to do, is not 
wrong. The former is always a weakness of will. The latter at times may be an expression of 
strength of will. This is the sense in which Buno Verbeek has us imagine that Ulysses makes 
a decision to bypass a pub, and is rational in doing so, even though he desires to go in and 
drink with his friends.218
Above, I noted that we might divide commitments of the will into various different 
categories,  such  as  decisions,  intentions,  and  efforts. Unfortunately,  these  categories, 
informed as they are by common usage, are not all that well defined. One possibly robust 
distinction is that between intentions and decisions. Gilbert sees the dividing line between 
the two as being that, “[w]hile a personal decision may be characterised as an act of will, a 
personal intention may be characterised rather as a state of will”.219 Further, Gilbert thinks 
that  “...  decisions  but  not  intentions  have  trans-temporal  reach”.220 That  is,  decisions 
continue to stand unless explicitly rescinded; however, it is possible for intentions merely to 
fade  away  by  failing  to  be  continued  to  be  held.221 This  seems  a  reasonable  potential 
distinction.  That said, as I have noted,  meaning is a slippery thing.  In  competition with 
Gilbert's suggested way of carving intentions as a particular form of commitments of the  
will, there is an alternative sense in which we might say that Gilbert's commitments of the 
will are synonymous with intentions. This can be seen by the fact that it is  acceptable to 
reply to questions like “what do you intend to do?”  by saying  “I  have decided to do … 
[such and such]”.  This appears to  imply that  both terms  are  interchangeable. In contrast 
with Gilbert, Bratman is happier to use the term intentions as a 'catch all' blanket term to 
cover all of these.222 In the next chapter – in which I discuss Bratman – I shift from the 
notion of 'commitments of the will' to that of 'intentions'. But note, I shall take the sense 
218 Verbeek, 2007, p.150. The use of the character of Ulysses is a nod towards the story in which he has 
himself tied to the mast of his ship to avoid the temptations of the sirens. 
219 Gilbert, 2006, p.130 [emphasis in original].
220 Gilbert, 2008, p.501.
221 For terminological simplicity, I will however view both of these processes as types of rescission.
222 While generally Bratman's use of the term 'intentions' covers all commitments of the will, he does, at 
least at one point, specify that 'plans' denote “intentions writ large” and 'policies' denote intentions that 
are vaguer and hold over a longer time. It is also worth noting that there is a meaning of 'plans' which 
does not fit Bratman's or Gilbert's usage, such as the plans to a building or a plan for making jam. As 
Bratman says, “I might know a procedure to achieve a certain end. In this sense I can have a plan to roast 
lamb whether or not I actually intend to roast lamb. On the other hand, for me to have a plan to roast 
lamb requires that I plan to roast it.” (Bratman, 1999f, p.29)
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of  'intention', used there, to be equivalent to  'commitment of the will', i.e. as a general 
term that covers the linked phenomena of intentions (in a narrower sense), decisions, plans 
etc. The discussion in this current chapter is framed in terms of 'commitment of the will', 
rather than in terms of  'intentions',  for the exegetical reason that Gilbert places the term 
'joint commitment'  at the heart of  her setting out of  Plural  Subject Theory.  It  is  thus 
important that the discussion  makes it clear that Gilbert's  notion of  'joint commitment' 
does not involve moral nor contractual arrangements, but is rather a question of direction of  
will.
So above I introduced the notion of harmony of wills as an element of collective 
action. Now that we can see commitment, as Gilbert uses the term, to be commitment of the  
will, we  can  understand why  she  thinks  that  joint  commitment  can  be  understood as 
pooling wills. Joint commitment is joint commitment of the wills – or to put it another way, 
it is joint willing. One might wonder how it is possible that all the members of a group can 
come to  participate  in  making  a  singular commitment-of-the-will  together? I  gave  the 
foundations of Gilbert’s answer to this question in the last chapter. Gilbert believes the acts 
of each member expressing willingness to constitute – with each other – a plural subject 
combine  together  to  create  a  joint  commitment.  The  idea  is  that  the  expressions  of  
willingness  are  not in  themselves  commitments,  rather  they become  a  singular 
commitment,  to act  as  a  group,  when they are combined together. As  Gilbert  puts  it, 
“[e]ach  person  expresses  a  special  form  of  conditional  commitment such  that  (as  is 
understood) only when everyone has done similarly is  anyone committed.”223 Now that we 
understand that  the commitment at stake is  commitment of the will,  we can  see more 
clearly that  she  must  mean to claim that  the combination of  expressions of  willingness 
unifies the agency of the participants. That is, it creates a will which is the will of all of them  
together, but of none of them apart. Thus we can say that Gilbert sees joint commitment as 
also being a type of commitment, but a commitment that, rather than being personally held  
by single individuals, is jointly held by multiple individuals and thus “... unifies people in a 
very real way”.224
223 Gilbert, 1992, p.7 [emphasis in original].
224 Gilbert, 2000b, p.30.
102
As we have seen in the previous chapter, when power relations are in play (as they 
arguably  are,  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent,  in  all  social  relationships) the  holding  of  a 
collective commitment can be a complex affair. In simple cases, a collective commitment 
may be  created by the direct involvement of each member of the collective. In complex 
cases, a collective commitment may be  created through the activities of a subset of the 
membership.225 The uniting factor  between all  these  cases,  if  they are  genuine  cases  of 
collective action that is, is that they are characterised by all the group members together 
comprising the subject of the joint commitment as a whole.
4.3 – Discord between commitments of the will
The picture we have, then, is of our two individual walkers surmounting the limits 
of their individual agency. They do so by harmonising their separate wills to create a single, 
internally harmonious, plural will – specifically, a plural will with the goal of reaching the 
summit of Scafell Pike. Now, let us suppose that when being planned the day before, the 
hard slog to the summit seemed like a great idea to both of them, but that half-way up the 
first hard step climb one of the pair changes his mind – or as we might put it, he changes 
what he individually wills – he personally decides to turn back. Here we have a situation of 
discord; one individual's will no longer meshes with the plural will of which he remains a 
part  of.  A key  difference between collective commitments  and individual ones,  as  is 
apparent in such a case, is that while we understand individuals as normally able to absent 
themselves from the duties imposed by their own personal commitments merely  through 
rescinding them, collective  commitments  can  only  be  escaped  by  being  rescinded 
collectively.226 On this model then, the errant walker is reprimandable directly because what 
their declared individual commitment demands of them (i.e. to give up on the walk) 
conflicts with what the commitment they hold collectively with the other walker demands 
of them (i.e. to continue to the top of the hill). Moreover, they cannot absent themselves 
225 I discuss such complications in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.a.
226 I use the term 'rescinded' here in a wide sense that includes the possibility that some kinds of 
commitments can be rescinded by fading out while others require active rejection (see Gilbert's distinction 
between intentions and decisions discussed above). (p.101 inc' fn. 221)
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from this criticism by abandoning the collective commitment, for it can only be rescinded 
jointly with the other walker.
We can see, then, that the very process of harmonising one's will with that of others 
gives rise to the possibility of discord, that is, to the possibility that the detached collective  
will can constrain the individual will. On this description there is a direct interplay between 
the wills; the collective will is directly providing the framework within which the individual  
members can decide how to act. A helpful way in which to understand the mechanics of 
this is in terms of Abraham Roth's notion of practical intersubjectivity. This is the idea that 
our  practical  rationality  is  not  just  sensitive  to  the  demands  of  our  own  subjective  
circumstances, but rather that it can be restricted by the willed states we share with others. 
Further, it is the idea that this can be the case without the need for the individual reissuing 
of that other's willed states.
Practical intersubjectivity may well involve the kind of enlargement of the concept 
of the  individual practical self that  will  make individualist-minded philosophers recoil  in 
horror.  Nevertheless, Roth believes that it is evident in the way we normally treat certain 
social situations. Roth sets up a simple scenario where the will of one individual appears to 
unproblematically  directly  impact  on  the  practical  deliberation  of  another.  He  has  us 
suppose that two people, let us here call them Nina and Jack, have decided to drive to 
Vegas together. This journey will require each of them drive in turn. We can imagine that 
Nina takes it upon herself to decide that she will drive the second leg and, thus, that Jack 
will drive the first leg.  Let  us suppose that on hearing this Jack does not object and goes 
ahead and drives the first leg.227 Roth thinks that a natural way to understand this situation 
is that Jack simply does not concern himself with resolving the question of the order in 
which he and Nina should drive. Rather, he sees this as already having been settled. He sees  
Nina as having resolved the issue for both of them. Because Jack and Nina are to perform a 
collective action, namely driving to Vegas together, and we might add, though Roth omits 
this, because Jack accepts Nina's authority to set their collective intentions.228 To use the 
227 Roth, 2003, p.66.
228 Or more precisely, Jack accepts Nina's authority to set the collective intentions with regard to achieving 
this trip's collective goal of driving to Vegas. It may be that Jack is always happy for Nina to act in this 
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terminology developed in the last chapter, Nina is an operant member of the collective that 
is composed of herself and Jack. The key point is that Nina's intention to drive the second 
leg  figures  in  Jack's  reasoning  “...  as  a  rational  constraint  rather  than  as  a  mere 
consideration”.229 What this also means is that in situations of discord we have a problem 
that  is  not  merely  a  coordination  issue;  rather,  we  have  problem  that generates  the 
possibility of irrationality. The irrationality of being obliged towards conflicting actions by 
practically conflicting commitments. That is, we have a problem of being obliged to act in 
one  way  by  the  collective  will  and  another  by  one's  own  will.  We  might  call  this 
intersubjective irrationality. This phenomenon can be seen by imagining that Jack and Nina 
each hold, and know each other to hold, conflicting intentions about who will drive.  If 
neither is willing to change their intention in the light of the other's intention, then there is 
a tension. This is because, at a group level, it is irrational for these conflicting intentions to 
both be held.
In contrast to the situation described above, socially interacting people can have 
conflicting commitments in a way that does pose a coordination problem, but does not 
equate to a situation of intersubjective irrationality. For example, Roth points out that there 
is nothing irrational about me having an intention to buy a car and you having an intention 
to buy the same car, even though our intentions are incompatible and we both know them 
to be so. Such a scenario does generate a problem, but this problem is practical rather than 
rational;  only one person can win, but this makes neither irrational in trying to beat the 
other. In contrast, just as Jane (discussed above) violates a practical norm if she intends to 
go fishing but then does something other than fish, Nina and Jack violate (at least at the  
collective level) the same practical norm if together they intend to drive to Vegas, but they 
fail to mesh their conflicting intentions as to who shall drive. Jack and Nina's conflicting 
intentions are  unlike those of the two agents  engaged in a battle to buy the  single car 
because their conflict is within a united will (that jointly intends to go to Vegas) rather than 
just between separate wills (that each intend to buy the single car).
unilateral fashion, say if she holds a position of general authority over him. Alternately, it may be just that 
in this instance, Jack cedes authority to Nina just because at this time he has no desire to have a say in this 
particular decision.
229 Roth, 2003, p.67.
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An alternative way to explain the irrationality in the situation above is to suppose 
that each has a supplementary-intention that their intentions will coordinate with those of 
the other party. So, in the case of the two people intending to drive together to Vegas, it is  
not directly the fact that their intentions, regarding driving the second half of the route, are 
in  conflict  that  makes them irrational.  Rather  what  makes  them irrational is  that  each 
individual’s intention to drive the second half is in conflict with their own supplementary 
intention,  i.e.  in  conflict  with  each  individual’s  intention  “...  to  coordinate  intentions 
pertaining  to  driving  to  Vegas  together”.230 The  problem  with  this 'bridge  intention' 
solution, as I have already discussed in Chapter Two, Section 2.5, is that it does not seem 
to make the link between the intentions of the two individuals strong enough. Because of 
this, it does not fit with the collectivity of the phenomenology of collective action (as has 
been  described in  this  thesis).  Simply  put,  because  the  supplementary intention  is  an 
individual intention, each individual remains rationally at liberty to rescind it.  As Roth 
notes, “[b]y revising my bridge intention, your intentions no longer make any claim on 
me”231.  In  the  driving  case  it  seems  like,  the  fact  that  the  two participants  are  doing  
something collectively,  ought to mean that neither have the power to unilaterally remove 
themselves from the rational constraint of their collective activity. The important point is 
that the intended driving action is not that of two separate but cooperating individuals but 
it  is rather a joint action.  The important thing is not the inconsistency between the two 
drivers' intentions  as such,  but rather the inconsistency between each driver's intentions 
and  a harmonised collective  intention. Thus, the rational  inconsistency is not (directly) 
between  the  intentions  of  the  two  individuals,  rather  it  is  between  the  individual’s 
intentions to play their parts in the collective action and what is necessary for the collective  
action to take place.
By moving from a focus on conflict between individual commitments to conflict  
between individual commitments and the joint commitment, we can see that there is a 
possibility  of  intersubjective  irrationality  even  in  situations  where  there  is  agreement 
230 Roth, 2003, p.77.
231 Roth, 2003, p.80.
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between the individual's commitments. So, for example, suppose that both Jack and Nina 
secretly did not want to go to Vegas, and thus that both intended to refuse to drive. If they 
both express their misgivings, they would decide, together, to cancel their trip. However, it 
seems possible that each fails to openly express their  individual stances. If  they do this, 
then, on Gilbert's view, the  joint commitment will stand,  and thus, if we take collective 
rational constraint seriously, they  will both be  intersubjectivly  irrational in intending to 
refuse to drive.  This  move also makes it  easy to generalise  this  model  from one about 
two-person  collective  actions  to  one  that  can  cover  many-person  collective  actions. 
Multi-person models, as I have noted at various points in this chapter, involve questions of  
authority,  hierarchy and social  power;  intersubjectivity  in  multi-person cases  can  come 
about in situations where an individual stands in control of others.
We can now understand more clearly what it means to think of the force of the  
constraining power  of  the  collective  will  as  direct;  it  is  direct  insomuch as it  operates 
intersubjectively for multiple subjects in the same fashion that the individual will operates 
internally  for  the individual  subject.  The collective  will  in this  sense has  intersubjective  
normative force; its force is direct – or as we might say, internal to the will – rather than 
externally constraining on it. A bridging intention, belonging subjectively to an individual 
agent,  would also  be  directly internally constraining to the will  of its  owner. However, 
because it is completely within the subjective control of the individual, it can be ditched by 
them. In contrast, joint commitments are both internally constraining and not controllable 
by the individual. So, the wrong that we are interested in – the wrong of breaking with a 
collective commitment – is not that of betraying another person in a moral sense (though 
of course in some collective action situations this may also additionally exist), rather, it is a 
rational wrong, it is betrayal of the will.232
232 See Gilbert, 2006, p.134 for discussion of the powerful (but potentially unhelpfully ambiguous) notion 
of betrayal in this context.
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4.3.a – The puzzle of intersubjectivity
Collective action involves committing together and together  being  bound by this 
commitment. Further, this is something that each individual makes happen; as Gilbert puts 
it, “[f]or each party to enter into a joint commitment is for him to  allow his will to be  
bound”.233 However, though Gilbert's theory requires that each individual jointly commits, 
because  their  will  is  thus  collectively pooled  they  can  then  be directly normatively 
constrained in their action by intentions, other than their own personal intentions.  This, 
depending on your outlook, is either Plural Subject Theory's biggest advantage or greatest 
problem. Those of an individualist bent might argue that this  is too high a price to pay. 
The fuzzy, but nonetheless intuitively forceful, idea which underlies their complaints is that 
to allow practical motivation to arise from a location external to the individual agent is 
counter to the fact of individual autonomy.
The notion of autonomy is at once straightforward, in that it exists in common 
usage rather than just obscure philosophy, and hard to pin down, in that, the exact content 
of what it means is often disputed. At the core of the notion of autonomy is the notion of  
being in control. Sarah Buss cashes out this general sense of autonomy by saying that “[t]o 
be autonomous is to be a law to oneself”.234 Within this, however, we can separate wider 
and narrower usages. Autonomy, according to the wider usage, requires that we govern our 
external  environments; let  us  call  this  environmental autonomy.  In  contrast there  is  a 
narrower  sense  of  'autonomy' that  requires  only  that  we  count  as  governing  our  own 
actions, or as Buss puts it, to be free to “... make one's own mind up”.235 I will follow Buss 
in referring to this as personal autonomy.236 There is a strong link between environmental 
autonomy and personal autonomy,  but they are different  phenomena.237 Environmental 
233 Gilbert, 2006, p.154 [emphasis mine].
234 Buss, 2008.
235 Buss, 2008.
236 Buss, 2008. The notion of autonomy that is perhaps most discussed is that of 'political autonomy'. 
Political autonomy appears to be autonomy in a wide sense akin to what I have called 'environmental 
autonomy'. However, depending on the account of political autonomy we focus on, it may apply more 
exclusively to freedom in relation  to social laws, customs and other institutional rights. 
237 Buss makes a similar point in different terms when she says that “...every agent has an authority over 
herself that is grounded, not in her political or social role, nor in any law or custom, but in the simple fact 
that she alone can initiate her actions.” (2008)
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autonomy requires personal autonomy because, we might reasonably assume, you can only 
count as governing the world if you count as governing your behaviour within it. But the 
reverse is not the case. Imagine a woman locked in a prison cell; she has no control over the 
time she is allowed to sleep, who she is allowed to see  and so on. This person has lost 
autonomy in the environmental sense, yet those limited actions that she can perform – such 
as  pacing back and forth – still count as being personally autonomous.  In contrast, if we 
were to imagine that our technologically advanced prison guards had a way to manipulate 
our prisoner's mental states – say to control her mind such that she wants to commit to the 
rule  of  the  dictatorial  regime  –  then  she  would  not  just  fail  to  be  environmentally  
autonomous, she would also fail to be personally autonomous.  In what follows, I will be 
using the term autonomy in the limited sense of personal autonomy. 
The complaint against Plural Subject Theory is not just that the constitution of a  
pooled will seems a little mysterious. Hopefully, I have done some work in dispelling this 
mystery; at least to the extent that  any remaining mystery is no greater than that which 
concerns the constitution of individual wills.238 Rather, the problem is that, the notion of 
individuals being guided by collective commitments seems to be in conflict with what, for  
individualists at least, is a key part of our understanding of ourselves as autonomous agents.  
Hans Bernard Schmid invokes the notion of zombies to characterise such a phenomenon; 
people not in control of their own intentions he thinks of as  intentional zombies.239 The 
image of zombies  has a certain resonance for they are seen as creatures who have lost the 
ability  to  truly  govern  their  own  worlds;  they  have  become  'mindless  brain  eaters'. 
However, it seems to me that the  imagery of puppetry is even more  appropriate for our 
discussion  of  autonomy,  for  it  conveys not  just  the  idea  of  lacking  in  control,  but, 
importantly,  also  that of being  controlled by others.  Using the terms explored above, we 
might say that the fear is that Plural Subject Theory requires that  engaging in  collective 
action  must  rob us  of  our  personal  autonomy and turn us  into  intersubjective  puppets. 
Intersubjective puppets appear to lack personal autonomy.  In the illustration above, Jane 
238 Indeed, in the coming chapters, I will argue that the remaining mystery of the plural will can be lessened 
even further by applying the same techniques as can be applied to lessening the mystery of the individual 
will.
239 Schmid, 2009, p.19.
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freely  chooses  to go to fishing.  No doubt  there  might be many complex psychological 
explanations  as  to  why  she  does  so.  However,  the  following  minimal  description  is 
intuitively  compelling:  her  actions  are  at  least  personally autonomous;  that  is,  they  are 
governed by her. Now, imagine that Jane is part of a collective that is  intending to go 
fishing. Following the plural subject model, Jane is thus jointly committed to playing her 
part in the collective fishing action. The question is: if Jane acts in line with this pooled 
will,  can  we  still  understand  her  actions  as  personally autonomous?  Would  such  an 
understanding reduce her to a mere intersubjective puppet, when we should understand her 
as a fully-fledged agent? This is the puzzle of intersubjectivity.
The plausibility of the idea, that  it  is  worrying  that  an  account  might  involve 
individuals becoming intersubjective puppets, can be seen by imagining a modification of 
the rugby club example: suppose that in his rebuke the keen bus pusher had made reference 
to his own personal goal  rather than to that of the team. Rather than saying, “You can't 
stop, we said we would push the bus”, he says, “You can't stop, I said we would push the 
bus!”  Now let  us assume that there are no issues of hierarchy  at play here,  e.g. that the 
presumptuous team-mate is not the team captain. Further, let us also assume that there is 
no standing commitment to have his personal pronounced goals automatically count as the 
goals of the collective. If this is so then there may still be indirect ways in which this kind of 
phrase might sometimes be an appropriate, even if rather rudely put, rebuke. For example, 
if the errant team  member  had promised to do whatever the keen member  wanted. 
However, suppose that we try to account for it in the same way that the PST account 
proposes that we account for the rebuke attached to the collective commitment. That is, 
suppose that we propose that the rebuke is legitimate because one individual can be directly 
normatively constrained by the individual intentions of another. Against such an 
explanation, it certainly seems fair to complain that the individual's autonomy is not being 
taken into account. We appear to have reduced the agent who is constrained by the intention of 
the other into a mere puppet controlled by that other. We can take Gilbert as acknowledging 
that this is how things are, when she says that in situations that are not collective actions, “I 
can persuade you to change your mind, but I cannot directly change it.”240 This case is 
240 Gilbert, 2008, p.491.
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clearly not completely analogous with that where the keen team member invokes a shared 
collective intention. Whereas, the errant team member is a part of the collective that holds 
the collective intention, in contrast, he plays no equivalent part in the constitution of the 
keen team member as an individual. It is not immediately clear, however, what exactly it is 
about this difference that might make the concern about autonomy disappear. One might 
argue that, just as in the presumptuous walker example, the individual has become a puppet 
of something external to them, in this case a puppet of the collective.
The puzzle of intersubjectivity is a puzzle precisely because  we  do not think that 
people have become puppets in any strong sense when they perform the kinds of collective 
actions that have been documented in this thesis so far. We can see this by noting the heavy 
contrast between normal cases of collective action and science fiction examples, such as the 
Borg in the television series Star Trek: The Next Generation. The Borg are all connected to a 
collective hive mind and are clearly all puppets of  its singular will. The Borg do perform 
collective action, but it  is  not collective action in the sense that we perform it;  for them 
there is no possibility of discord because there is no individuality left – rather they have a 
total harmony of the wills, an embodiment of the organic theory of collective action. This 
is why being assimilated241 is such a scary concept for liberal individualists.242
Perhaps we might counter worries about individual autonomy by stipulating that, 
as a basic fact of being social creatures, we just can be directly motivated by the intentions 
of others. One might think that such a possibility is ignored only because of an attachment 
to what we can call  the  individual motivation thesis: roughly that, individuals can only be 
motivated by their own will.243 Hans Barnard Schmid suggests, contrary to this theoretical 
thesis, that our actual social experience is of routinely acting directly on the intentions of 
others, without seeing this as problematic. He gives the simple example of one agent 
moving aside on a park bench to fulfil the intention of the other to sit down, claiming that 
it  seems perfectly  natural  to suppose  that  the  shuffling  agent  saw themselves  as  acting 
241 The term for being forcefully made part of the Borg collective.
242 Indeed, Lawrence M. Krauss claims that it is what makes the Borg “...the most frightening, and 
intriguing, species of alien creature ever portrayed on a television screen.” (1995, p.111).
243 Schmid rather pointedly calls it a product of the 'Cartesian Brainwash' (Schmid, 2009, pp.29 – 42).
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directly on the intention of the sitter.244 He proposes we label acceptance of this possibility 
as motivational heterarky.245 In a similar vein, Abraham Roth suggests that we accept what 
he, perhaps more informatively, calls practical intimacy. He defines this as the idea that; 
“[i]t is possible for one individual to take up and act on the intention formed by another 
without re-issuing the latter's intention”.246 In the terms we have been employing here, we 
might best call this phenomenon: the possibility of intersubjective motivation.
How does the possibility of intersubjective motivation sit with our concerns about 
autonomy? Well, Schmid believes that there is no reason to think that they pose any 
challenge to autonomy, for an individual can still be fully autonomous even when acting on 
the intentions of others, because it can still be 'up to them' whether they act or not. For 
example, in the case I described above of one agent, A, moving aside on a park bench in 
order to fulfil the intention of another agent, B, to sit down: “[i]t is not that B somehow 
acts directly through A's behaviour, bypassing and displacing A's agency … Rather, A's 
behaviour still instantiates A's own action”.247 Likewise, the case I first used to characterise 
one of the four primary features of the phenomenology of collective action might also be  
examined  here: the  Leicester  Tigers  pushing  a  bus  up  a  hill.  We  could  say  that  the 
autonomy  of  each  member  of  the  Leicester  Tigers,  is  not  challenged  by  their  being 
externally moved to push the bus by the collective intention to get the bus up to the top of  
the hill, because they each choose to be moved by this non-individual attitude. 
Unfortunately, such a reply does not quite address the concern about autonomy in 
relation to the pooling of wills in the Plural Subject Theory, for (as Roth points out in his 
discussion of Gilbert's examples) the issue is precisely that PST gives rise to the possibility 
of cases where it is not up to the errant individual whether the collective intention has 
authority over them. The trouble is that the collectivist model proposes that individuals 
who have formed collectives are thus normatively constrained by the particular intentions 
of that collective, whether or not, in that instance, they want to be. Roth's own solution to 
244 Schmid, 2009, p.19.
245 Schmid, 2009, p.19.
246 Roth, 2003, p.383.
247 Schmid, 2009, p.19.
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this problem rests on the idea that in certain circumstances one agent can have authority  
over the actions of another.248 Such considerations take us in the right direction. However, 
the issues I raised in a previous chapter, in relation to the possibility of operant members249 
complicate this picture. Recall that, we saw that the role of operant members in collective 
actions does not appear to be that of one individual having authority to set the subjective 
will of another individual. Rather, operant members appear to have the authority to set the 
collective will. Given that the collective will is  detached from the mere sum of individual 
wills, the group leader  in this case is properly understood, not as having direct authority 
over any other individual, but rather, as having authority over the collective will. The issue 
thus remains of what  it is that  makes it legitimate for this collective will to  constrain the 
individuals, given that this collective will is disconnected from that individual will.
So where does this leave us? Schmid and Roth may be right in their insistence that 
the mere possibility of intersubjective motivation (i.e. of acting directly on the intentions of 
others) does not run counter to agentive autonomy; however, we need to go further than 
this if we are to get to grips with the concern about normative constraint by intentions that 
are not solely one’s own. There is reason to think that the fuzzy idea of agentive autonomy 
does not provide quite as clear-cut an  objection to normative constraint by collective 
intentions as it might first appear. We might think that agentive autonomy is compromised 
by allowing an  agent's free choices to be normatively constrained by  anything  at all, 
believing that autonomy is akin to freedom to do anything at any time. However, we need 
to note that we  clearly  do  not  see  it  as  problematic  for  autonomous  agents  to  be 
normatively constrained by their own intentions.  We can thus ask the question: why is an 
autonomous agent not free to merely act as they please rather than being constrained by 
their intentions?  In the following chapter, I will suggest that answering this question can 
give us both a model that we can apply to understanding normative constraint by collective 
intentions, and also bring to light the necessary limitations of this constraint.
248 Roth, 2004, p.391 – 397.
249 Chapter 3, Section 3.4.
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As we shall see, Bratman, with his planning theory of agency, provides us with a 
potential answer to this question.  His theory aims to tell us not just why constraint by 
one's own intentions does not conflict with autonomy, but also why it is fundamental for 
being an autonomous agent at all. Given that collectivist theories propose that we should 
understand the constraint of collective intentions as being of the same type as the constraint 
issuing from individual intentions, there seems to be clear motivation for attempting to 
apply an explanation that mirrors Bratman's account of individual commitments of the will 
to collective commitments of the will.  This is not a use to which Bratman, as far as I am 
aware,  has  attempted  to  put  his  theory  of  (individual)  intentionality.  This  should  not 
surprise  us,  given  the  way  I  have  characterised  Bratman's  Shared  Cooperative  Activity 
Account.250 Nor should it  preclude us from attempting to do so,  for  his non-collective 
account of collective intentionality does not directly or necessarily follow from this account  
of individual intentions.
4.4 – Chapter summary
In  this  chapter,  I  have  put  forward  the  case  that  Gilbert's  notion  of  joint 
commitment is best understood by setting out its relationship to the way in which the wills 
of  agents  involved in collective  actions are  related.  I  did this  first  by resetting  out the 
argument of the thesis so far in terms of the ideas of discord and harmony between the  
wills, arguing that Gilbert's account is unique in its ability to capture them both. I then 
argued this allows us to understand Gilbert's notion of joint commitment as a harmony of  
commitments of the will. This has the benefit of expressing the real sense in which wills are 
pooled according to Plural Subject Theory, however it  has  also brought to the fore the 
puzzle of intersubjectivity. In the next chapter I will tackle this, and attempt to understand 
the nature of intersubjectivity using the tools  provided by Michael  Bratman's  planning 
theory of agency.
250 Recall that, Bratman rejects the collectivist account of collective intentionality. In contrast, he believes, 
roughly, that collective intentions require the existence of interlocking of conditional personal intentions 
which have the same orientation towards the collective act, and thus does not allow the possibility of 
conflict between the collective's intentions and the individual's personal intentions. (See Bratman, 1999, 
pp.93 – 142). See Chapter Two of this thesis for full discussion of this position.
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Chapter 5 – Constraint by the will (individual and 
collective)
Through taking the phenomenology of our social lives seriously, we have been led 
to adopt Margaret Gilbert's  Plural Subject Theory. This account captures the apparently 
contradictory,  but in fact  complementary,  phenomena  at  the heart  of  collective  action: 
unity between wills and discord between wills. Adopting Plural Subject Theory requires that 
we move beyond the framework of individual agency. I have argued that it is reasonable to 
do so  because the possibility  of  individuals  uniting together – and  so creating a  plural 
subject with a  collective will – is part of our basic understanding of social life.  The last 
chapter, however, raised a challenge: how can we marry the fact that the collective will has 
intersubjective normative force  with the apparent autonomy of individual agency? In this 
chapter, I  will  be looking to  disarm this  challenge.  I  do so, firstly, by setting out  how 
personal autonomy  requires constraint by one's own will,  and secondly, by  arguing that 
parallel considerations hold in the collective case.
The above will  involve attempting to  understand the nature of intersubjectivity 
using the tools provided by Michael Bratman's planning theory of agency.251 Whilst there are 
many theoretical  points  of  dispute  between  Bratman and Gilbert,  their  debate  is  often 
framed as a disagreement about the base phenomenology. Gilbert claims that we experience 
the collective will as directly constraining us and that we invoke this collective will when 
rebuking those who transgress. Thus, in Gilbert's world, the keener of our two hill walkers 
may well admonish the lazy one by saying something along the lines of, “You can't stop. 
We said we would go to the top!” Bratman, meanwhile, claims that all that we experience is 
a pressure towards a certain level of stability regarding the direction of our own will and  
everyday moral obligations towards each other. Thus, in Bratman's world, the keen walker 
is  more likely to  exclaim, “You can't stop.  You said that  you would go  with me to the 
top!”252 The first chapter of this thesis  described how the phenomenology can be seen as 
251 The argument set out in this chapter is an extended form of that which I make in How where I stand 
constrains where we stand (Kisolo-Ssonko, 2013).
252 Or at the very least, in the world according to Bratman's theoretical schema, where people do say the 
former, they can be understood as really meaning something like the latter.
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firmly on Gilbert's side. However, armed only with such descriptions, we may hit a brick 
wall  when arguing  with intransigent  individualists who  simply insist that  the  world  is 
otherwise.  By giving an  account  of  intersubjectivity  that  starts  with  a  theoretical 
understanding  of  the nature  of  our  agency,  I  hope  to  contribute  towards  breaking  this 
apparent stalemate.253
This  chapter  is split into  two  parts.  The  first  part,  entitled  'Constraint  by  the 
individual will', sets out Bratman's planning theory of agency and  his explanation of the 
power of individual intentions. The second part, entitled 'Constraint by the collective will', 
sets out  the  application  of  this  theory  to collective  intentions.  In  applying  Bratman's 
planning theory of agency to Gilbert's  Plural Subject Theory, I  am looking to defend the 
plausibility of Gilbert's theory in its general form. However, my investigation will result in 
the  need to modify Gilbert's theory.  I  claim that  we  must  replace  Gilbert's  idea  that 
pooling of wills takes place as the result of essentially voluntary 'willings', with the idea that 
the wills become entangled to various degrees over time. I will discuss the full implications 
of this change to Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory in the next chapter.
Before I continue, a brief terminological note: as I have set out in previous chapters, 
Gilbert's  notion  of  'commitments  of  the  will' is not akin  to  the  sense  of  the  term 
'commitments' in the general (moral or contractual) meaning. Rather, Gilbert's term covers 
the linked phenomena that are loosely referred to as intentions, decisions, plans, aims and 
such like.  In his discussions of agency,  Bratman  tends to  use the term 'intentions' as a 
blanket term to cover  this same set of linked phenomena.254 Because I will be engaging 
253 As I noted at the end of the last chapter, Bratman appeared to acknowledge the need for a turn towards 
the nature of agency at the 2012 7th Conference on Collective Intentionality where, in the questions section 
of Gilbert's talk, '"Saving the appearances" with joint commitment' (CIVII, 2012), he proposed that the way 
to move beyond these debates over the base phenomenology is to try to build a model of the nature of the 
individual will and its social analogue. This is the challenge I see myself as taking up. I further clarify the 
nature of this challenge at the start of section 5b, below.
254 While Bratman does not use the terminology 'commitments of the will', he does speak of intentions as 
involving “... a characteristic kind of commitment” (1999f, p.15) and can clearly be seen to be pointing 
towards the same phenomenon as Gilbert. Of course, Bratman does not believe that there is a collective 
will as such, but in this sense the term 'commitment of the will' is not necessarily any more problematic 
than the term 'collective intention', for strictly speaking Bratman does not think that there can be a thing 
that is the intention of a collective. Nonetheless, just as, on Bratman's account, talk of collective intention 
is actually to be understood as talk of sharing in having joint intentions, collective 
commitments-of-the-will could be taken to be seeing people as sharing in collectively willing. Though it is 
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mainly  with  Bratman's  formulations  in  this  chapter,  here  I  will  mostly  switch  to  his 
convention and use the term 'intentions' as synonymous with 'commitments of the will'.
generally true that Bratman's use of the term 'intentions' covers all commitments of the will, this is not 
always the case; for example, he acknowledges that 'plans' can be seen as “intentions writ large” and 
likewise that 'policies' can be seen to denote intentions that are vaguer and hold over a longer time (1999f, 
p.29). A further complication is that there is a usage of the term 'plans' which does not fit Bratman's or 
Gilbert's usage, such as the plans of the building or a plan for making jam. As Bratman says, “I might 
know a procedure to achieve a certain end. In this sense I can have a plan to roast lamb whether or not I 
actually intend to roast lamb. On the other hand, for me to have a plan to roast lamb requires that I plan 
to roast it.” (Bratman, 1999f, p.29).
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Chapter 5 Part (a) – Constraint by the individual will
In the last chapter, as an illustration of the normative constraint that our intentions 
(or,  as  Gilbert refers to them, the  commitments  of  our  wills)  place  upon  our  practical 
deliberation, I gave  Gilbert's example of  Jane forming an intention to go fishing. Gilbert 
takes it to be obvious that having formed this intention, and not having rescinded it, Jane 
can be criticised if her actions and further practical deliberation do not fit with it. This is 
the  sense  in  which  I  have  set  out  that  agents  can  be  normatively  constrained by  their  
intentions. Unlike, say, the rope that tied Odysseus to his ship's mast, such constraint does 
not  delimit  what  is  possible for  an  agent.  Rather,  it  sets  the  boundaries  of  what  is 
normatively permissible. To refer to such constraint as normative is to say that, rather than 
delimiting what an agent practically might do, it delimits what they ought to do. All this 
seems intuitively correct, a straightforward description of what we take to be the nature of 
intentions.255 However, if we are to get to the bottom of the nature of this constraint, we 
need to progress beyond noting that things are so and ask why they are so. What is it about 
intentions that means that the constraint that they issue has real normative force for agents 
like us?
Another way to put the point is to imagine a wayward sister to Jane; let us call her 
Anarchist-Jane. Anarchist-Jane is like Jane in that she responds to the practical world by 
forming intentions. However, unlike Jane, she then fails to see the constraint issuing from 
her intentions as binding upon her. What exactly is errant about Anarchist-Jane? In what 
follows, I  shall argue that Bratman's  planning theory of agency holds the key to answering 
255 Though note that not everyone accepts this. Bratman acknowledges that it is possible to reject the idea 
that the normative constraint of commitments of the will is real, calling theories that do so myth theories. 
He attributes such a position to Joseph Raz (2005) and Niko Kolodny (2005) and states that they believe 
that it is a myth to think of the constraint appending intentions as having any distinct non-instrumental 
normative significance in each particular case (see 2009a, p.419 – I explore the importance of the 
normative significance being distinct and non-instrumental below). However, while such positions are 
possible, given that the idea that our intentions do constrain is the intuitively natural starting point, 
Bratman – rightly, I think – believes that one should only accept a myth theory if one cannot give a compelling  
account of the power of these norms (2009a, pp.418 – 419). Thus, if we can find a workable way to explain 
what gives the norms their force, then myth theory will be redundant.
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this question.256 Broadly put, Bratman's  planning theory starts by noting that  we have a 
practical need to structure our lives. That is, to have a rational framework that allows us to 
avoid having to make practical decisions at every possible juncture. For example, it benefits 
Jane to see her decision to go fishing as a fixed point as she decides what clothes to wear, 
what  bus  to catch  and so  on.  She  can  determine  her  actions in  light  of  her  standing 
intention to go fishing. In this way, she does not have to revisit the rationale for this action 
at each juncture. I will explore the idea that intentions fill this function in the first section 
below (5.a.1).  However,  this  is  not the end of  the story,  for  Jane does not  simply see 
following her standing intentions as generally leading to better practical outcomes; rather, 
she experiences them as things that (as long as they continue to be held) ought to be followed  
in each instance.  In the second section (5.a.2) I will introduce the idea that intentions are 
experienced as having distinct non-instrumental force and present Bratman's notion that this 
is linked to the way in which intentions allow agents like us (i.e. planning agents) to count 
as governing by giving us a standpoint. That is,  by giving us a rational perspective we can 
identify as being the place “where we stand”.257
Understanding this dialectic will depend on appreciating the interplay between two 
concerns about the  metaphysics  of  agency. Firstly, the concern, raised by Harry Frankfurt, 
that we need an account of how agents  like us can count as authentically governing  our 
own lives.258 Secondly, the concern, originating from John Locke, that we need to identify 
some state that links the mental life of an agent to account for their identity as a singular 
agent  across  time.259 As  we  shall  see,  Bratman  thinks  that  by  allowing  us  to  have  a 
standpoint,  intentions can meet both concerns.  Further,  he believes  that  the normative 
authority of intentions is grounded in the fact that they can only play this role in virtue of 
being taken to be universally constraining (i.e.  constraining  in every particular instance). 
256 Bratman first began to develop this planning theory in his paper Intention and Means End Reasoning 
(1981), and has subsequently gone on to develop it in his book Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason 
(1999f) and throughout his work in various papers. Bratman's presentation of this theory is extended and 
subtle. It is thus open to different interpretations. In what follows, I put forward what I take to be the key 
elements that make his theory work.
257 Bratman, 2009a, p.431. As I shall explore below Bratman takes the concern with 'where-I-stand' to be a 
“Frankfurtian concern” (2009a, p.431).
258 See Frankfurt, 1971 & 1997.
259 Locke, 1748.
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From this metaphysical point – regarding the nature of agency – I will take it that the 
epistemic point – that agents can only properly understand themselves as agents if they see 
their intentions as constraining – follows.260 Thus, the error of Anarchist-Jane will be that 
by failing to appreciate the constraining force of her intentions, she fails to be able to see 
herself as the kind of agent she in fact is.
5a.1 – Intentions as rational scaffolding
There can be no doubting that intentions pervade our practical lives. They come in 
various guises, some are short term – such as my intention to finish typing this paragraph  
before I pause for a rest; others are longer – such as my plan to finish th is chapter by the 
end of the day; and others are much longer – such as my aim to finish this thesis by the end 
of the  summer.  Why,  one might wonder, do  I bother  with any of them?  As I began to 
sketch above,  Bratman's answer is  that  we are the kind of creatures that have both the 
practical need and the mental capability to organise our lives.  According to this picture, 
intentions are akin  to maps; they  offer  us  pre-considered  paths  across  our  practical 
choice-laden landscape. I will call this function that of offering rational scaffolding.261
The importance of  the rational scaffolding created by intentions can be seen by 
inventing an additional sister  for  Jane;  let  us  call  her  Intention-Free-Jane.  Unlike  their 
sibling Anarchist-Jane who ignores the force of her own intentions, Intention-Free-Jane 
simply fails to make any; she lives her life from moment to moment, making choices freely 
at every possible juncture. What would life be like for Intention-Free-Jane? Well, suppose 
she lives on a desert island, similar to that of Crusoe discussed in the previous chapter, but 
260 Bratman focuses on the metaphysical point, but I take it that the epistemic point flows easily from this 
metaphysical point. Indeed, Bratman seems to be suggesting as much when he says “When I recognize 
inconsistency in my own intentions, I see that in this specific case there is no clear answer to the question, 
'Where do I stand?' This question about myself is, with respect to this domain, simply not settled; there is 
as yet no fact of the matter.” (2009a, p.431)
261 The project is thus to understand intentions from a first person perspective. An alternative starting point 
would be to enquire as to the importance of such rules of reasoning in helping us understand other agents 
and their actions, i.e. to understand intentions from a third person perspective. While Bratman recognises 
that understanding how intentions work is an important component in our interpretive and evaluative 
assessments of other agents, he sees this as a secondary function of the fact that they structure “first person 
practical reasoning” (2009a, p.413). Thus, approaching the topic in this former way will allow us to 
unravel the latter problem.
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let us say,  so richly endowed with edible  plants  and free of dangers that it is never much 
effort for her to fulfil her very basic needs: to eat, drink and sleep. We might imagine that 
in such a land Intention-Free-Jane could get away with this form of mental life. She sees a 
piece of fruit and, if she wants to eat it, she eats it, and if not, she does not. She sees a nice 
patch of ground and if she is inclined to sleep at that moment, she lays down to sleep, if not 
then she does not. Sadly, the real world is not like this abundant Eden. Moreover, actual 
people have interests and desires far more complex than merely to eat, drink and sleep. So 
let us complicate  Intention-Free-Jane's life by imagining that she is not happy with her 
island existence and wants to escape back home. Naturally, she realises she needs to build a 
ship. It immediately becomes obvious that to achieve this she will need to think beyond her 
immediate present; she will need to think about her practical choices as extending across time. 
As Harry  Frankfurt  puts  it,  she  will  need to move  beyond the  “...  way  of  nonhuman 
animals and of small children.”262 The reason for this is that if, when deciding whether to 
pick up this piece of wood or that, Jane has to every time revisit the question of what she 
wants to use the wood (rather than see her intention to build a ship as a fixed point), she 
will fast get bogged down in cognitive overload.
In virtue of the fact that intentions are rational scaffolding,  they are,  as Bratman 
notes, a “... more or less all-purpose, universal means” to any end.263 To say this is just to 
recognise that you cannot usually directly make it the case that what you intend just comes 
about;  rather,  you need to do those things that are needed to bring it about, in order to 
bring it about. Moreover, if you do not want to be at cross purposes, to bring about things  
other than that which you wish to bring about, holding conflicting intentions will frustrate  
you in achieving your aim.  These points are obvious when we think about the problems 
that  Intention-Free-Jane would face trying to escape her island.  Intentions are defined by 
being the mental  means by which we  make it  such that  we do not  have to treat  each 
moment as one where we must decide what to do. Given the above, it is fruitless to ask why 
intentions structure. To ask such a question is like asking why buses accept passengers. For, 
in the same way that accepting passengers  just is part of what it is to be a bus,  providing  
262 Frankfurt, 2006, p.6.
263 Bratman, 2004, p.1.
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rational scaffolding just is part of what it is to be an intention. The question that I am asking 
is rather, why do we feel ourselves to be bound by this rational scaffolding?
According to Bratman, what I have called rational scaffolding operates in terms of 
the following two principles: means-ends coherence and intention consistency.
Means-ends coherence is the rule that if we have an intention to E then we must 
commit to doing that which we believe is necessary to do E. So, for example, if Jane intends 
to go fishing, and believes that it is necessary to buy worms to go fishing, then she ought  
also to intend to buy the worms.264 Bratman gives the following formal definition of this 
rule: “The  following  is  always  pro-tanto  irrational:  intending  E  while  believing  that  a 
necessary means to E is  M and that  M requires  that  one now intend M, and yet  not  
intending  M”.265 This  rule  is  important  because the  intentions we  form tend  only  to 
contain partial plans for their realisation,  and because we know that filling in the gaps is 
necessary as a means for achieving our goals, we must thus commit to filling in these gaps. 
In this vein, Jane's intention to go fishing may not specify the location at which she will  
fish, but, because having a plan about where she will fish is a necessary means to going  
fishing, she will need to form such a plan. Further, if, say, the chosen location is far away, 
she will need to have a plan about how to get there.
Intention  consistency is the rule that  if we are committed to one action then we 
cannot also  intend to do some other action that we believe  is impossible in conjunction 
with that intention. So, for example, if Jane intends to go fishing today and knows that this  
will not leave her with enough time to also get in a round of golf, then she ought not also  
plan to play golf. Bratman gives the following formal definition of this rule: “The following 
is always pro-tanto irrational: intending A and intending B while believing that A and B are 
not copossible”.266 Further, in interaction with the rule above, we can say that the agent is  
under pressure to  fill out their partial plans in ways that are  compatible with their prior 
264 Suppose that Jane knows that she must catch the early bus to get to town before the shop selling the 
worms shuts. However, perhaps because her scoleciphobia (fear of worms) overcomes her, she forms the 
intention to catch the later bus. In such a case, Jane's fishing partner, Jim, could rightly criticise Jane.
265 Bratman, 2009a, p.413.
266 Bratman, 2009a, p.413.
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intentions. Given this,  we  can  see  that,  in  filling  out  her  plan  to  fish  by  specifying  a 
location, Jane must take into account her prior  intentions – such as,  let us imagine, her 
decision never to fish at the lake where her brother was eaten by a carp. 
Of course, the average person might not explicitly acknowledge that they are guided 
by  the  principles of  means-ends  coherence  and intention  consistency  in  their  practical 
reasoning, at least not in these terms; nonetheless they are easily recognisable as formalised 
versions of our everyday practical reasoning (as the example of Jane shows).  Thus, when 
Bratman says that “[g]uidance by our (implicit) acceptance of these norms is central to the 
proper functioning of our planning agency”267 he seems to be right: implicit acceptance of 
these principles is thoroughly natural.  To say that our acceptance is implicit is just to say 
that  these are  not  rules  which  we  explicitly  have  in  mind  as  we  engage  in  practical 
reasoning; however, they are ways of thinking that can be seen to be embodied in the ways 
in which we think practical reasoning ought to function. They describe kinds of reasoning 
that we can recognise and admonish divergence from.
The special  nature of  intentions in providing rational scaffolding can be further 
elucidated by comparing them with desires. On one level, intentions and desires are similar; 
both contain descriptions of certain sets of affairs, and both can be said to motivate us 
towards  realising  those  sets  of  affairs.  So,  a  desire  to keep fit  has  the  same aim as  an  
intention to keep fit and either would motivate one towards exercise. In this sense, both 
are, to use Donald Davidson's terminology,  pro-attitudes,  that is, they are attitudes that 
motivate some set of affairs.268 However, while our desires do motivate us to live in certain 
ways, unlike our intentions, they do not normatively constrain our actions. Take Jane: she 
desires to go fishing, but she might also desire to stay in bed, desire to start training for a  
marathon and desire to become the kind of person who does not like to fish. However, it is 
not the case that if Jane fails to start training for a marathon, fails to stay in bed, or fails to  
stop liking fishing that she must have behaved incorrectly. Indeed, as these desires are not 
267 Bratman, 2009a, p.413.
268 Davidson lists 'pro-attitudes' as including “... desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of 
moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and public and private values” 
(2001a, p.4)
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copossible, not only do they fail to provide rational scaffolding but they could not do so.  
The fact that  we hold a persistent plurality of conflicting desires  is understandable  only 
because desires fail to structure our options in the way that commitments of the will do. 269 
On this picture then, intentions allow for the possibility of  evaluative judgement in a way 
that desires cannot. For example, Bratman says “[s]uppose that I know that I can stop at 
one of two bookstores after work, Kepplers or Printer’s Inc. but not both. And suppose I 
find both options equally attractive. I judge all out that stopping at Kepplers would be just 
as desirable as any act of stopping at Printer’s Inc.,  given my beliefs”. How can  I thus 
motivate myself to go to one store rather than the other? The answer is that I can simply 
form an intention to do one rather than the other without changing my evaluative beliefs,  
just as a real Buridan's ass would be able to avoid starving by forming an intention to go 
towards one bale of hay rather than the other, even though it has no evaluative preference  
between the two.270
So the rigidity with which the normative force of intentions holds, i.e. the fact that 
it is constraining, allows intentions to play a special role in our practical reasoning;  I will 
call  this  the  rigidity  of  rational  scaffolding.  As  I  have  set  out  above,  this  rigidity  is 
characterised as imposing two rules: means-ends coherence and intention consistency. This 
talk of rigidity should not be thought of as masking the fact that we can, of course, change 
our minds. That is,  we can rescind our personal intentions and their rigid hold over us is 
thus abolished.271 Bratman does not think that  if I form an intention that  this intention 
becomes an alien force that rules over me deciding what I should do; “[f]uture directed 
269 It is for this reason that Bratman rejects the belief-desire model of intentions, such as that held by 
Davidson. See Davidson, 2001b for his account of the belief-desire model, and see Bratman, 1999e for 
Bratman's rebuttal of it.
270 According to Bratman, Buridan's ass type cases are common in the lives of rational agents like us;  for 
example, “Just consider choosing one of the many boxes of Cheerios from the supermarket shelves.” 
(Bratman, 1999f, p.11) As Bratman sees it, in Buridan type cases the beliefs and desires of the agent 
under-determine the choice that the agent has to make. However, we are still able not only to make a 
choice but to act in the fully agentive sense (Bratman, 1999f, p.11 & p.20). Once I have an intention for 
some particular action, this becomes directly relevant to the rationality of my future plans. So in the 
Buridan’s ass case, if that ass had chosen the left pile of hay then moving towards that pile becomes more 
rational than moving towards the other – even though the ass’s beliefs and desires still do not give it 
reason to go one way rather than the other.
271 For Gilbert, this of course is the key difference between the plural will and one's individual will, i.e. 
that we are in a position to unilaterally change our individual wills. However, each individual is not in 
a position to unilaterally change the plural will.
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plans”, he notes, “... are after all revocable: they don’t control one's future conduct by way 
of some mysterious action at a distance; and many times in the face of new and relevant  
information we recognise that it would be folly to stick rigidly with our prior intentions.” 272 
So, to be clear, when I speak of rigidity of rational scaffolding, I am referring to the rigidity 
of the force of intentions  when held. The question of  whether we must stick rigidly with 
our prior intentions (i.e. not change our minds) is a separate one.273
What the introduction of Intention-Free-Jane shows  is that we can carve up the 
category of intentional action more finely than I have been doing so far. In the first chapter, 
I tried to clarify the notion of intentionality with the distinction between the completely  
non-intentional  movement  of  windswept  sand and  the  clearly  fully  intentional  act  of 
climbing to the top of Everest. I said that, at a most basic level, the difference between the 
two is that action is purposeful. However, Intention-Free-Jane's actions are intentional in a 
minimal sense that distinguishes them from the movement of wind swept sand, and yet 
they are not agentive in the full sense in which normal human adults' actions are. Bratman 
sees such a point and presses the idea that  unlike many creatures, “... we – normal adult 
human agents in a modern world – are not merely purposive agents”,274 rather  we make 
intentions that we see as providing rational scaffolding. In this sense, the agency of us (as in 
we actual adult humans) is planning agency.
5a.2 – Why practical utility is not enough
Imagine that we accepted the story of the  role of intentions above;  would this be 
enough to get us to the bottom of the normative authority of intentions? It certainly does 
explain why it is reasonable for  a  sensible agent  to let themself be guided by their 
intentions. However, there is a problem. The conclusion, that an agent must stick to these 
rules in every particular case,  does not follow from the premise, that being constrained by 
intentions is useful for achieving our ends. We can see this by returning to an examination 
272 Bratman, 1999, p.2.
273 Recall that Bratman does think that there is a pressure towards reasonable stability in not changing our 
minds. I discussed this back in Chapter Two, as part of his attempt to provide an individualistic 
explanation of why we face normative pressure to not renege on playing our parts in collective actions.
274 Bratman, 1999a, p.5.
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of Anarchist-Jane: suppose that she reads the above argument and accepts it; she says that 
she can see that it is useful to be constrained by intentions. However, she then goes on to 
say  that, all  the  same,  she  would rather not be.  Maybe  because  she  has  an underlying 
attachment to the power of spontaneity,  an attachment that she feels outweighs practical 
utility.  We want to be able to say to Anarchist-Jane that she has missed something.  We 
want to be able to say that she cannot just choose to ignore the force of her own intentions in 
this way. Unfortunately, the  truth of the  instrumental  utility of rational scaffolding does 
not give us enough ammunition to defeat Anarchist-Jane's intransigence. 
That there is something more to the normative authority of intentions – than the 
general utility of being guided by them – can be seen in cases where the particular demands 
of the intentions in question do not match that which the agent has most objective reason 
to do. Take the example of Jane and her intention to go fishing. I noted in the previous 
chapter that believing fishing to be morally unacceptable would not in any way make Jane's 
intention any less a real intention (or as I spoke of it there, any less a real commitment of 
her will). Likewise, we can say that I might intend to push over an old lady (which would 
be morally reprehensible), or I might intend to cut myself (which would have a negative 
effect on my health). In all these cases, the fact that, objectively speaking, we ought not to 
positively value the intended ends does not appear to change the fact that if I intend them 
and yet fail to be constrained by those intentions, then (in some sense) I am in error.275 
Further, we might even question the idea that being guided by the rational scaffolding of  
one's own intentions is always in one's general interest.  Consider the following: suppose 
that  Anarchist-Jane's  defiance  of  the  rules  of  practical  reasoning is  not  based  on mere  
libertarian wilfulness, but rather that she believes,  correctly, of herself that she is prone to 
make very bad decisions. Thus, she supposes that her general utility will not be adversely  
affected by  ignoring these  rules.  It  seems not  beyond imagination to suppose  that  not  
following  the  rules  and  thus  failing  to  effectively  act  might  actually  be  instrumentally 
275 While it seems clear to me that the idea that evil intentions constrain us fits with our every experience, 
those coming to action theory via a concern with the foundations of ethical action, often find it 
problematic for us to be normatively constrained to commit bad ends. Bratman admits that in the past he 
tried to avoid the conclusion that we can have such constraints, but he now admits that they do exist as 
there is an intrinsic reason for self-governance even where “... self governance involves volitionally 
necessary bad ends” (Bratman, 2009a, p. 443 - particularly footnote. 75).
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advantageous for her. The important thing, however, is that even if this is the case it  still 
seems that Anarchist-Jane is doing something erroneous by ignoring the force of her own 
intentions over her.
The problem is that,  it appears that we are rationally free to act in ways that are 
contrary to acting in the manner that would be of the greatest utility. Imagine that one of 
our two walkers  has been up all night writing up a  plan – based on extensive research – 
about the best route to take to the top of Scafell given their walking experience, the time of  
year, the weather conditions etc. The fact that objectively this plan describes the best route 
does not appear to bind the other walker to it.  In fact, it does not even seem to bind the 
walker who drew up the plans to follow them. Both walkers are at liberty to exercise their 
personal autonomy and ignore the plan. They are not bound by it, even though it would be 
of great practical utility to follow  it.  In contrast,  not  feeling oneself to be bound by the 
plans that one commits to is not like this – it is wrong.276
What is  missing from the above is,  as Bratman puts  it,  the fact that  intentions 
appear  to  have  a  “...  noninstrumental  normative  significance in  the  particular  case,  a 
significance that is distinctive in the sense that it is not merely a matter of the promotion of  
your particular ends”.277 Using the terminology developed by John Broome, we can say that 
intentions are strict normative relations. That is, they require that those who have them must 
act appropriately.  In contrast, Anarchist-Jane appears  to wrongly take them to be slack 
normative relations, that is relations that merely recommend that those who have them act 
appropriately.278 In this way,  the normative force of the rational scaffolding provided by 
intentions is universal (for the agent in question); it applies in each particular case. 
Given all of this, we will want to  be able to say that,  by failing to see  what her 
intentions require of her,  Anarchist-Jane is not being rational.  However,  her irrationality 
276 Recall (from footnote 254 above) that there are two senses to the term 'plan'. Bratman (1999f, p.29) 
distinguishes between having a plan as to how to cook lamb and planning to cook lamb. It is in the 
former sense, i.e. not the committed sense, that I am thinking of the walker having a plan as to the best 
way up the mountain. 
277 Bratman, 2009a, p. 418 [emphasis mine].
278 Broome, 1999, p.409.
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does not appear to be of the standard theoretical sort; that is, it is not a matter of her  
holding  contradictory  beliefs.  We  cannot,  for  instance,  locate  her  irrationality  in  her 
holding of both the belief that she will do as she intends, coupled with the belief that she 
will not. This is because, though it would seem odd indeed if she believes that she would 
definitely not carry out her intentions, it is not a requirement that she believe that she will 
carry  them out.  For example, it is possible that she may intend to go fishing but yet not 
believe that she will certainly do so. All that she is required to believe is that  fishing is not 
impossible, that there is some chance that she will do it. As Bratman has rightly shown, “... 
there need be no irrationality in intending to A and yet still not believing that one will.”279 
Anarchist-Jane  could,  for  example,  be  unsure  whether  she  can  reach  the  location  of  a 
suitable site for fishing and thus  be  aware that she may fail to fish, even though she is 
confident enough of the possibility to give it a go and thus to intend to do it (though, of 
course,  being Anarchist-Jane  she does not see her intention as binding upon her). “[T]he 
demands of theoretical rationality”, as Bratman puts it, “do not strictly speaking engage 
intentions, they only engage associated beliefs”.280 In this way Anarchist-Jane's irrationality 
is  a  matter  of  her  incorrectly  grasping  what  she  ought  to  do rather  than  a  matter  of 
incorrectly grasping what she ought to believe – and, in this sense, it is practical irrationality  
rather than theoretical irrationality.281
279 Bratman, 2009a, p. 38.
280 Bratman, 2009a, p.427, footnote 50. The converse account is dubbed by Bratman the 'Cognitivist 
Position'. He notes that holding it would require a commitment to a close connection between intentions 
and beliefs. Against such a position, Bratman claims that rather than requiring a flat out belief that we will 
certainly do that which we intend, to have an intention we must rather just see the possibility of our doing 
as we intend as something we take for granted. That is, it must be, in Bratman’s terminology, something 
that is accepted as part of the cognitive background for our deliberation (2009a, p. 38). Partly what we accept 
will mirror what we believe. However, Bratman says that, “There is an important phenomenon of 
acceptance that is context relative in a way in which belief is not”. Thus, while we cannot reasonably “... at 
one and the same time believe that p relative to one context but not relative to another” we do, in 
planning for our future actions, reasonably “... accept that p relative to one context but not relative to 
another”. (1999f, p.27) For example, in making her plan to go fishing tomorrow, Jane's 70% confidence 
– that the shop, from which she needs to buy equipment will be open – may suffice. However, in making 
a plan to hold a fishing party for her friend Jim's 80th birthday party, which she knows Jim will consider 
to be a very important event, her 70% confidence may seem too low. In light of this, Bratman says that, 
to form an intention to A we do not need to flat out believe that we will A, however we must ‘bracket out’ 
any doubts, that is, we must make a (context relative) acceptance that A will be achieved (1999, p.32).
281 In distinguishing between theoretical irrationality and practical irrationality I am following Bratman.
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5a.3 – Self-governance and there being somewhere 
where-I-stand
In setting up the puzzle of intersubjectivity in the previous chapter, I introduced the 
notion that we see ourselves as necessarily  personally  autonomous.282 Further, I discussed 
how the possibility of intersubjective constraint can be seen as troubling because it appears 
to  violate  this  autonomy.  I  ended  that  chapter,  however,  by  asking  what  is  it  about 
constraint  by  our  own  intentions  that  means  that  it  is not  problematic for  personal 
autonomy? We can now ask a related question, which pushes at the same issue: what is it 
that  means  that  Anarchist-Jane  (who  lives  in  the  moment,  paying  no  heed  to  her 
intentions) is  not a  legitimate  representative  of  the  most  authentic  autonomy  possible? 
Below I will present  an answer,  from Michael Bratman's work, founded on the idea that 
our being autonomous and our being constrained are intimately linked, such that, the reason for  
the latter derives from our reason for the former.283 At first this might seem odd. The rational 
scaffolding  provided  by  intentions  constrains  our  practical  deliberation. How  can 
something that constrains us be intimately linked to our being autonomous? Is autonomy 
not  freedom  from constraint?  Answering  this  question  will  take us  to the heart  of  the 
ground of the normative authority of intentions. As we shall see, Bratman's perception of 
the situation mirrors  Frankfurt's  insight that doing whatever one is motivated to do “… 
misses entirely… the particular content of the quite different idea of an agent whose will is  
free”.284 For one's actions to be realisations of one's will being free – or as I am calling it, 
one's personal autonomy – those actions must be governed by one's will. While Bratman's 
thoughts share something with Frankfurt's – both are concerned with what it is that allows 
us to count as governing as the very agents that we are – he departs from Frankfurt in what 
he  thinks  underlies the  possibility of  governing.  Frankfurt  thinks  that  counting  as 
governing comes from having 'second order desires' (see below). In contrast, for Bratman, 
counting  as  governing  comes  from  being  constrained  by  the  rational  scaffolding  of 
282 I contrasted this sense of autonomy with that of environmental autonomy, which requires control of 
one's surrounding world. Only in the personal sense of autonomy, i.e. that of making our own minds up, 
is necessary for the kind of agency we are interested in here.
283 As Bratman puts it, “... our reason for conforming to these norms of practical rationality derives in part 
from our reason to govern our own lives.” (Bratman, 2009a, p.412).
284 Frankfurt, 1971, p.14.
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intentions.  The normative authority of intentions thus ultimately resides in their place in 
the metaphysics of the agency of creatures like us.
Understanding Bratman's argument requires an appreciation of the complexity of 
human psychology. Our beliefs, desires, memories and other psychological states change as 
time passes.  Even in any one particular moment we will hold a diverse array of mental 
states, some of which may even be contradictory  (as with the example, above, of Jane's 
conflicting desires). However, even though our psychological content is heterogeneous, we 
consider  it  possible  for our actions,  which  must  be  brought  about  by  some  of  those 
psychological states, to be governed by ourselves as unitary agents. The general existence of 
the feeling that – ourselves –  govern in this way can be seen in the peculiarity of examples 
where we do not. David Velleman gives the following example: Sigmund Freud is reported 
as noting that, whilst sitting down at his desk, he moved his hand in a remarkably clumsy 
way and knocked an ink pot to the floor, smashing it. Freud's explanation for this was that 
his knocking of the ink pot was unconsciously done so as to get rid of it after his sister had 
remarked on its  ugliness.285 Velleman's  claim is  that,  even though Freud's  behaviour is 
motivated by an element of his psyche (his desire to get rid of the ugly ink pot), it is not 
something that he truly governed. In this sense, it is not agentive in what we might call the  
strong sense but is rather, in Velleman's terms, merely 'motivated activity'.286 
If most of our actions, or at least a great deal, are to be understood as expressing  
strong rather than weak agency, and strong agency cannot be understood merely in terms of 
our  acts  being  expressions  of  our  psychological  states,  then  it  becomes  necessary,  as 
Velleman puts it,  to find a way to locate the “… agent at work amid the workings of the 
mind”.287 That is, to switch back to Bratman's terminology of governance, for the agent to 
285 Velleman, 2000, p.2.
286 Velleman distinguishes the category 'ungoverned actions' thus;  “… contains the things that one does 
rather than merely undergoes, but that one somehow fails to regulate in the manner that separates 
autonomous human action from merely motivated activity” (2000, p.4).
287 Velleman, 2000, p.131. One might worry that in introducing the idea that we cannot reduce action 
governed by us to action caused by any proper part of us, we are putting an anti-naturalist bar on any 
reductive understanding of human agency. However, for Velleman, the idea that ‘the agent should be in 
control’ is not an absolute bar on reduction. Rather, it just sets certain criteria for what constitutes a 
successful reduction. It demands reduction that captures the functioning of the agent. That this type of 
reduction is possible can be seen by examining some of those operations of a person that are not agentive. 
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govern is “... for the relevant attitudes that guide and control [their] thinking and action to 
have  authority  to  speak  for  the  agent”.288 In  sum,  they  must have  agential  authority.  
Frankfurt's solution to the quandary  of how the relevant attitudes that guide and control 
our behaviour get to have agential  authority  (with which Bratman agrees) is that these 
attitudes must comprise a standpoint that we can identify with.289 
How,  then, might the relevant attitudes come to  comprise a standpoint that an 
agent can identify as  their standpoint?  Frankfurt looks to find attitudes  of the agent that 
can be said to be those with which the agent most strongly identifies. He thinks that the 
relevant attitudes are a certain kind of desire, second-order desires. Second-order desires are 
not desires about things external to the agent's mental world, rather, they are desires about  
desires.  In  a  sense,  they  are  desires  of  the  agent  that  they  be a  certain  way.  They  are 
attempts, we might say, at governing ourselves. For example, Jane's (first-order) desire to go 
fishing  might be coupled with a desire  that she desires to fish more than she desires to 
sleep-in in bed. These second order desires are thought to represent a standpoint that the 
agent can identify with because they describe the kind of person they want to be. This 
proposal has its merits.  It is  certainly preferable to any account that simply identifies an 
agent's  standpoint as  the sum of all  their  psychic stew.  This  is  because it  allows us to 
understand examples, such as Freud's smashing of the inkpot, as not being fully agentive. 
On Frankfurt's account, such situations are explained by noting that though Freud does 
have a desire that the inkpot be smashed, he does not desire that he should so desire. 
Bratman rejects  Frankfurt's proposal  that simply any second order desire  can  play 
the role of setting up an agent's standpoint. This is because, he claims that, there is nothing 
essential  to the nature of second order desires that means that we cannot be equally as 
alienated from them as we can be from first order desires. If Freud can reject his desire to 
smash the inkpot as part of his authentic standpoint, why is it not also the case that he 
could reject a desire, to desire to smash the inkpot? Similarly if, say, Jane had a higher order 
For example, Velleman notes that it is easy to understand a person as being a 'digester of food' in virtue of 
the functioning of certain of their parts (i.e. their stomach and the chemicals within it) (Velleman, 2000, 
p.138).
288 Bratman, 2000 [emphasis mine].
289 Frankfurt, 1997.
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desire, to not desire, to desire to be the kind of person who desires to fish more than to 
sleep,  where  would this  leave  her  second order desire?  Which one  would count  as  her 
governing and why? The problem is, as Bratman poetically puts it, there appears to be no 
principled characteristic by which we can identify any desire, of whatever  order, as being 
anything more than just “... one more desire … in the psychic stew”.290
To  be  able  to  understand  a psychological  state  as  capable  of  being  part  of  a 
standpoint that counts as our standpoint, we need a state that we cannot dissociate from; a 
state that is part of the core of our being the agents that we are.  As Bratman notes, “... it is 
only  if  there  is  a  place  where  you  stand  that  you are  governing  in  the  corresponding 
domain, for in self-governance where you stand guides relevant thought and action”. 291 He 
thinks that, unlike desires of whatever order, intentions can play this role. This is because, 
they are for an agent “... attitudes whose role it is to support the temporal organisation of 
her  agency  by  way  of  constituting  and  supporting  Lockean  ties  characteristic  of  her  
temporal persistence”.292  This is the nub of the importance of intentions and the rigidity 
they provide. Bratman's reason for thinking that intentions can do a better job than second 
order desires in setting up a standpoint, from which the agent can govern, is that intentions 
can provide the kind of links between disparate mental attitudes that create a whole agent. 
That is, they play what we might call a Lockean role in constituting our (particular kind of) 
personal  identity.  It  is  because  of  the  role  they  play  in  structuring  agency  across  time 
globally that they can be seen as having agentive authority in each particular instance.
How, though, do we move from our heterogeneous psychological content to having 
the potential to act from a standpoint that is authentically ours? Bratman's answer follows 
in the tradition of Lockeans who seek to explain the unity of the self in terms of 
psychological continuities that bring about “... cross-temporal organization and integration 
of thought and action”.293 While Bratman acknowledges that we can be united by mental 
links of many types (such as memories and the like), he believes that intentions provide an 
290 Bratman, 2000, p.37.
291 Bratman, 2009a, p.431.
292 Bratman, 2000, p.46.
293 Bratman, 2009a, p.430.
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especially strong kind of bond; a bond that has the power to make a standpoint not only 
united, but also governing.
In a general sense, there are  plenty of characteristics that could be thought of as 
unifying an individual; for example, it is possible to think of me as being linked to Joseph 
Kisolo-Ssonko from 2011 by virtue of having the  same jacket,  the  same mother,  or the 
same memories etc.  No doubt some of these are better candidates for providing a robust 
account of my identity over time than others. However, in searching for agentive unity we 
are looking for something particular; we are looking not merely for something that links a 
person together as a singular object, but rather something that links them as an agent. We 
are clearly looking for links between mental attitudes, but we must have a stronger sense of 
'link' than mere causal connection, because one's mental attitudes could be causally linked, 
without this necessarily meaning that, in terms of their content, they were linked in such a 
way that  we could conceive of them as  creating a coherent agent across time.  Bratman 
acknowledges  that  we  might  conceivably  argue  that  other  mental  attitudes,  such  as 
memories, could serve as bridges creating a unitary agent across time. However, memories, 
like desires, do not have the power to structure our future choices.  The fact that I can 
remember wanting to go to the beach yesterday, does not tell me what I must do today. 
Intentions, on the other hand, carry with them practical authority. If I continue to hold an 
intention to go to the beach then this not only tells me what I must do now (e.g. find my  
towel), but also structures the choices I can make into the future (e.g. getting out of the 
house  in time to catch the bus).  Intentions are special for Bratman because they are “... 
authoritative  policies”  that  are  “...  embedded  in  structures  of  planning  agency.”294 
Intentions create not just any kind of identity over time, but  agentive identity over time. 
Moreover, agentive identity over time in the sense of strong agency.
The special  characteristic, which we want the unifying factor to have,  is  that it 
should be a mental state that in some special way relates to the agent being the agent that  
they are. Intentions meet the requirement of having this special characteristic because they 
not only merely unify an agent, but give them a standpoint from where their actions can be 
294 Bratman, 2009a, p.430.
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governed because of the way in which they structure future rational deliberation. If we did 
not see intentions as necessarily structuring our future reasoning in this way, then they 
would not be the kind of thing that has the power of speaking for us. Here, my earlier 
comparison, between an agent who merely desires to keep fit and one who intends to, is 
germane. If an agent has the desire to keep fit, but not the intention, then if she fails to 
keep fit, she, other things being equal, commits no error. We can have inconsistent desires 
without this devastating where we stand, because desires, by themselves, are not enough to 
determine where we stand. However, if one has an intention to keep fit, then this frames 
what one ought to do – we can say that it frames one's standpoint.
It is important to grasp that Bratman's claims about the metaphysics of agency are 
claims specifically about the kind of agency that creatures like us exhibit.295 Thus, what it 
takes for us to be autonomous, given the kinds of creatures we are, may be different from 
what it  takes for other creatures  to be autonomous.  Hence, a creature that  simply acts 
instinctively may be understood as  acting autonomously merely in virtue of their actions 
reflecting their current  whims. However, we are not creatures like this. For the practical 
reasons, given above, we are planning agents. The fact that we plan, however, is not just an 
additional bolt-on to the nature of our agency; rather, it is part of what it is to be the agents  
that we are. This is the context in which we should understand Frankfurt's claim that, an 
"... essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure  
of a person's will."296 Though there might be some room for dispute as to whether this 
distinction clearly splits humans from all other animals,297 it is fairly clear that it is a correct 
description of us; our actions are not just isolated reactive responses to the external world. 
Rather, they are integrally part of our  planned response to that world.  They do  not just 
295 Creatures like us broadly being “... adult humans in a broadly modern world” (Bratman, 2000, p.35).
296 Frankfurt, 1971, p.7. Frankfurt speaks of agents that are merely purposeful as 'wantons' rather than 
'persons'. Intention-Free-Jane would be a wanton under this description, rather than a person. We might 
object that the term 'person' might have other implications, for example the application of moral rights, 
that do not map this distinction. Intention-Free-Jane may still have the legal standing as a person even if 
she does not exhibit strong agency. We need not resolve this question here, however. Rather, all we need 
to say is that what Frankfurt takes to be a necessary condition for being a person is at least a necessary 
condition for being the kind of agents we take ourselves to be.
297 As in this thesis I am interested ultimately only in getting to grips with human collective actions, I can 
leave this question of the nature of the agency of other creatures to one side. Lest one object to this focus 
as species-ist, we can say that this investigation applies to agents like us, and merely leave the question of 
whether any other animals are like us in the relevant way, open. 
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have a purpose, their purpose is  governed by us as agents who form ongoing plans about the  
shapes of our practical lives.  Bratman says that  “...  in self-governance the agent directs and 
governs her practical thought and action”.298 For planning creatures like us, directing and 
governing requires that  we  are guided by the framework which is created by the rational 
scaffolding of our intentions. In comparison, the things that  Intention-Free-Jane does are 
intentional; they are not like mere windswept sand. However, they lack something. Her life 
is lived moment to moment, it is purely reactive, and in this sense it is not governed by her 
as a planning agent with a unified standpoint over time.
If  Freud were  like  Intention-Free-Jane,  then,  we  might  think  that  it  would  be 
wrong for  him  to  dissociate himself  from  the  smashing  of  the  ink  pot.  As 
Intention-Free-Jane acts always solely on the basis of her immediate inclinations, the only 
way we can understand actions as being hers is to see them as arising from her mental stew.  
However, Freud – and the rest of us – are different from Intention-Free-Jane. We are not 
agents who merely react; rather, we are planning agents. In this way, having intentions is,  
for us, a matter  of our  seeing “...ourselves as agents who persist over time, who begin, 
develop and then complete temporally extended activities and projects.”299 We see ourselves 
as having the potential to act today, as the very same planning agent we were yesterday, but 
this possibility requires something in addition to the mere fact that behaviour comes about 
as a result of elements of  the same psychic stew.  It requires that we have a  where-I-stand 
built from the rigid scaffolding of our intentions.
As we have seen above, intentions provide us with rational scaffolding within the  
landscape of our practical choices. The rigidity of the rational scaffolding provided by our 
intentions is comparable to scaffolding supporting the construction of a bridge. For, just as 
that scaffolding – once erected – constrains the bridge's developing shape, intentions – once 
formed – provide stable platforms from which we can construct our practical lives. This 
metaphor is apt, for stretched just a little further, it brings us to Bratman's key insight: just 
as scaffolding only facilitates the construction of a bridge if (while  erected) it is rigid 
298 Bratman, 2007, p.4.
299 Bratman, 2000, p.35.
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enough to hold the relevant materials in place, our intentions only structure our practical 
lives because (while held) they are rigid enough to constrain our practical reasoning.300 The 
rigidity of the scaffolding  allows us  to have  a standpoint from which we can act as the 
agents we are. This is the very nature of the strong agency.
In summary then, the explanation for the normative force of the rules that append 
intentions in every particular case, is that seeing these rules as obligatory is a necessary 
element in the metaphysics of self-governance, that is, in making oneself into a united agent 
capable of governing.
300 These considerations, at least partially, mirror Christine Korsgaard's discussion of the normative force of 
the rules we set ourselves as deriving from ability to unify an entity: for example, she says that "… 
according to Plato, the normative force of the constitution consists in the fact that it makes it possible for 
the city to function as a single unified agent" (2009, p.152). Though note that Korsgaard conceives of 
normative force as being necessarily moral in a way that I have rejected in this – and the last – chapter.
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Chapter 5 – Part b – Constraint by the Collective Will
I have set out above how Michael Bratman's answer to the question of the origin of 
the normative authority of intentions is tied to his planning theory of agency. Or to be more 
precise, how it is tied to his planning theory of the kind of strong agency that agents like us  
have.  I  have  been  arguing  that  we  can  understand  collective  action  as  action  that  is 
governed by a plural subject (comprised of individuals pooling their wills). The argument I 
will now advance is that just as I need my intentions to rigidly constrain me in order that 
the rational scaffolding which this provides can create for me a where-I-stand from which I 
can govern, we need  our  collective  intentions  to  rigidly  constrain  us  in  order  that  the 
rational scaffolding which this provides can create for us a where-we-stand from which we 
can govern together.
While this is not a claim that Margaret Gilbert makes, it does fit with her project. 
For, as Thomas Smith notes, she believes that  “... joint commitment is a plural analogue of 
the sort of reflexive commitment that an individual agent performs when he unilaterally 
decides or intends to do something.”301 As it is such an analogue, we should be able to take 
Bratman's account and simply plug collective  intentions into the place occupied by 
individual intentions. In the first section of the second part of this chapter (5.b.1), I argue 
that such substitution is indeed fruitful. However, while it is possible to successfully ground 
the normative authority of collective intentions in this way, we shall see that a gap remains 
between the necessity of a where-we-stand from a collective perspective and its necessity from 
the perspective of the individual members of the collective. I will first try to bridge this gap 
with the notion of identity submersion (in 5.b.2) but dismiss this as not correctly satisfying 
the  phenomenology  of  constraint.  In  light  of  this,  I  go  on  to develop  (in  5.b.3)  a 
transcendental argument that the process of engaging in collective action  entangles one's 
own idea of  one's individual standpoint with that of the standpoint of the collective of 
which one is a member, such that a failure to be able to understand the latter undermines 
the ability to be able to understand the former.
301 Smith, P.1127, 2007 [emphasis mine].
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Before I set out on this task, it is worth noting that Bratman would not accept this 
use of his planning theory for (as I made clear in Chapter 2) he does not accept the notion 
of  a plural  agency. However, that is not to say that he does not see his  own  theory of 
collective action as connected to his theory of individual planning agency.302 Bratman calls 
his project for understanding collective action a  constructivist project because it “...begins 
with an underlying model of individual planning agency … then seeks a conceptual and 
metaphysical  bridge  from such individual  agency  to modest  forms of  sociality.”303 The 
difference between Bratman's constructivist project and the constructivist project that I am 
arguing for here is that, while we both start from his planning theory of agency, he does not 
believe that the explanations will be symmetrical in the way I am proposing. That is, while 
he  accepts  that  collective  commitments  of  the  will  have  specific  structuring  and 
coordinating roles, and that these generate characteristic social norms, he does not believe 
that  these  roles  create  the  possibility  of  plural  agency in the  sense  that  their  individual 
analogues create the possibility of individual agency. 
In setting out his vision for his constructivist project, Bratman criticises Gilbert for 
introducing what he calls the “... non-reducible social concept of a 'joint commitment'”. In 
this  light,  he  claims that  in  Gilbert's  Plural  Subject  Theory,  the  concept  of joint 
commitment is necessarily “... conceptually primitive”.304 This  critique appears to contain 
the implicit  claim  that  Gilbert's  Plural  Subject  Theory  negates  the  possibility  of 
understanding the plural will using the same conceptual tools as used to understand the 
individual will.  Hence,  Bratman claims that  he can, and – by implication – that  Gilbert  
cannot, explain the nature of our obligations towards collective commitments of the will “...  
while staying within the conceptual and metaphysical resources of the planning theory.” 305 
In this section I take myself to be  refuting this  critique. My claim is that while Gilbert's 
302 In a yet unpublished book to be titled A Theory of Shared Agency (forthcoming) Bratman promises to paint 
a more explicit picture of his vision of the continuity between individual planning agency and modest 
sociality. Elements of this project are sketched in an essay (mooted as a prospective chapter of said book) 
entitled “Group Agency” (2009b). 
303 Bratman, 2009b, p.57.
304 Bratman, 2009b, p. 58.
305 Bratman, 2009b p.58.
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notion  of  joint  commitment  is explicitly  non-reducible to  a  sum  of  individual 
commitments, this does not mean that we must see it as unanalysable. Indeed, as I have set 
out  above,  I  will  be  arguing that  we can understand its  construction in a  way that  is  
symmetrical to  Bratman's  understanding  of  the  construction  of  the  individual  will.  As 
Pierre  Demeulenaere notes  –  in  a  comment  on  Bratman's  “Group  Agency”  article  – 
Bratman's “... thesis is to build up shared social norms on the basis of individual norms”.306 
Hence, Bratman speaks of his constructivism as conservative.307 Adopting this language, we 
can say, in contrast, that the constructivism I set out below is a radical one. It is radical in 
that, though using the same initial conceptual apparatus as Bratman, it aims to justify the  
move beyond the framework of individual agency – that is, the move beyond the idea that the 
only norms of agency are individual norms.
5b.1 – Constructing the Plural Agent
So what happens if we simply take Bratman's planning theory of agency and plug 
collective intentions into the place he reserves for individual intentions? Straightforwardly, 
this results in what we might call the collective self-governance explanation. According to this 
explanation, the normative authority of collective intentions is grounded in the necessity of 
rigid rational scaffolding in order for the plural subject to count as governing its actions.
The  plausibility of  this  explanation  requires  underpinning  by  a  number  of 
suppositions. Firstly, that we think of collective acts as being performed by plural subjects. 
The argument that this is the case is one that I made in chapters Three and Four. Secondly, 
that collective intentions constrain rational deliberation for plural subjects, in the same way 
that  individual  intentions constrain  rational  deliberation  for  individuals. From  which 
would follow that, the collective engages in a strong form of agency. This  too has been 
covered to some extent previously,308 but I will  briefly  clarify the argument for it again 
below, presenting it in light of the discussions of the previous section of this chapter. Lastly, 
and most  crucially,  that  collective intentions can play the same part in constructing a 
306 Demeulena, 2009, p.61.
307 Bratman, forthcoming.
308 In particular, see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.
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collective standpoint as individual intentions play in constructing an individual standpoint. 
Moreover, that, it is only if there is a place where we stand that we can govern our collective 
actions. This I shall explore below.
On the question of the rigidity of collective intentions, reflecting the discussion in 
Chapter Three, we can say that they give rigid structure to practical choices in situations of 
collective action, just as individual  intentions structure  practical  choices in situations of 
individual action. This can be seen in the example of Gilbert's walkers; together they have 
the joint intention to walk to the top of the hill and it is as natural to suppose that,  as a 
pair,  they are constrained  by  this,  as  it  is  to  suppose  that  each individually would  be 
constrained by their own individual intention to walk to the top of the hill. To say this is 
just to acknowledge facts such as, if they collectively intend to walk to the top of the hill, 
then they cannot rightly also intend to abandon the walk halfway up. Nor can they rightly 
intend not to wear down the path to the top of the hill, if they know that walking to the 
top of the hill  will require this. Further, their joint plan to walk to the top of the hill  
structures their  joint  practical  life; for example, it settles the practical questions of what 
together they should do as they progress past different landmarks (i.e. keep going until they 
reach the hill's summit) and allowing them not to have to keep deliberating at each stop. 
This point is noted by Gilbert, who says that, “[just] as personal intentions are subject to  
demands for coherence and consistency, and so on, these shared intentions would appear to 
be subject  to similar  demands”,  for  example,  “[i]f  Zena and her  friends share such an  
intention to bring peace to the world, they have reason, by virtue of that intention, to  
develop concordant sub-plans.”309
Does this mean that collective action  is  agentive in  the sense that Bratman calls 
strong agency? If we accept the conceptual apparatus of Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory, 
then  it  turns out that it  must be.  This  is  because according to Plural  Subject  Theory, 
collective  intentionality  is  never  purely  reactive,  but  rather it  is  always  the  result  of  joint 
commitment. It is, in this minimal sense, always planned. This can be seen in the fact that 
while  Intention-Free-Jane  was  seen  to  be  practically  impossible  (given  the  pressure  to 
309 Gilbert, 2008, p.511.
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organise our lives), her collective analogue is not even conceptually possible. This is because 
it is not possible for a plural subject to act merely on its momentary inclinations as there is  
nothing more to the practical perspective of the plural subject than the collection of the intentions  
which its members collectively commit to.310 Therefore, it does not make sense to think of 
collective action as being weakly agentive; rather, when it exists, it must always be strongly 
agentive. Collective agency is collectively planned agency.
The possibility of the strong agentive nature of collective acts can be seen – just as it 
could in the case of individual agency – by noting the contrast with situations where there 
is no planning agency. In this vein, imagine that our walking couple are setting out on their 
hill climbing adventure on a particularly hot day. Let us suppose that there are two ways to 
get to the start of the hill, one is short and quick and best facilitates starting the hill climb, 
the other is much longer and requires wading through a river. It seems that in such a 
situation, just as Freud's subconscious desire to smash his ink pot (discussed above) could 
lead him to do so, our walkers might have unexpressed individual  desires to get wet in 
order to cool off, and these could lead them to together  take the longer path without 
individually realising, or collectively expressing, their motives. While the walkers' collective 
act of ascending the hill is something that they can lay full authoritative claim to as being 
their action, something that they truly jointly govern, in contrast, this is not the case with 
their diverting along the path that takes them through the river.  In terms of  collective 
action, this is not collectively agentive at all, as it is rather driven by their individual aims to 
keep cool.311 So we can say that, there is a need for an authentic collective standpoint for 
agents like us to achieve collective action, just as there is need for an authentic individual 
standpoint for agents like us to achieve individual action. Indeed, the point here is even 
stronger than in the individual  case  for,  given that  we have accepted the legitimacy of 
Gilbert's claims about the necessity of joint commitment for collective action, we can see  
310 On the organic thesis (which we rejected), where the collective is seen as an emergent organism, this 
would be possible. However, for collectives of the sort we actually do have – rather than the sci-fi Borg 
discussed in last chapter – this is not true.
311 It may be that the walking past the stream differs from the smashing of the ink pot in that from an 
individual perspective it may be strongly agentive, i.e. individually they may intend to go via the stream. 
However, even if this were the case on the individual level, the important point, however, is that it is not 
collectively so.
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that  the  act  of  the  walkers  is  only  a  collective  act  of  the  type  specified  at  all in  the 
circumstances of strong agency. 
So, it seems that we do see rational deliberation for us as plural subjects as being 
constrained  by collective  intentions. Moreover,  it  seems  that  in  doing  this, collective 
intentions can play the same part in constructing a collective  standpoint as individual 
intentions play in constructing an individual standpoint. Given this, we can say then that 
all  the members of a  collective together  failing  to see their collective intentions as 
normatively constraining would undermine their ability to act from a standpoint that can 
count as their own standpoint. In the case of our walkers, this means that if the pair do not 
see their collective intentions in general, and their joint plan to climb to the top of the hill 
in particular, as normatively constraining them, they will fail to form a collective agent 
capable of the governed intentional act of collectively walking to the top of the hill.
A wrong-headed objection to this line of reasoning would be to say that just because 
a collective fails to be an agent, this  does not necessarily mean that it will fail to be a 
collective per se. There are other ways in which we can identify the collective as a unitary 
entity, for example, that its members have common characteristics or certain physical 
relationships between each other and such like. Alternatively, we might consider it to be a 
unitary entity because of its legal or conventional status as one. This is correct; however, 
these facts do not blunt the force of the argument above, just as the following similar point 
does not blunt the argument regarding individual intentions. One could still identify an 
individual who failed to be bound by their own intentions as being a unified thing of some 
sort; this could be achieved by reference to their physical properties, to their social position, 
or their legal standing and so on. However, whilst being a united thing of some sort, this 
person would fail to be an agent united in a way that made her capable of governing her 
own actions. As I stated in the last section, what we require is  not  simply any kind of 
identity over time, but agentive identity over time. This, it seems to me, is akin to Locke's 
claim that rather than search for any old sameness, we must specifically search for  “...the 
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sameness of a rational being.”312 The same holds true for the collective; it is not what it 
takes to be a united object of any sort that is relevant, but rather what it takes to be united 
as a possible collective agent of actions.
Assuming that the above argument is sound, i.e. that there really is a 
correspondence between that which explains the unity of the individual standpoint and 
that which explains the unity of the collective standpoint, then, just as individual intentions 
have force over the individual, collective intentions have force over collectives. 
Unfortunately, this does not yet quite get us where we need to be in order to understand 
the  foundations  of  the  force  of  normative  constraint  in  situations  of  discord  between 
individual wills and collective wills. This is because it is not yet completely clear, as I will 
set out below, what is at stake for the individual in the collective's being understandable as a  
planning agent.
5b.2 – Identification
The collective self-governance explanation presented so far allows us to understand 
the necessity of collective intentions being seen as constraining for the plural agent to exist 
as a plural agent. However, there is a gap between this and explaining why each individual  
member of the plural subject must see these  intentions as constraining on their  personal 
practical rationalities. This gap exists because each member is not, on their own, identical 
with the plural subject and thus each member can ask the question: “Why should I care 
about the existence of the plural agent?” The intrinsic reason that each individual has for 
their own existence as an agent cannot be straightforwardly transposed onto the collective 
case. In the case of the individual, the agent cannot abandon their own standpoint as they 
have no other standpoint  to fall back on –  one's existence as a  planning agent  cannot be  
separated from one's existence as the very individual that one takes oneself to be. By contrast, in 
the case of an agent's attachment to the collective perspective, we might wonder why that 
312 Locke, 1748. Though we might quibble over whether being rational requires being a planning agent. For 
example, we might suppose that Intention-Free-Jane could be rational if her actions are appropriate 
responses to her momentary desires even though she fails to plan across time. However, it seems likely that 
at least sometimes when we think of what it takes to be a fully rational being we are thinking in terms of 
the need for something like what has here been called planning agency.
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agent cannot simply abandon the standpoint of the we and retreat back to the standpoint of 
the I?
We are justified at this juncture in making the following  conditional claim:  if an 
individual agent wants to see their actions as part of a collective action, then they must see 
the intentions of that collective as normatively constraining  on the participating agents 
together. This is because it would not make sense for an agent to see their actions as part of 
a collective action if they fail to be able to rightly see that collective as an agent capable of  
action. On this account, then, collective intentions have the power to normatively constrain 
because the individual sees themself as participating in the action of a plural subject. This 
requires that they see their collective as the kind of thing that we can understand as a plural 
subject;  the kind of  thing that  can act  with strong agency.  This, in turn,  requires  that 
collective intentions are seen as having the power to constrain such that they can provide 
the structure necessary for the plural subject to be able to govern its actions.
This is not the end of the task however, as we must still ask: what is the relation  
between the plural agent, which the individual sees themself as part of, being constrained 
and that individual seeing themself as constrained. In order to answer this question I will 
turn to the notion of identification with the collective. As well as asking what it means for 
the agent to identify  with the collective,  I  will  examine how it is  that,  in situations of 
discord, such identification can become less than voluntary.
Firstly, we must clarify exactly what is meant by 'identifying with the collective'.  
We sometimes talk of identifying with others in a very loose sense, where what we mean is  
that we see ourselves as similar to them in some relevant sense. A recent example of such  
usage, which generated heated debate amongst political commentators, involved members 
of a British anti-government campaign  group claiming to identify their movement with 
that of the successful Egyptian campaign to oust the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. 313 
The  dispute amongst  the  commentators was  in  regard  to whether  or  not  the  two 
movements  shared  significant  relevant  characteristics  for  such  an  identification  to  be 
313 See for example Jenkins (2011) & Gopal (2011).
144
legitimate. However, even if we assume that they did, this does not seem to be the kind of  
identification  that  could  help  with the  current  issue.  We might  well  imagine  that  the 
British protesters' attempt to identify themselves with the Egyptian protesters was aimed at 
forging a sense of solidarity and a commonality of aim between the two groups. However,  
it seems obviously far too strong to suggest that this would mean that the British campaign 
group  should  see  themselves  as  constrained  by  the  present  intentions of  the  Egyptian 
campaigners.  For  example,  the  Egyptian  campaigners  might  be  said  to  have  held  the  
collective  intention  to  occupy  Tahrir  Square,  in  Cairo;  if  the  British  protesters  were 
constrained by this  intention then they would have to hop on a plane and fly to Egypt! 
Amongst other things, this would seem to problematically conflict with their own collective 
plan to occupy Trafalgar Square, in London.
If  the  protesters' seeing  themselves as  importantly  similar  to  the  others  is  not 
enough, then how might we strengthen the identification requirement? Well, sometimes we 
talk of people identifying with others in a much stronger sense than that above. Sometimes 
we  talk  about  individuals  identifying  with  others  in such  a  strong  sense  that  they  see 
themselves as sharing a singular identity with those others.314 Cases of very highly organised, 
strict and centralised religious and political organisations, what we might call 'cults', appear  
to be illustrations of this type of phenomenon. In such cases, individual members of the 
collectives in question might feel  that they have no individual standpoint of their own, 
rather, they identify the standpoint of the group as  their perspective. The submersion of 
individual  identity  beneath  the  identity  of  the  group to  this  extent  might  strike  us  as  
politically  worrying,  but  it  may  well  be  functionally  useful.  Imagine that  one of  the 
individual members of the British anti-government protesters in the example above saw 
themself as having no agentive identity beyond that of the group, or at least no agentive 
identity in the context of the time in which they were engaging in the collective action of  
occupying Trafalgar Square.  If this were the case, then – free from considerations about 
personal safety and personal desires and the like – they would be focused  solely on  the 
314 While these two senses of identification are no doubt linked, it is not entirely clear how identification in 
the widely used sense of sharing significant relevant characteristics engages with the identity in the 
philosophical sense of being a singular object. To be clear, it is the possibility of this relational 
philosophical sense of identity that is important for the discussion that follows.
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'higher' goal of maintaining their collective capture of the Square. Thus they might well be 
more likely to achieve their group goal.
If  we understand identification as submersion of singular identity, then this not 
only tells us why the individual cannot help but see themself as part of the plural subject, it 
also tells us why this identification is not experienced as conditional. For if the agent truly 
has submerged themselves, then they will have no individual standpoint left to retreat back 
to.  If  they understand themself  only  as  a  group member,  then constraint  by collective  
commitments  will  be  inescapable.  On this  account  then,  collective  intentions  have  the 
power to normatively constrain individuals because the individual fully identifies themself 
with the plural subject and thus they have no standpoint of their own. This requires that  
they see the collective as the kind of thing that can act as an agent. This, in turn, requires 
that  collective  intentions  have  the  power  to  normatively  constrain,  for their  doing  so 
provides the rational scaffolding necessary to create a standpoint from which the collective 
can govern.
Does such submersion happen? Well it may well represent a utopian ideal for some 
collectives, but it seems doubtful whether it is ever really achieved, even in the case of cults. 
The  situation  which seems to fit  with such a  model  best  is  that  of  the  fictional  Borg 
discussed in the previous chapter. However, while individuals assimilated into the Borg 
collective  can  (in  their  fictional  reality)  fully  submerge  their  personal  identities,  this 
possibility seems too extreme to represent the formation of collectives in the real world. In 
most situations, the notion of completely giving over of one’s identity is obviously far too 
strong. This can be clearly seen if  we return to Gilbert's  canonical  example of the two 
walkers. The extreme nature of requiring full identity submersion is tempered slightly if we 
bracket  the submersion of  identity  to the activity  taking place at  that  time, i.e.  to the 
context of the walk, rather than extending it to such things as the breakfast they ate before 
they set off and the drive home they will complete after the walk, both of which they may 
do very much as individuals. However, even with the caveat of this bracketing, it seems 
very  odd  to  think  that  either  walker  completely  subsumes  their  agentive  identities 
underneath that of the collective which they form. As much as we want to say that there 
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really is a collective ‘we’ that is endeavouring to reach the top of the hill, we do not want to 
say that there no longer exists two individual walkers at the same time.
So, identification is not a matter of losing one's own individual identity; rather, it 
appears to be a matter of being both part of the plural subject but also still an autonomous 
individual. However, if this is the case then can collective intentions be strict normative 
relations in Broome's sense? In one sense, yes. For, if an agent wants to see their action as 
part of a collective action, then this does not merely recommend that they see the collective 
intentions as normatively constraining;  rather it requires it. However, it might be 
complained that the conditionality of this argument nullifies its force. If identification with 
the collective is a choice, then what stops us from just not identifying? This would violate  
Gilbert's  obligation  and  permission  criteria;  namely  that  an  individual  faces  normative  
pressure to act in line with the intentions of the plural subject (that they are a member of), 
even where this conflicts with what their own personal  intentions would have them do. 
Keith Graham appears to mark this point when he claims that “[p]recisely because we are 
individuals whose existence is not exhausted in the social relations we participate in and the 
groups to which we belong, questions can arise about whether to identify with or dissociate 
from collective agencies of which we are members”.315 We can see this in the example I set up 
as  a  canonical  example  of  the  phenomenology  of  constraint  in  collective  action:  the 
Leicester Tigers pushing their coach up a hill. The question that I have been seeking to 
answer is: “What is it that explains the fact that John (a member of the team) is directly 
normatively  constrained  by  the  collective  intention of  the  team?”  We  have  above  an 
explanation that will only work if John conceives of himself only as a team member. But 
this is not the case; not only does he also see himself as an individual, he is additionally a 
member of  other collectives, for example, his family. So, John has other alternatives to 
identifying with the team.  What, then,  would make it wrong for him to say, “Sod the 
team's existence, I'm off for a beer”? The answer,  which I will be setting out in the next 
section, is that part of  John's sense of self will be  entangled with the collective and thus 
conceptually require its existence. That is, I will claim that John's ability to understand 
himself as having a coherent where-I-stand and thus to be the kind of agent he in fact is, is 
315 Graham, 2007, p.8 [emphasis mine].
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dependent on his ability to understand the plural subject he is part of as having a coherent 
where-we-stand.
5b.3 – Inauthenticity and the transcendental argument for 
the inescapability of the plural subject
So, what is to stop John saying “Sod the teams existence”?  Well, being able  to 
understand ourselves  as  parts  of  plural  subjects is  something  that  has  many  pragmatic 
advantages. It allows us to navigate a social world which is populated by a vast number of 
different individuals without having to consider each individual as such; we can engage, 
rather, with collectives. Moreover,  being able to consider practical questions from a 
collective perspective also seems to solve problems of the rationality of co-operation in 
'prisoners' dilemma' type cases, as co-operation is unproblematically the most rational 
choice from the collective standpoint.316 As Philip Pettit says, where “... I see myself as the 
representative of a group, charged with doing as well as possible by its interests  [I] might 
use this representative identity to get out of game-theoretic predicaments”.317 
Clearly, not being able to understand the world in terms of being a part of true 
collective actions would have many disadvantages. This gives us a forceful pragmatic reason 
to be able to understand the collectives we are part of as potential agents of collective 
actions. However, if this reason is only general and  pragmatic, then why is it not easily 
trumped by the other pragmatic demands of an agent's own standpoint? As we have already 
seen, the move from general rules to particular norms is difficult. Whilst we might have a 
general reason to maintain the identity of collective agents in this way, this does not 
necessarily give us a reason in each particular case. So, it is clear that John has a general 
reason to want the rugby team to exist as an agent that can perform joint actions.  For 
example,  he wants them to win the cup  as a team. However, in this particular case, the 
team's existence is causing him to be compelled to push a heavy bus and thus, everything  
316 For example, see Hollis (1998) for an elucidation of what he calls the 'team work' solution to problems of 
the rationality of cooperation (particularly pp.137 – 142). I discuss this further in Chapter One, section 
1.3.
317 Pettit, 2007, p.33.
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considered, he has no reason, founded upon his own individual standpoint, to see it as  
existing. 
That we cannot locate the  strict reason, for  an agent to  have to  understand the 
collective they are a part of as an agent, in the general utility of doing so, does not mean 
that pragmatic questions never inform an individual’s social interaction with others. There 
are times where an individual's interaction with others is driven purely by  the  pragmatic 
perspective of their own standpoint. Take Bratman's own example of interaction that falls 
short of collective action: suppose that I am a gangster and that, “I intended that we go to 
New York together as a result of my kidnapping you and forcing you to join me”.318 
Imagine that I gave you a choice, either you act as if we are travelling together or I have 
your parents murdered. You would have a strong pragmatic reason to 'go along' with my 
scheme and take part in what, to onlookers, may appear to be a collective act. The point, 
however, is that while this may appear to be authentic collective action, in fact it is not. In a 
similar way, John the rugby player may attempt to be an inauthentic team member. That is, 
he may attempt never to really identify with the team at all and rather see himself as merely 
going along with the notion that they are pushing the bus together for purely individualist 
reasons (say, that he wants the others to like him).319 This would be an interesting kind of 
social interaction but  it would not be authentic collective action. Such  interacting 
individuals could rightly  consider themself to be a unit of sorts; united by their physical 
proximity, their interdependence or perhaps their mutual goal. However, they would not 
be bound as a planning agent – i.e. as a plural subject – which is precisely why they would 
not count as performing actual collective acts. Both of us would be free to act contrary to 
the mutual goal (of travelling on the plane together) without being concerned about this 
destroying the potential of our collective to act, although of course you would rightly be 
very concerned about maintaining the fiction of our collective act so that I did not carry 
out my threat.
318 Bratman, 1999b, p.100.
319 The reason I say John may attempt to be inauthentic in this way, rather than saying more 
straightforwardly that John may be inauthentic, will become clear in the following chapter as there I will 
argue that the reality of social life makes such inauthenticity difficult i.e. that we cannot help, as I shall put 
it, but become entangled in collective wills.
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Most social situations, however, are not like that of being kidnapped or trying to be 
an inauthentic team member. The former claim is quite obvious; the latter is perhaps more 
contentious, but I take it that the phenomenology described in Chapter One of this thesis 
attests to its truth. That is, in more typical social situations we do not conceive of ourselves 
as merely pragmatically interacting with others.  Rather, we see ourselves as involved in 
authentically collective acts. Further, we do not stand outside of each instance of social 
interaction and at each moment choose whether to engage in collective action – rather, we 
find ourselves already bound up in many ongoing social projects. This can be seen clearly in 
the example I have been using throughout the thesis of Hillary and Tenzing summiting 
Everest: as Philip Ebert and Simon Robertson note, “When asked who reached the summit 
of Everest first, Hillary and Tenzing have always insisted that they climbed it together and 
that there is therefore little point to that question – after all, they did.”320 In Chapter One, I 
noted that this showed that the climbers  experience the intentionality of their action as 
essentially collective. Here, we can now go further and say that this shows that because they 
have understood their endeavour as collective they cannot now, post-hoc, reconceptualise it 
as an individual feat. To do so would not just be to enter into a situation inauthentically, as 
John the inauthentic rugby player above tries to do. Rather, it would be to be inauthentic  
in understanding what one had already (authentically) done.  Graham seems to be noting a 
similar point in saying that “[s]ome of the things that people do gain their significance from 
being part of some collective action”.321 It is this concept of being bound up, through the 
social nature our actual lives, in the collective will that I will refer to as entanglement. 
The argument here, then, is that we can assess the normative force of attachment to 
the possibility of the plural subject in two parts:
Firstly, prior to  an individual’s authentically engaging in collective action.  At this 
point, given the general utility of collective action, each of us has a general reason to engage  
in it. This gives us a reason to see the collective as an agent, but it is a  reason with a slack 
320 Ebert & Robertson, 2010, p.102.
321 Graham, 2007, p.60 [emphasis mine].
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normative force. Slack in that it merely recommends that we see our collective as potentially 
a plural subject. 
Secondly, after our authentic engagement in collective action.  At this point, given 
the fact that we need to be able to understand the collective as a plural subject in order to  
be able to fully make sense of our contributory actions, we have a reason that holds sway in 
the particular instance.  This gives us a reason to see the collective as an agent, and it is a 
reason with a strict normative force.  Strict  in that it  requires that we see our collective as 
potentially a plural subject. 
We set up our actions to be contributions to social agency because it is beneficial to 
do so. However,  once we have done so, we can only continue to understand our 
contributory action as the kind of thing we set it out to be if we are able to see the collective 
as an agent capable of governing our collective actions, and because this requires the 
intentions of  the  collective  to constrain, we must see them as doing so.  Post-hoc 
reconceptualising our contributions is logically possible, but it is a kind of inauthenticity. It 
is a kind of inauthenticity in that it requires self-consciously misleading ourselves about 
how, at the moment of our actions, we set them out to be. Engaging in such inauthenticity 
undermines our own agentive identity as singular agents, and, as set out above, we have an 
intrinsic reason to value the existence of our own agentive identity. It does so because if we 
fail to see ourselves as bound by our former intentions, in this case our intentions that our  
actions  be  authentic  contributions  to collective  acts,  we  fail  to  then be  able  to have  a  
where-I-stand from which we can govern. 
This account has  what we might call a two-part  transcendental structure.322 For it 
starts with peoples' experience, and says that our social lives are such that we feel ourselves 
to be part of collective actions. It then presents, (firstly) the existence of a collective capable 
of governing its own actions as necessary for us to have this experience, and (secondly) the 
constraint of individuals by collective intentions as conceptually necessary for the existence 
322 I understand the term 'transcendental' here in a general, rather than any specifically Kantian, sense (see 
Stern, 1999).
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of the collective as an agent.  From this, it concludes that collective intentions must 
constrain individuals.
To return to our hill walkers, according to the account  given above, they have a 
general pragmatic reason to start walking together, given the utility of such collective 
actions. This pragmatic reason does not force them to engage in collective action. They 
may, for instance, feel that walking up the hill as individuals, perhaps individuals under 
contract to help each other if needed, is just as individually beneficial as fully-fledged 
collective action. If they do so, they will not be constrained by a collective intention – 
although they may face other normative pressures, such as fulfilling their contracts to each 
other. However, if they do decide to engage in collective action, then, once they are doing 
so, their understanding of their own contributory action will be bound up with the 
existence of the collective act. This will require them to continue to see the collective as 
capable of governing its action. This, in turn, means that they must see themself as having 
to abide by the norms that append the collective intention to walk to the top of the hill, 
because failure to do so will result in failure for them to be able to understand their 
contributive behaviour as such, and thus failure to fully understand what they are doing.
We can conclude, then, that an individual's reason for seeing themself as 
constrained by the intentions of a collective of which they are a member is both similar to 
and different from that which they have  for being bound by their  own intentions. It is 
similar in that it is a matter of securing a unitary standpoint which can be the authentic 
agent of actions. However, it is different because the securing of this standpoint is not an a 
priori necessity for the individual. Rather, it becomes a necessity only after the fact of social 
interaction. Understanding the nature of collective action in this way means that we must 
not  think  of  becoming  bound  by  collective  intentions  as  a  simple  case  of  voluntarily 
pooling our wills (as it is on Gilbert's account). Instead, we must understand ourselves as 
bound by collective intentions because we become entangled in a collective will through the 
actual process of engaging in social life. I further explore what this means,  with regard to 
how we understand joint commitment, in the next chapter.
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5.c.1 – Chapter summary
In the first part of this chapter, I set out Bratman's planning theory of agency and 
established that the rigid structure of the constraint our individual intentions put upon us is 
necessary for us to have a where-I-stand from which, as individuals, we can govern our own 
actions. In the second part of the chapter, I applied this to collective intentions, finding 
that we can similarly say that the rigid structure of the constraint our collective intentions  
put upon us is  necessary for us  to have a where-we-stand from which together  we can 
govern  our  collective  actions.  Modifying Bratman’s account allows us to understand 
collectivist accounts of collective intention, such as Gilbert's, as rightly saying that collective 
intentions are projects of creating  a  plural  will  through  constructing binding collective 
commitments. However, it forces us to acknowledge that these collective commitments will 
only appear obligatory to the individual to the extent that the individual sees the existence  
of the plural will itself as a required fact. This does not mean, though, that the individual 
can merely choose at any moment whether they will or will not see collective commitments  
as binding. This is because their understanding of their own actions is entangled, through 
the actual process of living a social life, with the agency of the collective.
Returning to the  terminology of  intersubjectivity,  we  can see  that  our  lives  are 
intersubjective because understanding ourselves as subjects (in the sense at stake) is bound up  
with our sense of being entangled in plural subjects with other people. Thus, the fact that we 
can rationally act directly upon intentions that are not wholly  our own is tied to the fact 
that our sense of rational autonomy is far messier and more extended than individualists 
allow.  Given  their entanglement  in  various  plural  agencies,  the socially  situated 
autonomous individual can  be  recognised  as  having a choice: accept the normative 
constraint of the collective intention or abandon the possibility of collective 
self-governance. Unlike abandoning the possibility of individual self-governance, the latter 
option is not completely barred to the agent,  for the agent can fall back onto their own 
individual agency. But this option is not without conceptual cost, for, given our contingent 
but actual social experiences, our own sense of subjectivity is bound up with our sense of 
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belonging to, and acting as part of, a collective. Rejecting the existence of the plural subject 
will  come at  a cost for  the individual  and in the next chapter  I  will  argue that  this is  
experienced by them as what I shall call normative pain, the felt strength of which will be 
determined by the extent to which they are entangled. Thus, as we shall see clearly in what 
follows, we do not experience the choice as a plain choice, but rather we experience it as a  
dilemma, as a situation in which we feel torn.
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Chapter 6 – Modified Plural Subjects
Let  us  return  to  the  reoccurring  motif  of  our hillwalking  pair.  Previously, I 
considered their walk in isolation, and their relationship only in terms of their particular act 
of  walking to the top of Scafell Pike. Doing so allowed me to hone down on certain key 
aspects without the distraction of too much informational noise. However, such a strategy 
does risk missing something of the complexity of real social life. In this chapter, I will look 
at how acknowledging such complexity informs the way we should think about collective 
action. In the example of our walkers, allowing the complexities of their lives to come into 
view makes an important fact immediately obvious:  they are unlikely to have met for the 
first time as they stood at the bottom of the hill. Rather, they will have a social history. They 
may have climbed hundreds of hills before as part of a hill walking club; they might work  
together, or have been friends for a long time; they may be members of the same political 
party;  they  may  even  be  married.  I  will  argue  that  these  kinds  of  facts,  regarding the 
histories of such collectives, taken together, constitute their members having lived (what I 
will call) a social agentive life.
I  will  approach the complexity  of  social  life through the prism of the  Modified  
Plural  Subject  Theory (PST*), as  developed  in  the  last  chapter  by  applying  Bratman's 
planning theory of agency to Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory. PST* replaces Gilbert's idea 
of pooling of wills with the notion I expressed as wills becoming entangled. My argument will 
be that, by understanding entanglement as a messy elongated product of real and complex social  
life, PST* can better capture the actual phenomenology of collective action. 
The chapter will be split  into two sections.  In the first,  I will  expand  upon the 
nature of PST*, and the difference between it and Gilbert's PST. I will further tease out the 
nature  of  entanglement and  ask  what  this  tells  us  about  how we experience  normative 
constraint. In particular, I will relate a notion of the variability of lived agentive life to the 
variability of the normative pain of going against the collective will. My claim will be that if, 
for example, we take our two walkers above, the felt cost of going against the collective will 
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shall vary in line with the extent to which they are entangled in that collective. Thus, while 
the strict obligation to their collective decision to walk to the top of the hill  will  exist  
independently of  their  wider  history, an  aspect  of  their  experience will  feel  more 
normatively problematic for them if they rebel when they are more entangled (e.g. if they 
are married), than if they are less (e.g. if this is their sole joint venture). I shall understand 
this as variance in the normative pain that tracks variance in entanglement.
In the second section, I will look at  two test cases  which, I will argue, show the 
phenomenology of actual social life  to fit better with PST* than with Gilbert's PST. The 
examples I will explore  will be, firstly, that of being in a romantic couple, and secondly, 
that of political obligation. In setting out these examples, I aim not to make substantive 
claims about the exact nature of love or political fidelity; rather, I merely aim to set out how 
our general  experience of these  phenomena fits with the conception of collective action I 
am arguing for.323 I will  be arguing that, with its notion of entanglement, PST*  better 
captures how it feels to become part of the plural will  (i.e. that  being united need not be 
fully voluntary, but can instead involve merely living a social agentive life) and, further, the 
variance in the feeling of normative pain of rebelling against the plural will (i.e. that such 
variance tracks variation in the level of entanglement.) By setting out these examples, I will 
also make concrete what I take actual lived social lives to involve, in particular, how I take 
the experience of normative pain to be expressed. These two points mark the distinctiveness 
of my variant of Plural Subject Theory from Gilbert’s.
6.1 – Pooling -vs- entanglement
According  to  planning  theory,  individual  intentions,  or  as  Gilbert  calls  them 
individual  commitments of the will,  structure the practical lives of individual subjects. In 
the previous chapter, I presented the case that our being bound by our intentions is rooted 
in their  allowing us to understand ourselves  as  the  very  governing  agents  that  we  take 
323 I aim more directly to give an account of loving union in Kisolo-Ssonko (2012) and a further project will 
be to construct a theory of political obligation as founding on entanglement as described by PST*, in the 
same way that Gilbert sets out to give such an account of political obligation as founded on pooling of 
wills as described by her theory (see Gilbert, 2006).
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ourselves to be. Further, I argued that this also holds for collective cases, i.e. that collective 
commitments  of  the  will enable  a  collective  standpoint  and  that  this  grounds  their 
normative  authority. Given  this  outlook,  we  can understand  joint  commitment as 
grounded in our  nature as planning  agents;  specifically,  as  grounded  in  our  nature  as 
planning agents who operate in a social world. We can say, then, that to be jointly committed 
is to be caught up in a structure that allows us to conceive of ourselves as part of a plural 
subject. In this section, I will expand on this picture and argue that it follows from it that 
the process of  forming  a  joint commitment  need  not  be thought of as the combining of 
mutually interdependent individual willings, as Gilbert's PST seems to imply. Rather, I will 
argue that  the process of forming a joint commitment  can be  merely the very  process of 
living as socially planning agents.
To help further unpack what I take the process of living as socially planning agents 
to be, and how I see it as  related to joint commitments, let  me marshal another concept: 
'agentive life'. I shall understand this term as capturing those aspects of the existence of an 
agent (whether individual or plural) that conceptually necessitate that they are an agent. By 
saying that these aspects conceptually necessitate the existence of the agent as agent, I mean 
to say that, they are aspects that are properly understandable only given the assumption of 
the  existence of an agent.  Thus, if we live agentive lives, then, in order to authentically 
understand  ourselves,  we  must  understand  ourselves  as  agents,  and  thus  we  must 
understand ourselves as being committed by our intentions. So agentive life is underpinned 
by the fact that the lived reality of actual people  requires the possibility of agency to be 
authentically understood.
So, what are these aspects of one's life? As before, let us start with the individual and 
then move on to consider the collective. In light of the previous discussion of agency, it is 
clear that the performing of actions requires that we understand ourselves as agents.  For 
example, if I perform the action of climbing a mountain, then I can only understand this as 
something that I intentionally do, if I understand myself as an agent. Performing actions is 
thus clearly an aspect of one's agentive life. But, not everything that happens to us requires 
in-itself that we are able to understand ourselves as planning agents. As I discussed back in 
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the  first  chapter  of  this  thesis,  we  need  not  see  all  things that  happen to  us as  being 
intentional  acts.324 For example, if I fall  off a mountain unconscious, I do not need to be 
able to understand myself as an agent in order to understand this falling. If I had been an 
inanimate object, say if I had been shot dead before I fell, the falling of my body would still 
be characterisable as the same sort of event.  Though such non-intentional events do not 
require the existence of a  standpoint to be understood in isolation,  we  do need such a 
standpoint to understand them in terms of their embeddedness within the ongoing lives of 
ourselves as agents. Thus, if I am still alive as I fall, I will want to understand this falling as 
the falling of the same agent that formed and carried out the intention to reach the summit 
of the mountain.  That is, I will want to understand it as the falling of myself the agent. 
Further,  I will want to understand the consequences of the fall in terms of my ongoing 
plans, for example to get back home and raise my children. What this means is that given 
that I understand my life in its totality as an agentive life, I am required to make sense of 
my now-falling in terms of how it fits in with my wider agentive plans, goals and aims. One 
has no other option but to live in this way because we identify ourselves as singular things 
that  live  agentive lives.  Unless  we have some kind of  cognitive  issue,  such as  multiple 
personality disorder,325 we can  have no rival  identities to fall  back on – it  is  my entire 
understanding of me as the kind of thing that I am. Of course, there are some things that 
happen to me that are of no consequence to my agentive life.  For example,  every passing 
second, trillions of neutrons move through my body, not interacting with it at all. It would 
be wrong to say that it is required of me that I understand their  moving through me in 
terms of my being an agent. However, what we can say is that as an individual I thus have 
no choice but to see all of those events that are embedded in my life as an agent in terms of  
my being a singular ongoing agent.
It is clear from the many examples given throughout this thesis (not least the four 
canonical examples of the lovers, the mountain climbers, the residents' association and the 
rugby club) that in addition to individual agentive lives, we also live collective agentive lives. 
324 See Chapter 1, Section 1.2.
325 I take it that we have a non-instrumental reason not to want to have such a cognitive disorder. This 
seems like a plain truth about the nature of being a unified individual. At the very least, we might say that 
it would be the height of inauthenticity to believe that we could switch between standpoints (i.e. 
identities) intentionally.
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It is plain that the performing of actions,  in this case collective actions, requires that we 
understand ourselves  as  plural  agents  who are  performing  those  collective  actions.  For 
example,  if we perform the action of climbing a  mountain, then we can only understand 
this as something that we intentionally do, if we understand ourselves as a plural agent.  
Further, just as in the individual case, not everything that happens to an individual requires 
in-itself that they understand themselves as individual planning agents, not everything that 
happens to collections of people requires those collectives to understand themselves (taken 
together) as plural planning agents. However, again in parallel with the individual case, if 
they have lived their lives as ongoing plural agents, as joint social planners with continuity 
of existence, they should thus make sense of even the non-intentional things that happen to 
them in terms of  the  embeddedness of such events within their ongoing collective lives. 
That is, they will make sense of them in terms of their ongoing collective plans, goals and 
aims.326 Thus, for example,  given that Hillary and Tenzing climbed Everest as a team,  if 
they had fallen from the mountain then this unintentional falling would not in-itself require 
that they understand themselves as a  joint agent.  However, they would have understood 
their falling (had such a catastrophe occurred) in terms of their ongoing plural agency; they 
would understand it in terms of their joint commitment to be the first climbers to reach the 
summit.  There  will  of  course,  just  as  in  the  individual  case,  be  some  minimally 
embedded/non-embedded  events  that  we need not understand in terms of  the ongoing 
agentive life of the plural subject;  for example, if Tenzing  were to momentarily  gaze at a 
mountain flower as he passes it. However, what we can say is that all of those events that 
are embedded  in  their collective life  need to be understood in terms of  their life as an 
ongoing plural agent.
There is an important difference between the individual and collective cases. The 
individual has no choice but to see all events that are embedded in their lives in terms of 
their ongoing agentive life, because they have no other viable way of understanding who 
they are. In contrast, because they can always fall back on this individual identity, it is in  
some sense possible for individuals to abandon the understanding of the collective as agent. 
326 I take it that the discussions of the previous chapters have shown that we do indeed understand our 
particular collective acts not in isolation but rather as entangled in ongoing plural agencies (in particular 
see section 5b.1 of Chapter Five).
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In this  sense,  our  being part  of  any particular  collective  agentive identity is potentially 
escapable in a way that our individual agentive identity is not. This escapability, however, is 
not  straightforward.  Rather, it  is  reined-in by the fact that  abandoning the collective  is 
almost never without the cost of loss of self-understanding; this was established in the last 
chapter. So, to the extent that the agent has in fact lived part of their life in ways that are 
collectively agentive, they abandon their ability to properly understand this aspect of their  
lives if they abandon seeing ongoing events in terms of this plural agent. Thus, if Hillary 
refuses to see those things that happen on the mountain to himself and Tenzing (that are in 
fact  embedded in  their  plural  lives)  in  terms  of  their  joint  commitment  to  climb the 
mountain,  then he abandons the ability to understand their  life on this mountain as a 
collective  agentive  life.  An important extra  point is that, even the parts of their collective 
activity that do not  in-themselves necessitate the existence of an agent  can be embedded 
within the wider framework of  their  ongoing plural  agency.  Hillary thus  abandons the 
ability to understand the wholeness of their activity.
The relevance of the multiplicity of the events which are embedded in our need to 
understand our – individual or collective – selves as agents, is that it shows the breadth of  
the agentiveness of our lives. It is thus a  broadening out of the transcendental collective 
self-governance explanation.  That is, a broadening out of the argument, made in the last 
chapter, that having engaged in a particular collective action, we have no choice but to see 
that collective as an agent.
In the last chapter I  said that our need to understand ourselves as part of plural 
agents differs from our a priori need to understand ourselves as individual agents. We have 
no choice but to engage in individual action. In contrast, though there are many benefits to 
living a social life, it is merely contingent that we do. Further, I said that, given that we do 
engage in collective acts,  we  are  required to understand ourselves as  being  part of plural 
agents. The argument in this chapter has the same structure but a different focus. Rather 
than the consequences of a particular collective act, the current argument focuses on how it 
is that  the  agent  understands themselves  in  general. The need,  for  this  general 
understanding of oneself as  being an agent that is  able to engage in collective acts,  arises 
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through our living of socially agentive lives as described above; such that, particular activity 
is not made sense of in isolation, but rather it is made sense of as embedded in our ongoing 
plural agencies.
By recasting this argument in terms of this notion of living an agentive life, we can 
move  beyond merely  understanding the  ground of  collective  normative  constraint  (the 
conclusion of the last chapter) to understanding what this tells us about how it is that we 
actually come to form joint commitments. For Gilbert, the creation of a joint commitment 
is a conceptually simple thing; it is something that happens through the voluntary willings 
of multiple individuals together.327 She  thinks of  pooling of wills  as akin  to the readily 
understandable notion of pooling of money: in both cases we voluntarily will something to 
come  into  existence  that  then  cannot  be  considered  as  consisting  of  discreet  separate 
pieces.328 As Gilbert puts it, “[f]or each party to enter into a joint commitment is for him to 
allow his  will  to be bound”.329 More  precisely, Gilbert  believes  that  joint  commitment 
comes  about  when,  in  conditions  of  common  knowledge,  each  has  expressed  their 
willingness to be jointly bound. For the modified plural subject account PST*, the creation 
of  a  joint  commitment  can  be  as  simple  as  Gilbert  suggests  –  it  can  be  a  fully  and 
transparently voluntary act – however, it can also be a  messy elongated product of real and  
complex social life. How this works in particular cases will be explored in the examples below 
of love and political obligation. Here I will expand on how PST* implies that entanglement 
generally works.
327 Or at least, it is fundamentally simple. She does, as I have discussed and shall return to below, allow the 
messiness of real social life to come into view insofar as she allows for the possibility of implicit 
commitment. However, as I have claimed before, it is quite opaque exactly what is going on in Gilbert's 
examples of implicit commitment, such as that of Quiet Harbour (Gilbert, 2008, p. 487). At any rate my 
claim is that the process of becoming jointly committed is even more messy than Gilbert's account allows 
for.
328 Interestingly, I have found that undergraduate students find the notion of a pooled bank account not as 
readily accessible as those of us who are older. My (tentative) sociological claim would be that this 
demonstrates the motif of this chapter: that it is living a social life (in this case I guess the life in an a 
long-standing and economically co-dependent romantic couple that most undergraduates have yet to 
experience) that forces us to have to see things in a collective way. See discussion of romantic couples in 
section 6.2 below.
329 Gilbert, 2006, p.154.
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On the picture painted above, joint commitment should not at base be understood 
as being created  by interdependent  willings  of  individuals  in  conditions  of  common 
knowledge. Rather, it should be understood as the – sometimes unintended and ignorant – 
messy product of individuals simply living as social agents. In this sense, rather than each 
individual  having to pool their will through an individual act of expressing willingness to 
do so,  each individual’s will  can  become  entangled with the plural will by the very act of  
living in such a way that presumes the existence of this plural will . This is what I understand as 
entanglement: the independent threads of people's lives become twisted together to form a 
mass that one can no longer understand as a set of independent threads, but rather, one can 
only see as a single cord. Because of the kind of existence we have, entanglement, we might 
say,  is the process of living a social  agentive  life.330 The upshot of this is that rather than 
each party necessarily voluntarily entering into a joint commitment by allowing her will to 
be bound, each party  can  become subject to a joint commitment through the process of 
coming to see  her will as entangled with the plural will.  Or to put it  in slightly different 
terms, for one to enter into a joint commitment is for one to come to be bound insomuch 
as it requires that one understand part of one's agentive life in terms of the agentive life of 
the plural subject. The plural will can thus be understood as something that is constructed. 
It is constructed in the same way that the individual will is constructed:  a standpoint is 
created through our taking ourselves to be jointly constrained by collective intentions. Our 
being more or less entangled is our having more or less at stake in this understanding.
Allowing-in the messiness of social life is not meant to imply a negation of Gilbert's 
observations  about  our  experience  of  constraint  by  the  collective  will.  The  obligation 
criteria,  that  each  participant  has  a  pro  tanto obligation  to  promote  fulfilment  of  the 
intentions of the plural will, still holds according to PST*. As does the permission criteria, 
which says  that  participants  understand that  they  are  not  (ordinarily)  in  a  position  to  
unilaterally 'by a simple change of mind' remove the constraints imposed on them by the  
obligation criteria.331 However, there are two important differences between the experience 
330 Note that, though being entangled is a product of having a social history it is not equivalent to it. Only 
social interactions that require the existence of a plural subject (directly or through their embeddedness) 
create the conditions for entanglement. 
331 See Gilbert, 2000b, p.17.
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of the plural will implied by PST* and that implied by Gilbert's PST. Firstly, rather than 
entering into a joint commitment being something that an agent – however subtly – must 
feel themself to choose to do, it can be something that they can feel  non-willingly drawn 
into. This is explained above in the discussion of the idea of agentive life, i.e. that inasmuch 
as the agent finds that they have to live a social life, they will find that they have entered 
into  a  joint  commitment  and  are  part  of  a  plural  agent.  Secondly,  because  there  is 
variability in lived agentive life, this creates the possibility of variance in how it feels to rebel 
against the obligation criteria. I discuss this below.
We might say then that Gilbert's pooling of wills is binary, it is all or nothing; you 
either  are  part  of  a  joint  commitment  or  you  are  not.  In  contrast,  my  notion  of 
entanglement  is  analogue,  it is open  to  degrees; your  embeddedness  within  the joint 
commitment is on a sliding scale. For Gilbert, your will is either pooled or it is not pooled, 
whereas, according to PST*, you can be more or less entangled with the plural will. This is 
not to say that  PST* claims that  there is variance in the level of normative requirement 
towards  the  collective  will.  Whatever  degree  you  are  entangled,  this  entanglement  still 
requires you  to  see  the  collective  will  as  constraining.  What  varies  is  not  the  fact  of 
obligation; this is constant. Rather, what varies is the cost of your transgression in terms of loss  
of self-understanding.  By  the cost of loss of self-understanding, I  mean  the  cost to one's 
ability to understand one's life as the life of an agent. Your experience of your transgression 
will thus vary along this axis. That is to say, there will be variance in what we might call the 
normative  pain you  experience  in  rebelling  and  this  will  depend  on  the  level  of  your 
entanglement.332
What do I mean to invoke by the concept of 'normative pain'? Well, just as we can 
understand physical  pain as a negative feeling, of variable strength, experience of which 
indicates  bodily  damage,  normative  pain  is  a  negative  feeling,  of  variable  strength, 
experience of which indicates normative transgression. Just as Ulysses, who was discussed in 
332 Of course, there are all kinds of reasons why your total experience of rebelling may vary; your emotional 
response tied to such things as feelings of loyalty, how tired or hungry you are, whether the sun is shining 
etc. may be the overwhelming determiners of your total experience. My claim is just that normative pain, 
varying along the axis I describe, will form a distinct and important part of your experience; it may well 
not always be the largest part, but – as I will try to show in the examples below – it is a recognisable part.
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an earlier  chapter as  struggling against his  binding by rope to his  ship's  mast,  will  feel 
physical pain  pulling against the physical constraint of the ropes, one  will  feel normative 
pain when one struggles against the normative constraint of the collective intentions that 
scaffold our social lives.
So, there is a strict requirement to follow the collective will.  This does not vary. 
Rather, it  is  just  that  the  cost  in  terms  of  loss  of  self-understanding  of  violating  this  
obligation varies. Variance in normative pain is indicative of variance in this cost in terms 
of loss of self-understanding.333 Admittedly, the concept of variance in cost in terms of loss 
of self-understanding does give you a variance in your additional instrumental reasons to 
avoid violation. This is because normative pain, as the name suggests, is something that  
feels uncomfortable and we have reason not to want to feel uncomfortable, either physically 
or  normatively.  So  while  the  strict  obligation  must  remain  constant,  the  slack 
recommendation (to keep to that obligation) can vary.
In summary, the modified Plural Subject Theory gives the following account of 
collective action: collective action is the action of a plural subject that is created by the will 
of  members of the collective  becoming entangled together to form a plural will  through 
their living of a collective agentive life.
6.2 – PST* as better capturing the phenomenology
In this section I will set out two examples that illustrate the advantages of PST* 
over PST in capturing the phenomenology of our social lives. PST* does not differ from 
PST in seeing the base characteristics of the phenomenology of collective action as: unity, 
collective intentionality, constraint and detachment. Rather, PST* merely modifies how we 
should  expect  these  base  characteristics  to  be  experienced. As  explained  above;  these 
modifications are  (i)  the not necessarily voluntary nature of unity and (ii)  the variance in 
the feeling of normative pain  of breaking with constraint.  The first  example will  be an 
333 I take my notion of the possibility of variance in normative pain due to variance in entanglement through 
lived agentive life to be similar to, though expressed in quite different terms, Elisabeth Pacherie's notion of 
the possibility of variance in what she calls our “sense of agency” (2012).
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expansion on the  canonical example – which I set up in  Chapter  One – of a romantic 
couple.  The second  will be that of political  obligation as  Gilbert sets up in  On Political  
Obligation.334
6.2.a – Romantic Couples
In Gilbert's example of  the  romantic  couple,  Tony and Celia, sharing a cake, we 
saw that a romantic couple is a form of plural subject.335 Marriage, with its formal vows and 
declarations, might be thought to be the clearest form of relationship of this sort. However, 
especially  in our modern world,  becoming a  romantic  couple need not  be a  matter  of 
making any formal vows or declarations.336 Thus far, this description of romantic couples 
may sit fine with Gilbert’s vision of the formation of a plural subject. As has been explored, 
she does not require that partners must make official declarations. Rather, she believes that 
our  expressing  our  joint  willingness  can  be  informal  and  even  implicit  in  our  general 
behaviour.  Thus,  though unmarried romantic couples may never have formally made a 
joint commitment, they will have lived as a we; as Gilbert notes they will have done many 
things jointly such as “... creating and maintaining a comfortable home, raising a family … 
maintaining a joint bank account, buying a car, visiting the parents and taking the kids to 
the  zoo.”337 These  collective  actions  will  be  part  of  the  joint  life  that  the  couple  live 
together.
This is all correct. However, a stronger claim also seems to be true: not only is it the 
case that we can find ourselves in a romantic couple without making a formal declaration; 
further,  we  may  well  find  ourselves  becoming  drawn into  being in  a  romantic  couple 
against our will. Think of a casual 'just seeing each other' pair of individuals who deny that 
they love each other until it dawns on them that they are, de facto, a couple. This speaks 
334 Gilbert, 2006.
335 Or to put it less strongly, the types of relationships that people who are in love commonly form are plural 
subject ones. I do not mean to imply that the only way to be in love is to be in such a relationship.
336 Gilbert's claim that, though ongoing romantic union can exist “...without the benefit of marriage”, 
marriage remains “... its usual locus in culture as things stand” (Gilbert, 1996d) seems increasing 
anachronistic, at least in the UK where according to European Union statistics nearly half of babies are 
now born to people who are not married. (Eurostat, 2013)
337 Gilbert, 1996d, p.222.
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fundamentally  against  Gilbert's  voluntaristic vision of  forming a  joint  commitment.  In 
defence of Gilbert, it might be complained that  here  I am mixing two things up: having 
romantic feelings and becoming united. The first, it might be argued, is the thing that we 
feel we have no control over. That, however, does not capture the force of love: to say that 
we cannot help falling in love is not  simply to say that we cannot help having romantic 
feelings towards someone, it is to say that we cannot help finding ourselves as being united 
with them. This is because, by virtue of being and acting as a plural subject, lovers find that 
their agentive identities become entangled; a where-we-stand emerges and we cannot help 
but invest more and more of our sense of where-as-individuals-we-stand in it. This is partly 
because of the inescapability of romantic feelings that  compel us to be  together, but also 
just because of the practical realities of  negotiating a social world that treats romantically 
engaged individuals  as  a  single  unit.  While  this  does  not  fit  with PST,  it  is  a  perfect 
example of the idea of joint commitment as arising through entanglement that we find in 
PST*.
The second aspect of romantic love,  which I want to argue fits better with PST* 
than PST, is that there is a certain anguish to going against the collective will (that is, going 
against  the  will  of  your  joint  couple-self) which is  separate  from the  strength of  your 
emotional  attachment  to  the  other  person.  We can  see  this  in  the  following example: 
imagine that a romantic couple, Mary and Claire, are on their way to the airport to go on 
holiday. Suppose that things do not go smoothly and that Mary turns around, before they 
get to the terminal, and starts walking back home. Her partner Claire would be justified to 
say,  “You can't  go home,  we said  we were  going to Majorca!”  This  fits  with Gilbert's 
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conception of the obligation criteria.338 However, what I want to suggest is  that,  though 
this is correct, it leaves out the possibility of the variability of normative pain.
To demonstrate  this  possibility,  let  us  think about the following three different 
couples. Firstly, we have  a newly formed couple, Bill and Ted.  Let us say that they have 
been  together  for  a  few  months,  seeing  each  other  once  or  twice  a  week.  They  see  
themselves as very much in love; they are full of the strong feelings of lust and desire, but  
live in separate houses, have separate groups of friends and different hobbies. Secondly, our 
Claire and Mary. Let  us say that they have been together for  twenty-five years, bought a 
house  together,  adopted  and  raised  a  child  together,  share  friends  and  have  the  same 
hobbies. They feel still very much in love. Finally, imagine a couple, Patrick and Madeleine 
who have been in a relationship longest of all, thirty years. They do live together, and pay 
bills jointly and have raised children. But they do not really feel much romance toward each 
other and often find themselves attracted to other people. Now suppose that each of these 
couples is  on their way to the airport and one of each of them turns round and starts  
walking back home. Each rebel will be open to a rebuke of Gilbert's form: “You can't go 
home, we said we were going to Majorca!” However, the act of rebelling will feel different 
in  a  relevant  way to  each.339 The  relevant  difference  (for  our  discussion  of  joint 
commitment) is as follows: when Ted turns round to Bill and announces that he is not 
going the wrong that he is committing by violating the collective will feel less normatively  
338 Andrea Westlund raises the worry that any account of love that allows individuals to be bound to the 
collective will must be incorrect, because it cannot respect the reciprocity that she argues is at the heart of 
any loving relationship. Against this I argue (in Kisolo-Ssonko, 2012) that while it is true that when a 
relationship is healthy each party tries to take the needs of the other into account, this does not mean that 
the collective will itself must be automatically reflective of any change in each individual's perspective. So, 
for example, in the holiday case: if Mary and Claire are in a well-functioning romantic couple then each 
will try to accommodate the other. Even once they have come to their collective decision they will be open 
to the possibility of further deliberation over its content. If Mary comes to realise that she does not want 
to go to Majorca, then this does mean that Claire ought to be open to changing their collective intention, 
but it does not imply that the existing collective intention automatically ceases to hold sway. Westlund's 
confusion stems from the fact that she idealises romance, ignoring the fact that unhealthy romantic 
couples still count as plural subjects. Given the reality of sexism in our society, a more realistic picture of 
actual marriage could well be that given by Susan Moller Okin, who says that “... gender structured 
marriage involves women in a cycle of socially caused and distinctively asymmetric vulnerability” (1989, 
p.138). A similar point regarding the idealising of love (though not directed at Westlund, nor 
acknowledging the structural influence of sexism in quite the terms used by Okin) is noted by Gilbert 
(1996d).
339 It will of course also feel different for lots of reasons that are irrelevant to the case in hand. For example, 
the different emotional temperaments of the individuals. 
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painful than the same wrong will feel to Mary. Similarly, the wrong of Madeleine's doing 
so will feel even worse than Mary's. The differences between the three couples exist because 
of differing levels  of  entanglement,  and thus differing levels  of  cost in terms of  loss  of 
self-understanding  in  abandoning  the  collective  as  plural  subject;  the  more  their 
understanding of themselves is bound up with their being in the couple that they are in, the 
more discomfort (of the sort in focus) they will feel.
The idea is  not that  any of  the  couples  experience no obligation towards  their 
collective wills.  Rather,  the claim is that the degree of normative pain of breaking these 
obligations will vary. Of course, variation in their overall experiences of rebellion from the 
plural will  could be a function of variance in other factors; the different level of moral, 
romantic, or practical obligations felt by each party. Moreover, it will be affected by their 
different  emotional  sensitivities,  where  these  are  shaped by  their  individual  histories.340 
However,  I have tried to set the example up so that variance in normative pain does not  
correlate with these other factors; thus  the rebuke may feel more normatively painful to 
Madeleine than it feels to either Mary or Ted, even though Madeleine no longer has any 
emotional feelings of lust or desire for Patrick. This is because, though she is no longer 
emotionally attuned with Patrick, her will is nonetheless highly entangled with his, due to 
the  length  of  time they  have  lived  together  as  a  couple.  In  contrast,  though Ted  is 
infatuated with Bill, their agentive lives are less entangled in their plural subject-hood and 
thus the specifically normative pain will feel less, though the emotional pain may well feel 
greater. The difference between the couples' experiences lies in the nature of the we rather 
than the personal feelings of each party. This interpretation is made all the more plausible 
given that the rebuke in question makes direct reference to the will of the we.341
340 See footnote 332 above.
341 The phenomenology of the variance of normative pain can also be seen not only when we look at the 
phenomenology of rebelling against a particular obligation but also in that of totally breaking with the 
plural subject in question. Nozick puts it, in a way that fits very neatly with my argument, “[a] willingness 
to trade up [i.e. to find a new partner], to destroy the very we you largely identify with, would then be a 
willingness to destroy yourself in the form of your own extended self.” (1995, p.235) We might think of 
this as the possibility of an “Us! There is no us!” scenario as the ultimate (but still not without cost) way of 
escaping from the obligation of the plural subject.
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6.2.b – Political Obligation
Whilst Margaret Gilbert, in line with others in the collective intentionality field,342 
often focuses on small scale examples of collective action, she envisions her theory as being 
able to explain even the world of the grand social scale. In A Theory of Political Obligation 
she sets out to achieve the ambitious goal of using her account to explain the nature of our 
experience of political obligation, in particular, of political obligation towards one's nation 
state.343 In this section, I will argue that the way in which we experience political obligation 
fits  better  with  my  Modified  Plural  Subject  Theory  than  it  does  with  Gilbert's.  In 
particular,  I  will  argue  that  we can  see  this  in  the  not  necessarily  voluntary  nature  of  
political obligation and the variance in the felt cost of rebellion against our political state. 
As I explored in depth in Chapter Three, we can think of the construction of plural 
subjects  as  the creation of  an alliance.344 The forming  of  such an alliance need not be 
political, at least not in the strong sense.345 However, the language of alliance (as with that 
of related terms such as partnership, commitment, unity and such like) appears particularly 
apt to capture the world of politics; it is common to hear people talk about such things as 
“our  party's  views”,  “our  duty  to defend our  nation's  religion”.346 This  match between 
Plural Subject Theory and the way we conceptualise our political world was evident in the 
comparisons I made between Gilbert's notion of unity between people and types of social 
contract  theory.347 Whilst  the  political  realm  might  be  phenomenologically  ripe  for 
interpretation  in plural subject terms,  those of an individualist  bent,  sceptical  as they are 
about Gilbert's claims to have captured the phenomenology of small scale groups, are even 
more likely to claim that there is nothing as grand as a plural subject on  a large scale. The 
342 See Chapter One, Section 1.3 for a survey of the field.
343 Gilbert, 2006 and also pre-empted by an earlier short paper (1996e) where she gives a brief sketch of the 
application of PST to political obligation.
344 See Gilbert, 1996c, p.271.
345 Though we might think that insomuch as any social activity involves interaction between people, it is at 
least political with a small 'p'.
346 Gilbert notes the ease with which “... people think in terms of 'our' government, 'our' constitution and 
so on” (2006, p.294).
347 See Chapter 3, Section 3.1. As Thomas Smith notes “... there is a formal parallel” between Gilbert's 
approach and contract for if we “... substitute ‘have agreed’ for ‘are jointly committed’ ... and ‘agreement’ 
for ‘joint commitment’ ... Gilbert’s argument comes to resemble a more or less familiar contractarian 
approach” (2007).
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problems they point to, however,  as  I suggest below, can be understood not as defeating 
Plural Subject Theory, but rather as supporting PST* over PST.
One of the reasons that people are sceptical about explaining political obligation on 
the plural subject model is a variant on the 'no actual contract' criticism of contract theories 
of  political  obligation.  Contract  theories  of  political  obligation  hold  that  we  have 
obligations towards others in our society because we have formed a contract with them. 
Critics of this view point out that no actual agreements to such contracts have been made  
by the general populace.348 A similar criticism might be made of Plural Subject Theory as 
applied to the state, i.e. it might be claimed that it is apparent that there are no actual 
expressions  of  readiness  to  be  jointly  committed to  the  state.  Gilbert  agrees  with  the 
no-actual-agreement  criticism  of  contract  theory.  However,  rather  than  seeing  it  as  a 
complaint that can also be raised against her theory, she sees it as an important advantage of 
her theory over actual contract theories. The validity of her doing so is grounded in the fact 
that she does not believe that joint commitment requires explicit agreements; rather, her  
theory allows for the possibility that the  expressions of readiness to be jointly committed 
can be much more subtle and elongated over time. Such subtle expressions are evident in 
the ways we communicate in the everyday social world. As Gilbert puts it:
“... it is common knowledge … that in face-to-face conversations, letters, and so on 
everyone speaks without hesitation of 'our country', 'our constitution', 'our laws',  
and so on in relation to the population as a whole. They speak of what 'we' are  
doing in terms of both international relations and internal issues. They evince guilt, 
pride, and other such emotions over such things. And they give no indication that  
they do not wish the plural subject interpretation to be made.”349
So, Gilbert's  theory can allow for the lack of  explicit  agreements  in a way that 
contract theory cannot. However, there is a tension in Gilbert's writing between, on  the 
one hand, her desire to allow joint commitments to arise in non-explicit ways and, on the 
other, her need – required by the formal structure of her theory – to say that  “...  [e]ntry 
into a joint commitment is [always] at some level voluntary”.350 This has the outcome that 
her theory of political obligation struggles to deal with the  possibility of hold outs.  Gilbert 
348 See Gilbert (2006, p.70 -75) for a concise summary of the 'no-actual agreement' objection.
349 Gilbert, 2006, p.244.
350 Gilbert, 2006, p.168.
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allows that some people may be 'hold outs'; they may reject the political society they live in. 
She  conceives  of  these  as  people  who  live  reclusive  lives;  explicitly  rejecting  society's 
invitation to join in joint commitments.351 The question we might ask, however, is: what is 
to stop us thinking about people who do play along with society as also being hold outs? 
What is to stop people who do not isolate themselves, but live with others, simply choosing 
to do so without signing up to Gilbertarian joint commitments?  Recall that I raised this 
question  in  a  previous  chapter  when  considering  the  possibility  that  our  rugby  team 
member  might  simply  pretend to  be  seeing  himself  as  part  of  the  collective  action  of 
pushing the bus up the hill. The rather grander variant of that question we can ask here is:  
what blocks the possibility that every member of a political society is simply playing along with  
things?
Gilbert seems right to think that we find ourselves in political societies that we feel  
ourselves to be obligated to, even though we may not feel ourselves to have explicitly signed 
up to these societies. However, her theory seems to be at a loss to explain why it is that we 
cannot just all be secret hold-outs, merely pretending to play along with the national plural 
subject. In contrast, our actual experience of political obligation seems to be of feeling it to 
be something non-voluntary in a way that Gilbert's account does not capture. Here the 
advantage of PST* is that it can rule out the possibility of hold outs who simply play along  
with social life. This is because for PST* it can be the very process of living a social life that 
creates joint commitment and, just as we have seen in the example of the romantic couple 
above, the fact that one can feel oneself to be forced to live such a social life means that one 
can feel  oneself to be forced to enter into a joint commitment at the level of the nation 
state.
 The tension generated by the possibility  of  non-voluntarily  entering  into plural 
subjects  becomes  all  the  more  sharp  when  we  move  from  consideration  of  liberal  
democracies, where people are assumed (whatever the actual realities) to have some sort of 
participatory possibility to more unsavoury political setups. For example, if we suppose that 
the German state in the 1940s constituted a plural subject,  we might feel  uneasy about 
351 Gilbert, 2006, p.296.
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assigning obligations to play their part in invading France to all members of the German 
state.  Had all  the  citizens  taken part,  even if  just  implicitly,  in  the  creation of  a  joint 
commitment?  As John Searle  notes,  any  description of  the time must  acknowledge the 
complexities and the differing levels of involvement and motivation. He says that “[a]t the 
time  of  the  Nazi  regime  ...  members  of  the  Nazi  Party  enthusiastically  endorsed  the 
institutional structure of the Third Reich. But there were lots of people in Germany at the 
time, who, while not endorsing the institutional structure went along with it as a matter of  
nationalism, indifference, prudence, or even just apathy.”352 Gilbert must surely struggle to 
incorporate such states into her theory, even though she does appear to want to allow the 
possibility of cohesion. PST* however does not struggle, for rather than  require explicit 
endorsement, or even implicit  endorsement, we can just say that it is  the experience of 
living a social life that entangles the citizens into the plural will of the German state.353
The example of the alliance to the German state of the 1940s  also highlights a 
second key point at  which PST* succeeds in reflecting our phenomenology  better  than 
Gilbert’s PST: the possibility of variance of experience of political obligation. It seems to me 
that  at  least  a  large  part  of  the  reaction  against  extending  Gilbert's  PST  to  political 
obligation, and the scale of states, has to do with the feeling that Gilbert's binary notion of 
joint  commitment  (i.e.  you  either  have  committed  or  you  have  not)  implies  a  binary 
experience of political obligation that does not fit with our real life experience. Against this, 
it seems to me that Gilbert is right to think of our obligation as all or nothing. Obligation 
is, after all, a strict normative requirement, rather than a slack one. However, PST* allows 
us to see that there is a different space from which we can explain the variability of how we 
experience  our  obligation.  According  to  PST* the  variation  can  be in  our  level  of 
352 Searle, 2010, p.57.
353 An alternative way to face down the unease such examples create is to claim that only liberal democracies 
count as plural subjects. This is problematic. Firstly, because we might question the extent to which even 
so called 'liberal democracies' live up to the promise of genuine democratic participation. But more than 
this, such a move seems to commit the same error of idealising plural subjects as I claim Westlund 
commits in the case of conceptualising love. As I noted above (see footnote 338), an ill-functioning 
romantic couple can still count as a plural subject.  The same should also be true for an ill-functioning 
state for, as Gilbert says, “[c]oercive circumstances need not prevent me from entering into a joint 
commitment. If I am party to such a commitment I am obligated and that is that” (1996, p.373)  and 
thus  “[p]olitical obligations … offer practical support to tyranny, as they do to any form of political 
society.” (Gilbert, 2006, p.286) It is this that leads Gilbert to claim that there is something “tragic” about 
group membership. (1996f, p.387).
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entanglement and thus in the level of normative pain that we would feel in rebelling against 
the collective will. This will give rise to a very different experience of being in conflict with 
the collective will; however, this need not be a difference in the actual obligations that we 
have.
The  plausibility  of  such  a  way  of  understanding the  variance  in  experience  of 
political obligation can be seen in imagining the following contrasting examples:  suppose 
that Karl lives in a rough part of town and that he reasons that his personal interests will be 
best  protected by joining the local  Nazi  group chapter.  He joins it  and shapes his  life 
around his membership of it. He sings Nazi songs  and he thinks of his interactions with 
others in terms of their place within the  Motherland.  Contrast  Karl  with  Bob,  a rather 
more indifferent citizen. Let us suppose that Bob lives out in the countryside. He has less 
contact with the state apparatus, perhaps there is not even a local chapter of the Nazi party 
in his tiny village. He is a member of the German state, and he knows it exists, but it has  
only a marginal place in his general life.  It seems obvious that the committed nationalist 
Karl  will experience rebelling against the plural will differently to the indifferent citizen 
Bob. There thus appears to be variance in the extent that we feel political bodies, states or 
parties to obligate us,  which mirrors the variance in our political leanings.  According to 
Gilbert's theory, the obligation  to the state should  be experienced by all as being equally 
binding  upon  them.  An  individualist  might  claim that  this shows  that  variance  in 
experience of national collectivity is really just variance in the extent to which one is being 
deceived by political rhetoric. PST* offers an alternative to both of these; an alternative that 
allows us to claim that our experience of the state as a plural subject is not a mere illusion, 
but at the same time allows for a variance in how people experience the obligating force of 
national collectivities. This is because we can see variance in political leanings as changing 
the way we live our social lives, and this in turn as changing the extent to which we are 
entangled in the plural will.
Bob and Karl are, according to PST, both obligated to the state and its collective 
action.  However, if they rebel against this obligation, the normative pain of doing so will 
differ for the two of them in a way that tracks their level of entanglement. Remember that I 
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am not claiming that this will explain the entirety of their experience of rebellion. Human  
beings  are  complex  creatures  and other  factors,  such as  for  example  differing  attitudes 
towards risk, will colour their experiences in all sorts of complex ways.354 My claim is only 
that there is an element of their experience of the plural will that will vary in its painfulness  
in  the  way  I  describe.  According  to  PST*,  what  we  sacrifice in  rebelling  against  the 
collective will is our ability to understand the agency of the group and our part in it and, as 
I have said above, the normative pain of this is variable depending on how much we have 
conceptually invested in the agency of the collective.  Thus,  Karl will experience defecting 
from the national will in a different, more normatively painful way than Bob.  It will  feel 
worse for him to reject the political obligations he feels towards his fascist party because a 
greater number of the things that he has done will be tied up in understanding that plural 
agent as an agent. In this sense, the nationalist may not just be living an illusion when he 
feels himself to be bound to the nation state in a way that the indifferent citizen does not – 
rather the nationalist because he has lived and understood his life as a nationalist, will actually 
suffer more normative pain in rejecting the national will than Bob would.
6.3 – Chapter Summary
In this  chapter I  have developed those aspects  of  PST* that  distinguish it  from 
Gilbert's  theory,  in particular  the  experience of  the  sometimes non-voluntary nature of 
forming a plural subject and the possibility of variance in normative pain.  PST* is not 
intended to be a new theory replacing PST; rather, it should be seen as a refinement of it –  
a refinement that can be summarised as coming from supplementing Gilbert's notion that 
the creation of a plural will requires the voluntary pooling of wills, with the insight that  
wills can become entangled simply through the process of a lived social life. I have argued 
that this refinement is exemplified in the phenomenology of our actual social lives,  such 
that we experience a variance in the normative pain of breaking with the collective will that  
corresponds to the level to which we are entangled. In the next and final chapter I will give 
a broad sketch of how PST* impacts on our general understanding of our social worlds.
354 Again, see footnote 332.
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7 – Conclusion: Capturing the messiness of social life
What  does  it  mean to  be  an  agent?  This  question is  fundamental  to  our 
understanding of  ourselves.  To properly  address  it,  we  must  recognise  that  we are  not 
lonely  Robinson  Crusoe figures.  Rather, we  are  social  creatures.  Acknowledging  this 
requires more  than  just  seeing  the  interconnection  between  individual  acts.  It  means 
recognising the fact that we do things together. We raise families; we conquer crevasses; we 
win leagues; and we save our green community spaces from development;  we do all these 
things and more. In doing so, we embody a kind of agency which has only recently come to 
be seen as important in analytic philosophy: plural agency.
Pitting our understanding of agency against  social  reality undermines any attempt 
to fully  understand  our  lives using a  limited  conceptual  schema  according  to  which 
individuals  are the  only  valid agents.  Even sophisticated  individualist  outlooks, such as 
Michael  Bratman's  Shared  Cooperative  Activity  Account, fail  to  do  justice  to  the 
phenomenology involved in our social existence. This forces us to expand our outlook. It 
forces us to consider the possibility that to collectively act is to act together as plural subjects.  
Free  from the  straightjacket of  individualism, we can embrace the  fact that  by uniting 
together we create intersubjective intentionality. 
Margaret Gilbert succeeds in mapping out the general contours of this terrain. Most 
importantly, she captures the possibility that  the plural will  can be in conflict with the 
individual will. This, however, creates a conceptual challenge: finding a way to make sense 
of intersubjective  constraint. That  is,  finding  a  way  to  make  sense  of  individuals  being 
limited, in what they can rationally do, by the  collective agency of  which they are part. 
Overcoming this challenge  requires the use of the same  conceptual tools  we can use to 
understand the constraint  of individuals by their own wills; in particular, the conceptual 
tools provided by Bratman's planning theory of agency. In deploying these tools, Gilbert's 
notion of the plural subject  becomes grounded in a  substantive conception of agency. It 
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becomes grounded in the fundamentals of what it means to be a planning agent in a social  
world.
This taking of a scalpel to the innards of plural agency reveals that the relationship 
between the individual and the collective is neither clean nor neat. Rather, it is messy and 
tangled. Instead of a unity of individuals voluntarily pooling their wills, the actual process 
of living a social life may entangle wills together. Letting the messiness of real social life into 
our theory will impact on our general understanding of our social worlds, and, to conclude, 
I will highlight some of the ways it might do so. This will both encapsulate the difference 
between my proposed modified theory and Gilbert's original, and point towards interesting 
areas for potential further research.
In Chapter Five I asked: what bars the possibility of someone merely pretending to 
be an authentic participant in collective actions? This question was, and is, poignant. Such 
a possibility would undermine Gilbert's vision of our actual social life being scaffolded by 
the constraint of collective wills.  From an individualist perspective, merely pretending to 
live social  lives  is attractive  because  it  seems that  an individual who did so would gain 
greater autonomy. The challenge  for  the  collectivist  view  is  that if  such  pretence  is 
attractive, then why not think that the whole operation of society is nothing but a sum of 
such inauthentic pretences? PST* can face off  this danger because, according to it, the 
pressure to  live authentic  social  agentive  lives means that  one almost inevitably becomes 
entangled in the plural wills that populate our social worlds. So, for example, even if our 
member of Leicester Tigers rugby club is attempting to merely pretend to live a social life,355 
they will come to find themselves entangled with the plural will that they are trying to fake 
involvement  with.  On  this  picture, entering  into  joint  commitments  is  just  not  as 
fundamentally voluntary as Gilbert makes out.  It is, in contrast, something that we  may 
find we cannot help but do. Being an agent in a social world thus means not being fully in 
control of the agency we are part of.
355 See discussion in Chapter 5, Section b.2.
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This point about the inevitability of social life is the key insight that must inform our 
view of plural agency. One of its consequences is that it muddies the water when we try to 
set up examples of coordinated acts that are not quite collective  actions. So much can be 
seen in one of the key examples from Gilbert's foundational work on plural agency,  On 
Social Facts.356 Gilbert introduces a thought experiment that has us start by imagining a set 
of  individuals  who clearly  have  no social  life.  She  then has  us  consider  what minimal 
characteristics must be added to make the set social. She starts with a set of individuals who 
survive by picking mushrooms alone in the woods, never interacting. She then adds various 
conditions of ever-increasing  interpersonal interaction.  In doing this, she claims to  show 
that, even where we allow that our mushroom pickers regularly interact, it is still logically  
possible that they fail to be united as a plural subject.357 Gilbert is correct to present such a 
possibility  as a  logical possibility.  However, she fails to  recognise quite how hard  it is  to 
imagine that in the actual world this set of circumstances could exist,  whilst still no social 
group be formed. She says that, “... it does not really matter whether or not it is true that 
after finding themselves in this position that people would naturally get together to form a  
social group as long as they do not yet constitute one”.358 This is  correct as far is it goes. 
However,  the inevitability  with which social  life, and hence  the generation of  a  plural 
subject, will flow from this situation seems to be underplayed by her understanding of joint 
commitment. If we accept that the mere living-of-a-socially-agentive-life  can create plural 
subjects, then, inasmuch as the material conditions of the mushroom pickers are such that 
they are likely to come to live a social life,  those material conditions  will drive them to 
being a plural subject.359 The question of when, and where, our agency is social, or is not 
social, is thus hard to answer precisely.
356 Gilbert, 1992.
357 Gilbert, 1992, p.36- 43.
358 Gilbert, 1992, p.38.
359 Allowing for the notion that the material conditions of people's lives can drive construction of plural 
subjects opens up the possibility that we might be able to think of the Marxist theory of historical 
materialism in plural subject terms. Thus, for example, we can see that when Gilbert says “[w]hen Marx 
and Engels urged the workers of the world to unite … the message behind the call to unity was that 
workers should set themselves up to act jointly.” (Gilbert, 1992, p.228) This need not mean that they 
should set themselves up to share in readiness to jointly act but rather just that they should live collectively 
agentive lives. Calling on the workers to unite is, thus, calling on them to live socially agentive lives and this is 
a process that Marx saw as being made historically inevitable by the change in the means of production 
that pulled people away from the countryside and isolated individual labour and towards the town and 
mass factories with collectivised social labour. 
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As I also highlighted in the first chapter, the question of the general rationality of 
social cooperation  will be affected  by how we understand collective action. I cannot  give 
here a full treatment of what the Modified Plural Subject Theory might tell us about the 
nature of this problem. However, a broad outline of what the results of such an application 
might look  like is easy to sketch. As I detailed in  Chapter  One,  Martin Hollis  suggested 
that we might think that the problem of trust is solvable “... if [we] can trust one another to 
play as a team”.360 This is because, from the perspective of the team, cooperation is rational. 
It  is  rational  in  that,  even  when  pulling  out  is  the  best  option for  the  individual, 
cooperation can remain the best option for the team – as each person properly playing their 
part  is  what is  needed for the completion of  the collective goal. For individualists,  the 
puzzle of such an account is that “as a team” is always to be read as “as  if there were a 
team”. That is, thinking from the team perspective is always, in essence, just a pretence. By 
accepting the possibility of plural agency, the nature of the question changes. The problem 
is no longer one of asking why it is that the individual might pretend to think as a fictional 
amalgam. Rather, it is one of asking what the relationship is between the individual and the 
– actually existing – plural subject, of which they are part.
With the above in mind, we can see that according to Gilbert's picture,  the team 
solution should be cashed out as follows: we make a joint commitment with the other, and 
then we are bound by that joint commitment as neither of us can then unilaterally remove 
it. On the picture presented by the modified theory the obligation and permission criteria 
still  hold.  However, there  is  a  difference  in  how the  individuals  will experience  their 
normative constraint. Furthermore, this difference tells us something instructive about the 
way in which we experience  social  pressure to cooperate  (or  indeed not  to cooperate).  
While  reneging  on  the  promise  will  be  normatively  objectionable,  for  the  entangled 
individuals, the  normative  pain  of  rebelling  will  vary  according  to  the  levels  of  this 
entanglement.  Given this, we can say that  those social situations where  individuals have 
lived more of their lives working as a team will guard more strongly against the possibility 
of default.  The more entangled we are the less the problem of trust is a problem. Conversely, 
360 Hollis, 1998, p.137 [emphasis mine].
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the less entangled we are, the more the problem of trust is  a problem. Established and 
ongoing plural subjects will,  thus, have a greater power to facilitate a smoothly running 
social world than ad hoc groups. This tells us that what it means to be a cooperating agent 
does not have a single answer; rather, it is particular for different individuals depending on 
the extent to which they are entangled.
Recognising the existence of entanglement allows us to realise that, in terms of an 
agent's vision of their preferred self, the formation of actual plural subjects is likely to be a 
disorderly  and contradictory  affair. We need not  feel  fully  comfortable  with the  social 
situations we find ourselves in, yet we find ourselves in them all the same. This means that 
social life is a powerful force for individuals, but a force that they may not always feel to be 
on their side. Such an observation fits well with Christopher Kutz's point that:
“... many cases of collective action involve contexts where agents are alienated 
from the end to which they contribute, whether because of coercion,  wilful 
ignorance,  or  moral  qualms.  A pacifist  takes  a job at  the nuclear  weapons 
plant,  because  it  is  the  only  job  available;  an  accountant  processes  the 
astonishingly large receipts of a pizza parlour, not inquiring too carefully into 
their explanation”.361 
In addition to  not feeling comfortable with the plural subjects we find ourselves 
entangled  within,  we  may  even  commonly  find  ourselves  entangled  in  multiple  plural  
subjects, the standpoints of which conflict with each other.  Using Kutz's sense of alienation, 
and extending Abraham Roth's notion of intersubjectivity,362 we  can  say that  this is the 
possibility  of intersubjective-alienation. Such  alienation is  evident in  the  experience  of 
Tenzing Norgay, one of the mountain climbers in the example used to illustrate collective 
intentionality. In his autobiography, Tenzing describes many times where he felt himself to 
be torn between his existence as a part of the Sherpa community, in particular the Sherpa 
crew who were performing a collective job of service for the mountaineers, and his existence 
as a 'true' mountaineer,  as part of the group of men primarily motivated by the goal of 
getting to the top of the mountain for its own sake. After he had achieved the climbing of 
Everest, the expedition on which arguably he first truly became a 'real climber' in addition 
361 Kutz, 2000, p.26 [emphasis mine]
362 Roth, 2003. As discussed in Chapter 4.
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to being an employed leader of the Sherpa team (a Sirdar),  he said that, being “...  both a 
high climber and a  Sirdar,  with the two different responsibilities,  is  too much for one 
man.”363 Tenzing lived multiple social agentive lives with different components. We might 
say that he felt dual loyalty; that is, that he had, as Ebrahim Mohammed Alwuraafi puts it, 
the “... emotional experience of being pulled in two different directions”.364 Moreover, we 
can see that it is his feeling of belonging to two different collectives that pulled him in these 
competing directions.  In  the  language of  PST*  we  can  say  that,  he  found  himself  in 
situations where, whichever side he put himself on, he would experience the normative pain 
of  rebelling  against  one collective  perspective.  Such  tension  is a  very  real  part  of  the 
phenomenology of social life. As I noted above, Gilbert recognised the possibilities of such 
felt  sense  of  dilemma  but  characterised  it only  as  arising  from the  contradictory  pull 
between external normative pressures such as morality, and normative pressure internal to 
the collective will. On PST*, we can recognise that there can be a felt sense of dilemma that  
is internal to the conflicting collective wills.
The possibility of a sense of dilemma, which is internal to the conflicting collective 
wills,  can be seen in situations of  political rebellion where individuals jump alliance from 
one collective identity to another.  For example, the members of the  German resistance, 
through their acts of  opposition to the authority of the Nazi party, set up a new plural  
subject.  In doing so, they may have found themselves entangled in both plural identities, 
and  thus  faced conflicting  obligations.  Such  a  situation  is  contradictory,  but  such 
contradictions are not theoretical problems. Rather, they are just part of the complexity of 
political life. We can give a similar reading to Daniela Tagliafico's rendering of the example 
of the Libyan revolution: Libyan citizens, she notes, faced a situation in which it is unclear 
what collective political entities really exist; the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,  with its leader, 
Gaddafi,  or the  National  Transitional  Council  that  claimed  to  be  the  true  legitimate 
government; “... one could then ask which of the two competing governments was really 
existing:  was  it  the  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya  or  the  National  Transitional  Council,  or 
363 Ullman, 1956.
364 Alwuraafi, p.28, 2013.
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perhaps both?”365 On Gilbert's PST, the question we can ask is: which plural subject have 
the citizens collectively committed to? On PST*, things can be much messier. We need not 
look only to voluntarily commitments, but can also investigate the extent  to which the 
agent  is  entangled  through their lived  social life  in  both plural agencies.  We can thus see 
that the changes in their social experiences will alter this entanglement and therefore result 
in variance in the normative pain of the move, from recognising the authority of one plural 
subject, to recognising the authority of another.  It will thus always be a challenge for the 
individual, living in a complex social world, to understand the agency they are part of and  
the contradictions within it.
One  might worry  that  the case  of  the  two  competing  governments  is  better 
understood as one where entanglement and commitment come apart, for it seems possible 
that an agent's social life indicates entanglement with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya but that 
that agent nonetheless supports the National Transitional Council. However, PST* allows 
for this as a possibility. It allows for it because supporting the Council, through a voluntary 
act  of  will, is a  form of placing oneself into an entangled situation.  You are  entangled 
because you have expressed your understanding of the  National Transitional Council as 
something that you are now part of. We can compare this to the discussion of the couple 
sharing a cake and the stranger wishing also to share. In Chapter One, I had said that Celia 
is free to take up  (the stranger)  Bernard's offer.  I said that she can choose to perform a 
collective act with him, and accept the unity this involves, without having had any prior 
relationship  with  him.  However, rather  than  say  that plural  agency  is  possible where 
entanglement can be absent, we can see  voluntarily pooling your will as  a way of becoming  
entangled.  To extend the metaphor of  physical  entanglement: it  is  akin to intentionally 
throwing a ball of string down onto the floor to tangle it up. Thus, entanglement does not 
require a prior relationship. Rather, it can be generated by the mere making of an explicit 
commitment, i.e. a pledge of alliance to the Transitional Council,  or such like. This does 
not negate the fact that if the former life as engaged with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has 
entangled you, then in rejecting it you will face normative pain. Further, merely making a 
365 Tagliafico, p.84, 2012. Tagliafico's discussion of what she calls the paradox of collective acceptance is 
framed in Searle's terminology rather than Gilbert's – nevertheless, her insights into the messiness of social 
life fit equally well into considerations of how plural wills are formed.
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commitment  to  start  supporting  the  other  side  may  well  be  a  weaker  way  of  being 
entangled than that of having an extended social agentive history.  Questions of political 
allegiance, social life and the nature of agency are thus intimately linked.
In this thesis, I have sought to give a theoretical backing to the phenomenology of 
our social experience; that is, to our strong sense of doing things together. I have hopefully 
shown that  collective  action  is  a  real  phenomenon;  it  cannot  be  explained  away.  The 
framework of individual action is a blinker; our agency really is extended. Thus, as we leave 
our two walkers, satisfied with their day's achievement, at the top of Scafell Pike, we can see 
their achievement as not only being one of  reaching the summit of the hill.  Rather, they 
have  also  created  something  that  is  bigger  than  their  individual  selves;  they  have 
constructed a plural subject of which they are both members. The existence of this plural 
subject enriches their lives as it allows them to move beyond their individual agencies and 
interact with the world as a we. The price of this enrichment, this harmony of wills, is the 
possibility  of  discord  and  constraint.  As  they  swap  sandwiches  and arrange  their  next 
endeavour, the hillwalkers might feel they have lost some of their individual autonomy in 
not having full individual control over their conquest of the hill terrain. However, their real 
loss is to be weighed against their real gain: by being entangled in the intersubjective plural 
agent, they obtain the ability to engage in enlarged social projects. The possibility of plural 
agency is part and parcel of what it means for us to be the kind of agents we are.
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